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WRIGHT, SYLVIA J., Ed.D. Art as Idolatry or Sacred Possibil-
ity: A Hermeneutic Study of Art Education. {1987) Directed 
by David E. Purpel. 214 pp. 
This investigation focuses on the problems of viewing 
education in the visual arts through a technological currie-
ular framework that limits human potential and on the possi-
bilities presented by expanding the art educator 1 s view of 
curricular decision-making through appropriating a moral 
aesthetic. Particular emphasis is given to the way a wholis-
tic rationale honors both the dialectic between self and 
society and that between the self and one's sense of what it 
means to be fully human. A heimeneutic methodology (Ricoeur, 
1978a) based upon this dual dialectic (Macdonald, 1978b) is 
used for this study because it allows the author to develop 
greater understanding of how a teacher's personal and profes-
sional realities are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967) and how a critical and imaginative consciousness 
(Macdonald & Purpel, 1987) of this process might develop the 
necessary sense of agency for meeting her social responsibi 1-
ities as an art educator. 
Chapter II connects the general tendency within a tech-
nological rationale toward reification of knowledge and its 
management as objectively existent phenomena--a use of know-
ledge in which its origins in human intent are both hidden 
and exploited. This partial, or idolatrous use results in 
unequal power arrangements whereby certain people determine 
what counts as knowledge while silencing the voices of those 
who draw meaning from more just standards for human relation-
ship that would lead to a cooperative rather than competitive 
social reality. Recognized here is the inherent violence in 
reification (.Freire, 1982) and the need for an aesthetic 
rationality (Macdonald, 1978b) that celebrates the value of 
each person's participation in the creation of knowledge. 
In Chapter III, ways in which certain curricular frame-
works in art education represent a dehumanizing technological 
rationality are presented and the need for a moral aesthetic 
(Stinson, 1985) is demonstrated. The placement of human 
need above transmission of subject matter culminates in the 
concept of teaching through art. This use of art to serve 
a transcendent vision of justice and love is developed in 
the final chapter. 
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As a high school art teacher, I have struggled with 
what role I should play in the lives of my students regard-
ing so subjective an experience as self-expression. Who 
must I be and what must I do to present information about 
and provide experiences in the visual arts without violating 
my students • right to participate in the construction of a 
shared reality? To gain insight into this problem, I have 
found it necessary to investigate my own pattern making, 
the ways in which I respond to the human project of 
co-creating the world. What you are about to read repre-
sents my confusion over a number of issues that arose in 
my life that have bearing on the perception I hold of 
myself as an educator. 
Clarification of the Problem and the 
Emergence of Methodology 
The prospect of writing this dissertation necessitated 
a process of bringing my confusion about art and curricular 
concerns into a manageable focus. At first I tried to 
simply recollect and record incidents that seemed important 
to my development as a person interested in art and teaching. 
Two concerns emerged from this initial attempt. First, I 
was too nervous about providing a formal report of deeply 
felt personal and professional anguish to associate freely 
with my past experience. Taking the presence of pain as 
evidence of failure in both areas, I found myself editing 
out the very aspects I needed to confront, those which 
created the most conflict in my mind. Secondly, it became 
evident that the process of identifying relevant issues 
was, in itself, a viable part of my research. How I 
approached my questions could not be separated from the 
questions themselves without losing a sense of the whole 
con text from which they emerged. 
Together with my chairman, the decision was made for 
me to write a series of letters to him expressing whatever 
thoughts and feelings I had over a period of several weeks 
involving curricular concerns in general and teaching art in 
particular. This change in form made so much difference 
that we decided to include both the initial form and the 
letters in the dissertation as original data, for it comes 
as close to my primary experience of the research problem 
as possible. The importance of viewing experience as data 
in this study and using it as a particular form of data--as 
text for interpretation--will become more apparent as 
phenomenology and hermeneutics are discussed in the context 
of alternative approaches to research methodology. 
The problem of self-understanding with respect to its 
effect on my praxis in the area of teaching has determined 
my need for a certain mode of inquiry. Popkewitz (1980) 
outlines three paradigms of educational inquiry: the 
empirical-analytic used in searching for law-like regular-· 
ities among phenomena, the symbolic or linguistic which 
focuses on how human interactions produce rule-governed 
action, and the critical which is concerned with theory as 
illuminating the ways in which social relations have histor-
ically developed and the mechanisms of social life that 
obscure human involvement and social interest in that 
development. Understandings gleaned from critical theory 
have led, however, to a concept of critical consciousness 
(Freire, 1982) that implies a positive as well as a negative 
potential for human involvement in the construction of 
social reality (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1967). At this 
point, recognizing the responsibility between cooperating 
with oppression and contributing to a liberating praxis 
becomes a spiritual matter in the sense that it becomes 
important for the individual to see his or her own well 
being as linked to the welfare of all others, to be able to 
hold in his mind the image of another person in place of 
himself and recognize their essential oneness. This is 
both religious, in that it reconnects man to the fundamental 
nature of his existence, and aesthetic, because it involves 
manifesting a vision, giving form to imagination. The 
methodology that emerges, then, from the question regarding 
my responsibility toward the co-creation of reality, is thus 
both critical and imaginative (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987), 
involving a dual dialectic, one social and the other 
spiritual (Macdonald, 1978b). 
It seems obvious to me now that teaching and learning 
are dialectical in nature, that teacher and student enter 
into a relationship with each other by sharing information 
and experiences, but that was not always so. That the domi-
nant paradigm for educational research has been empirical-
analytic, a search for objective knowledge we are taught to 
count on, has certainly affected my life. I believed, as 
I assume most students did who succeeded in schooling based 
on this kind of research, that everything could be reduced 
to a usable fact. It only dawned on me gradually, over 
many years of teaching, that this assumption led to using 
people instead of communicating with them. Shapiro (1983) 
reports a declining faith in nomothetic research due to 
recognition, by graduate students like myself, of the dis-
sonance between the promise and actuality of positivism. 
The failures of generalizability, causality and prediction 
are especially difficult to overlook when, applied to human 
relationships, they tend to separate and destroy. Facing 
this sense of alienation and violence led me to ask the 
kinds of questions that lend themselves to a phenomenolog-
ical mode of inquiry. 
suransky (1980) offers two summaries useful for noting 
the differences between a positivist and a phenomenological 
approach to research in the human sciences. Based on 
Giorgi's (1971) critique, she lists the following implica-
tions of objective consciousness for research: 
(a) The point of departure for the empirical approach 
is through controlled observation. 
(b) Speculative content must be discussed or trans-
lated into known empirical or mechanistic laws. 
(c) Reductionism is employed, i.e. the phenomenon is 
made equal to its operational definition. 
(d) The phenomenon should be described quantitatively, 
i.e.: expressed by a mathematical equation. 
(e) Determinism is assumed--as all phenomena are sup-
posed to have causes--and if the causal situation 
of a phenomenon can be duplicated, then that 
phenomenon wi 11 recur. 
(f) Whatever the price, certitude must be established--
facts must be certain and immutable. 
(g) Precision is demanded and predictability is made 
the "raison d 'etre" for research. We need facts 
that will yield laws enabling us to predict future 
behavior. 
(h) The phenomenon must be analyzed and broken down 
into its essential elements. 
(il Repeatability is essential: for the phenomenon 
must be defined in such a way that replication can 
occur at any other time by any investigation. 
( j) The independent, detached observer is necessary--
the data must not be influenced by the "idiosyn-
cracies" of the experimenter. (Suransky, 1980, 
p. 168) 
In contrast, the application of phenomenology to research 
embodies the following tenets: 
(a) An attempt to penetrate to the essence of a phe-
nomenon be it learning, behavior, social process 
or interpersonal relations. 
(b) A founding of research on the primacy of experience. 
This includes the experience of an encounter with 
the-other {Heidegger' s "Mi tsein") as researcher, 
of the co-constitution of meaning with "the-other" 
being researched. 
(c) A critical perception adopted toward all existent 
theories and a refusal to employ these theories 
as technique. 
{d) One must be "led by the things themselves" {Husser!) 
in the treatment of the material, i.e. the subJect 
of investigation must prescribe the method. The 
researcher is required to ground h/himself in 
field observations: the ultimate goal being 
intentionally directed back to the field as opposed 
to the alienated creation of an external set of 
generalizations removed from the people, the origi-
nal subjects of the research data. One cannot 
manufacture a pseudo meta-reality to verify the 
second order constructs of science which are 
often alienated from the primary encounter of 
one's social experience. 
(e) The phenomenological method involves the process 
of intuition, reflection and description. Process 
rather than product is emphasized. 
(f) W/man can only be understood from w/man--from the 
phenomena and actions of human life itself--which 
is an open existence. Hence one's point of 
departure must always be w/man in h/his totality 
in a world relatedness. This implies intentional-
ity, a project for being, and a situatedness in 
the world involving choice and responsibility. 
(g) W/man cannot be treated as the passive object of 
research, for phenomenology is a theory of encounter-
ing subjects. (Suransky, 1980, pp. 170-171) 
She states that "all knowledge is sustained by a ground of 
postulates derived from the primary experience with the 
world," that "experience provides the original data" and 
theories are only formulations which should be utilized to 
disclose experience (Suransky, 1980, p. 165). It is this 
view of data that makes s.ense of my need to gain entrance 
into the cycle of theory informing pratice informing theory 
at the point of questioning my own personal and profes-
sional experience. 
In using my experience as data, I will be doing for 
myself, to some extent, what Freire {1981) does for others 
when he observes events in their lives and presents them 
back for reflection: using a critical consciousness of my 
social reality to empower myself to change that reality~ 
Hargreaves (1984) has found that most teachers base currie-
ular decision-making on their own classroom experience, 
but that this process generally remains circular, non-
reflective, because the possibility of seeing something new 
emerge out of our own lives is generally not recognized. 
Even though any kind of research begins with autobiography--
who and where we are determine the very questions we can 
think to ask and the language in which we can pose them 
(Burgess, 1984; see also Habermas, 1971)--this is rarely 
made explicit. It seems we fail to think about our own 
thinking and how it affects our choice of subsequent action 
because most of us believe the answers to our questions 
are objectiv~ly existent (Greene, 1983). This dissertation 
is an attempt to find a way out of that trap, to find out 
how my own consciousness affects the meanings I take to 
be real~ 
Hermeneutics as a Phenomenological Approach 
to Research 
Phenomenology, critical theory and the religious/ 
aesthetic come together for me in Ricoeur 's writings on 
hermeneutics. I can see my life as a certain kind of data--
as text--and reflection as research because Ricoeur • s con-
nection between the tradition of hermeneutics--the theory of 
-----------------------
interpretation--and philosophical reflection (P. Thompson, 
1981) makes sense of what began to happen as I wrote the 
series of letters and looked back on them~ "Reflection," 
writes Ricoeur, "must become interpretation because I cannot 
grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the 
world" (Ricoeur, quoted by P. Thompson, 1981, p. 17). I can 
see distanciation and appropriation operating in my under-
standing of being and my relationship to other beings as a 
hermeneutic characterized by suspicion at times and affirma-
tion even within suspicion because Ricoeur (1978a) writes of 
these approaches to interpretation in a way that fits my 
understanding of critical theory revealing the need for a 
religious/aesthetic aspect to praxis. 
P. Thompson (1981, p. 6) explains: 
According to one view, hermeneutics is construed as 
the restoration ·of a meaning addressed to the inter-
preter in the form of a message. This type of 
hermeneutics is animated by faith, by a willingness 
to listen, and is characterized by a respect for the 
symbol as a revelation of the sacred. According to 
another view, however, hermeneutics is regarded as the 
demystification of a meaning presented to the inter-
preter in the form of a disguise. This type of her-
meneutics is animated by suspicion, by a scepticism 
towards the given, and it is characterized by a dis-
trust of the symbol as dissimulation of the real. 
Ricoeur (1978a) suggests the latter type, a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, when practiced by such critics as Marx, Nietzsche 
and Freud, brings with it yet another possibility: 
Beyond this sUspicion, beyond the work of deciphering, 
we finally come to a third trait, to discern a common 
power of affirmation: we have thus to struggle in 
ourselves not only with suspiCion, with deciphering, 
but also with the affirmation. For all three of 
these men, finally, are positive thinkers, in the 
sense that they have pressed fundamentally for the res-
toration of man's positivity. {Ricoeur, 1978a, p. 217) 
He goes on to write about this hermeneutic of affirmation as 
an interpretation that goes beyond the smashing of idols 
and lets symbols speak, but this time to the possibility of 
man (Ricoeur, 1978b). His example of such a hermeneutic 
of affirmation, his own interpretation of the Parables of 
Jesus, can be described as wholistic and transcendent, for 
it requires of the interpreter a shift in perspective from 
who supposedly constructed the symbols to an inclusion of 
the content of the symbols as well (Ricoeur, 1978c). As I 
understand it, Ricoeur is asking here that the doubter/ 
believer take responsibility for his own participation in 
the meaning of Biblical text. I am intrigued by the parallel 
that can be drawn between Freire's (1982) concept of the 
co-creation of reality and Ricoeur • s hermeneutic of affir-
mation. 
For a detailed listing of Ricoeurian hermeneutic 
principles, I refer the reader to Croatto's (1981) Exodus: 
A Hermeneutics of Freedom (pp. 1-3). For my purposes here, 
however, I have collapsed the concepts of human event 
(whether founded or foundational) , word (written account of 
an event) and exegesis (interpretation of a written account) 
to mean simply "text." I take the liberty of using my 
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understanding of Ricoeur on awareness of existence through 
reflection as interpretation as ground for viewing all human 
experience as text, of viewing the very perception of exper-
ience as interpretation and thus viewing our understanding 
of being here and being in relationship to others as a 
hermeneutic. 
Because I have so generalized my use of text to encom-
pass all human experience, I will rE!fer to distanciation 
as any occurrence of distance between the world of the text 
and the world of the interpreter. I use distanciation as a 
term of respect for distance, for the perspective made 
possible by recognizing I cannot know, can only imagine 
another's interpretation of existence. Distance keeps me 
mindful that I am only my part of the world at a given time 
and cannot even today be the same part of the whole config-
uration of my own life as I was yesterday. It appears all 
response to that which is other, even within myself, is to 
some extent projection. If this is so, then imagination 
necessarily operates between distanciation and appropriation 
and its conscious and creative use is to be taken as a 
serious responsibility to self and others. 
As I understand it, distanciation gives rise to appro-
priation and the farther the distance to be crossed, the 
more possibilities there are for new meanings to be found 
in a given text (see Croatto, 1981; P. Thompson, 1981). 
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Croatto (1981, p. 3) also points out that 11 there is a surplus-
of-meaning in all human praxis,'' so appropriation is always 
to some extent agonic. The existing conflict between pos-
sible interpretations, the need to choose among different 
meanings, gives rise to a still wider range of opportunity 
for new appropriations. This appears to actually set confu-
sian and struggle in a hopeful light, revealing the formula-
tion of questions as entrance into the dynamics of change. 
Before I present the first stage of my struggle with 
decision-making, it is important to note specifically what 
has already been implied, that the appropriation of meaning 
from any text, even the text of my own life, guards against 
solipsism: 
To appropriate, Ricoeur (1981) explains, "means 'to 
make one's own' what was initially 'alien,••• so that 
''interpretation brings together, equalises, renders 
contemporary and similar" (p. 185). The act of appro-
priation does not seek to rejoin the original inten-
tions of the author, but rather to expand the conscious 
horizons of the reader by actual ising the meaning 
of the text. Although interpretation thus culminates 
in self-understanding, it cannot be equated with naive 
subjectivism. Ricoeur emphasises that appropriation 
is not so much an act of possession as an act of dis-
possession, in which the awareness of the immediate 
~ is replaced by a self-understanding mediated 
through the text. Thus interpretation gives rise to 
reflection because appropriation is bound to the 
relevatory power of the text, to its power to disclose 
a possible world. (P. Thompson, 1981, p. 19) 
What you are about to encounter in the remainder of this 
chapter are my beginning attempts at making sense of a past 
world of experience bracketed out for the purpose of 
recognizing new possibilities for future action. For me 
this is a hermeneutic of affirmation. 
I have taken from Ricoeur, and from phenomenology and 
critical theory, that which is helpful to my search for 
meaning in the areas of art and education. I do not, 
however, intend a formal application of any theological, 
philosohical, psychological or sociological tradition 
per se. I will instead draw from those areas of concern 
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the theories that can inform my focus on praxis in teaching. 
The initial report of those experiences considered 
important to my development as an art student and teacher 
is not dated, but was written approximately 1 week before I 
began the letters. This report is included here as Sec-
tion One. Sections Two through Six are comprised of the 
five letters written during the weeks beginning on Octo-
ber 20th and ending the week of November 17, 1986. Comments 
appearing at the end of each section were written on 
December 2, 1986, after an initial re-reading of the report 
and letters as a body of data. Introductions and summaries 
were written for the sections after a period of focusing 
on the dialectic between my study of Ricoeur • s hermeneutics 
and a deeper consideration of these sections, this time as 
text. 
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SECTION ONE: A FORMAL REPORT 
My Past Experience as an Art Student and Teacher 
Introduction 
This initial attempt to Pemember and record experiences per-
tinent to my identity as an art educatOl'9 UJhile it includes significant 
events, excludes much of the undePlying conflict I felt about art and 
the power other>s had to define it for me from elementary school, 
through high school and college, and on into my years of teaching. 
Believing a paxot of my life could be so pzoescribed, 'IJ)hile feeling 
violated by such prescriptions, is the major conflict revealed 
thr-oughout this section. Stark shifts in my position on what art 
is and/ or shou Zd be indieate extreme discomfort with the prospect 
of struggle, a desir>e to situate myself beyond doubt by choosing 
one "side" or the other. 
At the time this report was written, the possibility of there 
being many viable altel'natives, different perspectives that could 
eo-exist, simply oVer1iJhelmed me, despite the evidence of this within 
my own experience. That realization, however, seemed to provide the 
only way out of the dissonance accompanying a view of life as an 
"either/or>" proposition. Fox's (l979) "both/and" viewpoint can be 
reached only by letting go of the dualistic framework for choice. 
That one can enjoy skill and imagination at the same time could not 
occur to me as long as I believed I had to choose between the two. 
The evidence in this section of my difficulty at looking on the whole 
of my e:xper>ience points both to a need to admit and confront the 
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presence of conflict in my life and the need to develop a greater capacity 
for> wholistic vision. Those particular needs prompted the change in 
foz>mat from this kind of straight reporting to the witing of letters 
to my chairman for the five remaining sections. 
The Report 
My second grade teacher stared in disgust at the muddy 
pools of tempera which had been, only moments before, a 
carefully traced and filled in Thanksgiving turkey. 
"Your cousin wouldn•t have made a mess like that," 
was all she bothered to say. 
It was enough. My regular classwork had often been 
compared favorably to the standard set by an older cousin 
the year before; I hadn't seen it as praise for being some-
one other than myself. Virtually no personal meaning could 
be invested in memorizing and repeating correct answers in 
other subjects. It took failing at this exciting, unfamil-
iar task of painting to jar me out of my complacency, make 
me see that when I hadn't been told exactly how to do 
something, it just wasn't safe to rely on my own resources. 
You see, the purpose of the project was to allow us 
"self-expression. 11 The feathers on our turkeys provided 
that opportunity. Although the image was traced from a 
standard pattern, each painting would be different because 
we could choose which colors were to go where. I knew it 
was still important to "stay in the lines," but I didn't 
know how much more difficult that was to accomplish with 
paint than with crayons. She didn't tell us to let 
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color dry before applying another right next to it, so when 
the wet colors on two adjacent feathers of my turkey began 
to bleed into one another, I panicked. 
The decision to mix all the colors together originated 
in my feeling the need to "fix things" so the teacher 
wouldn • t be too displeased. When I did that, though, some-
thing else happened. I became totally involved for a brief 
period of time in what paint does, in what I could do with 
it. I kept mixing and adding more colors just to watch 
those streaks and swirls of liquid create hues and patterns 
I. had never seen before. 
Perhaps it is ascribing too much power to one incident 
to say that the dissonance experienced then, between my 
fascination with the process of painting that turkey and my 
teacher's disapproval of the resulting product, actually 
set off the love/hate relationship with art that haunts me 
sti 11, but my mind does go back to it when I feel partic-
ularly threatened by the conflicting demands of doing or 
teaching art. Conformity and competition have plagued 
both roles. The color-in-the-lines, paint-by-number require-
ments in elementary school gave way to more subtle, complex 
pressures in high school and college. Originality, self-
expression, these were emphasized, but within the limited 
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scope of what kind of "uniqueness'' would win contests, 
which way of expressing "oneself" would fit current fashion 
and bring success in the art world at large. That paradox-
ical mesage, "Do what everyone else is doing, only do it 
better," simply grew louder, reached farther over the years, 
drowning out more and more of what art could be but isn't. 
Art promises us something--a way to "make our mark," a 
means for visibly affecting the environment which threatens 
to overwhelm us with its power. It seems, though, that my 
early interest in drawing was born, not of some need for 
unilateral control over people and things, but of an 
earnest desire for cooperation, a sense of uniting forces 
with my surroundings. There was something celebratory 
about it then, something holy. 
Art offers power over separation, the power to know 
ourselves in the context of relationship, recognize our-
selves as sacred parts of a larger whole. As such, it is 
power that can only be shared, not wielded or seized. When 
interaction with media is used to limit experience and enforce 
alienation, then it becomes idolatry and violence, not art. 
In having been asked to conform and compete in the name of 
art, I feel I was asked to deny the very creativity and 
communion art could have made possible. My desire for 
cooperation was twisted into an ugly need to appease. 
17 
After failing so miserably to paint that stupid turkey 
to specifications in the second grade, I was determined not 
to be found lacking again. I learned to maintain rigid 
control over art materials. According to Lowenfeld and 
Brittain (1982), spontaneous art activity generally ends 
between the ages of 12 and 14 as a child's attempts at 
realism reveal shortcomings in his drawing ability. It 
happened for me at age 7. 
Until then, drawing had allowed me to spend hour after 
hour in another world, making up stories in my mind and on 
paper all at once. My pictures were more than illustra-
tions; in some ways I felt like I was actually watching 
them appear. My parents kept me supplied with paper and 
pencils and crayons since as far back as I can remember. 
I can't recall specific instances of verbal praise, just a 
very constant sense of encouragement. I felt very sure my 
art activities were highly valued. In addition to being 
given ample opportunity and materials, my drawings were often 
saved. 
Experimenting with the paint when those turkey feathers 
together seemed 1 ike a very natura 1 extension of my 
freedom to explore pencil and crayon at home. Having no 
brothers or sisters, my art materials literally "kept me 
company" when my parents were busy with other matters. 
Unlike toys, they responded to my touch. Together we made 
___________ ,,_ --- -
things happen! But all of this went underground once 
rea 1 ized such an approach was frowned upon in school. 
There, art was like everything else--something you did 
either right or wrong. I felt I had no choice but to sub-
ject my love for making things to another's will. I was 
going to be in school for a long, long time. I had to 
learn to do everything the teacher's way; art was not 
exempt. 
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So I started to watch carefully for just what pleased 
that second grade teacher and I found it to be neatness. 
The ability to trace and cut out construction paper letters 
and figures with precision was a skill in great demand, for 
few second-graders can use scissors very well, so I became 
proficient at it. I found I could get out of boring class-
work and bring acclaim to my teacher at the same time by 
volunteering to work on bulletin boards. Appearances meant 
so much to her. I guess an attractive room made her look 
1 ike a good teacher. 
don't remember trying to draw realistically that 
year, but in the third grade I met a girl who could and she 
became my idol as well as my best friend. We copied illus-
trations of beautiful girls out of library books. kept my 
practicing a secret from teachers for several years until I 
could really draw well. Meanwhile, my reputation for doing 
good bulletin boards grew. Actually that was the only kind 
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of art activity I remember being available in school during 
most of elementary school, with the exception of coloring 
those dittoed sheets for various holiday displays. We 
were all required to do them and always to comply with 
certain specifications. 
It was the sixth grade before I ever had to copy some-
thing for an assignment. The teacher flipped slowly. through 
various illustrations of a piece of classical music after we 
had seen the entire filmstrip along with hearing the record. 
we were to choose one frame to draw as we listened to the 
music again. My teacher was astounded at the speed and 
accuracy with which I reproduced not one, but two of the 
scenes in the allotted time. From then on I was considered 
an "artist." 
Everyone was required to take Exploratory Art in the 
seventh grade and in that class we did just what the course 
title implies, we explored! I got to experiment with all 
kinds of media and techniques. There was no pressure to 
perform, to produce a prescribed product. Our teacher 
seemed happiest when we were simply enjoying ourselves. 
could finally relax the controls and have fun again, this 
time with not only paint but clay and plaster and numerous 
other messy substances. This was art as I had once believed 
it to be. I reasoned that it must just take a "real" art 
teacher in a 11 real" art class to know. That's when I 
decided to become an art teacher msyelf. Then the rules 
changed again. 
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Ninth grade art was an elective, so only students who 
were "serious". about art could sign up. The warm, friendly 
woman who had liberated and inspired me two years earlier 
had by this time quit to have a baby, so there was a new, 
strange lady to take her place. This art teacher wore lots 
of black eyeliner and bright, flowing clothes. I knew a 
little bit by then about beatniks from seeing them on tele-
vision, but I had no corresponding sense of 11 cool." My 
best friend from the third grade did, however. She had not 
been in any of my classes since the third grade until this 
crucial year. I was shocked to even see her again, much 
less find out that she knew exactly what our weird teacher 
wanted and that our teacher, in turn, knew just what pleased 
the judges in art contsts. I'd missed something somewhere 
along the way. The very person who had taught me how to 
draw so realistically was now doing abstract work and winning 
awards for it. Her drawings had "soul," people said. 
didn't know what they were talking about; I just felt 
inadequate and, somehow, betrayed. 
Well, if I could copy realism, surely I could mimic 
craziness, too. I tried for awhile, in high school, to play 
the game. I'd think up the wildest picture or sculpture I 
could imagine and spend weeks carrying out the idea in 
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paint or plaster. I laughed about how easy it was; at least 
I laughed at first. Then I started to win contests and to 
feel ashamed. It embarrassed me to attend the receptions, 
to take my parents to see a hoax--work that meant nothing 
to me but made everyone else wonder what ''deep" thoughts 
gave rise to it. I finally told my teacher I was planning 
to teach art, not do it for shows, so she let me become a 
kind of teacher • s aide. I spent my senior year matting 
other students' ·work for contests. By then it was merely 
useful, not anything special, to be able to cut a straight 
line. 
A story like this one is supposed to end with the indi-
vidual rising above all odds to go her own way and nmake it 11 
in spite of the system. In a sense I did get my way. I just 
felt horribly guilty for not even wanting whatever it was I 
supposedly could have won by using my 11 talent" to fight. 
thought going into art education would free me of the battle. 
I planned to spend my enthusiasm liberating other people 
from those pressures I myself could not stand, inspiring 
them to participate in that special relationship to the world 
through art I knew was possible. What actually happened, 
though, only multiplied my guilt. As an art student I had 
failed to value award-winning art, so naturally, as an art 
teacher, I failed to produce award-winning students. 
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When I started teaching art, not only did I get caught 
up in sharing what art materials could do, I got lost in the 
excitement of watching my students enjoy themselves, the 
excitement of simply being with other people and having 
fun. Teaching took me farther away from the "real" world 
than I had ever been before and that had consequences my 
university training hadn't led me to expect. For the most 
part, those 4 years of undergraduate school reinforced my 
sense of what art education could be, but without reference 
to the institutional constraints that work against it 
actually happening. As far as the public schools were 
concerned, I had simply changed roles, from that of rule-
follower to rule-enforcer, but the rules themselves had 
remained the same. My teacher's certificate had earned me 
the position of being required to do to others what had been 
done to me. Failure to meet the demands of conformity and 
competition was no longer a choice I made for myself alone. 
When I shunned that responsibility in the classroom, I was 
letting my students believe things could be other than they 
are. 
They thought I was pretty funny, my students did. When 
I started feeling too guilty about our "making ourselves at 
home" with each other, I'd try to get down to business and 
take the subject more seriously, but they just went along 
with me, knowing it wouldn't last. The power of a group of 
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people experiencing together even a little bit of freedom to 
respond to their environment honestly and make choices about 
how to spend their time and energy within it, that power is 
too different to deny for long. 
What is it about freedom and happiness that makes us 
think we're failing to take life seriously enough? What 
should be taken more seriously? Exercising or enduring 
oppressive control? Suffering or causing others pain? 
Teachers in this country are not allowed to strike their 
students physically, yet they are paid to reduce a child's 
world of infinite possibility to a few "correct" facts and 
figures for which he must fight his friends to "own." It is 
this, what Freire (1982) calls "banking education'' that I 
can't take seriously for very long. I wish I couldn't take 
it seriously at all, but I, like many others in my culture, 
spent the greater portion of my youth in a world of someone 
else's "right" and "wrong." I am thus well conditioned to 
respond with guilt when I exercise my preference for another 
reality. 
Comments 
My pain is evident in my defensiveness, but I still 
reify art and defend it as well as defend myself against it. 
The reduction of experience looks to me now like an extreme 
effort to control my discomfort, to find some means of 
explaining it away. I couldn't afford to see ambiguities at 
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this point; it was too frightening. What if I only uncover 
questions, don 1 t find answers? What if 1 appear to be as 
confused as I rea 11 y am? 
Summary 
Here it is revealed that the search for order in control and the 
strong desire that there be some other way of making sense out of con·-
flicting definitions thxoeatens my very identity. If art, a pr-ocess in 
which I involve myself extensively, can be cont1'olled by others, then 
so can I. If that is the case, all I can do is learn to adapt to whatever 
view is held, of art or of me, by the ones I find have the greatest powe1' 
to judge. If art cannot be so controlled, then neither can I, but that 
alternative is even more fT'ightening. Does it not leave me to a world 
only of my own making, to isolation and the chaos of my own mind? These 
questions identify several issues and indicate the depth of my need to 
investigate them: the plaee of reification in bloeking understanding 
of the soeial dynamics involved in the construction of reality, the link 
between identity and relationship and the possibility of choosing harmony 
over control as a means of meeting the human need for order. 
SECTION TWO: THE FIRST LETTER 
Taking the Freedom to Struggle with Conflicting Meanings 
Introduction 
Because the first atterrT(?t to enter my past kept prematurely 
dosing over experiences rather than opening them up, my chairman and 
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I experimented with the letter format beginning with this section. The 
freedom to aaeept a wider range of e$perience as applicable to my search 
for self-understanding is evidenced here. There is a willingness to 
let hope and doubt lead me through the questioning process instead of 
the feeling that I have to know the Pight answers in the same moment 
I dare ask a question. 
The Letter 
Week of October 20th 
Dear Dr. Purpel: 
I •rn taking you at your word that organization and 
style can come later, that the important thing for me right 
now is simply getting my thoughts out and onto paper. Let-
ting them just run around in my head, worrying about how I '11 
ever make sense of it all, these habits immobilize me. I've 
decided you are the one to write to because it is your help 
I need in learning to trust myself with the freedom to let 
this work flow. 
I need to trust you with my messiness and repetition. 
I'm always ''presenting" my writing to you. A long time ago 
I used to just share my thoughts with you in letter form, 
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back when writing a dissertation seemed remote a Now no 
matter how much I know I should know better, my most basic 
beliefs just don't seem good enough for a formal piece of 
work. This is a battle I fight with myself all the time .. 
Whom will I side with? The part of me that still wants to 
impress or the part that is grateful to you for the freedom 
to speak and wants more than anything just to take advan-
tage of it? A return to writing to you from the heart and 
not the editor's mind at this point is a commitment to be 
more "real'' with myself. 
You understand my arrogance. You know that, whether it 
is being played out in ambition or self-hatred, it is a 
painful trap. want out. I want to enjoy the peace of 
being "boring." 
Today is Thursday 6 It • s taken me all week to begin 
writing, so you won•t see much volume yeta What I did to 
get my energy level up was to act out some of the things 
I •a written about for last week. I cut out paper dolls 
for one of my friends • children and made a set of stencils 
for a little girl I 1 m very close toa I needed to use what I 
could do with craft materials to feel in touch with media 
again a 
From doing those things for the kids, I went on to 
explore an old interest in ·ornament and decorative pattern; 
I played around with graph paper and the mandala format 
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some. These give me a sense of order and harmony, connect 
me to history and religious symbolism. I used to feel 
terribly guilty for indulging myself in this interest. It's 
so far from the surrealism and abstraction popular in the 
art world during my lifetime; even depicting nature has 
seemed like an unforgivable crutch. 
It doesn't take very much for me to invest myself in 
things, really. Blake's (1949) "to see a world in a grain 
of sand" and hold "eternity in an hour 11 (p. 50) never 
seemed like vision to me, but like the natural state of 
being alive. Dewey (1934) writes about appreciation, lit-
erally making that which we experience ''appreciate," become 
more than it was before, simply by valuing it. Imagination, 
it seems to me, should be a way of beholding that honors 
the idea or material involved, works with it. I'm not 
comfortable imposing something on the world. That doesn't 
feel creative. 
r•ve read that faith is simply recognition of the 
truth. I have faith in Fox's {1983) art as meditation 
because release from duality to experience union through 
relating to materials has been a truth for me. This does 
feel like creativity, but for a break somehow occurs 
when I'm supposed to hang the results on a wall, subject 
it to a judgment far removed from the reality I experienced 
in making the art object. 
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I could hardly believe it when you said to me that art 
museums don't make much sense to you. This was after the 
cut-paper assignment in one of your classes. I learned so 
much about myself from the interplay involved between myself 
and the material in expressing my concept. I never can 
remember the exact theme, but I can still see my work in 
my mind's eye and I still learn from it. 
One of the forms of decorative pattern I like a lot is 
interlacing. There's a lot of it in Celtic art. My sculp-
ture in your class was nothing like ornament, but the ele-
ment of weaving two colors into a spiral was a kind of 
interlacing, I guess. I remember thinking a lot more about 
male and female energies than I had before. I must have 
been reading Bakan (1966) then on agency and communion. 
There's more I want to say about being female, but not 
yet. The point for now is how deep a meaning I take from 
something as supposedly simple and unimaginative as inter-
woven bands on medieval manuscripts. I love to recreate 
them. It's like a rituaL I like the spinning effect of 
certain quilt designs, too. It does something for me to 
work out a patchwork pattern like that. I know the idea 
of the spiral is rich with symbolism and I know I want to 
live out some of its meaning very consciously, but something 
else goes on when I work with it visually and manually. I'm 
living it out this way, too, but somehow on a different 
level. 
29 
I said I have faith in Fox's (1983} art as meditation. 
What I mean by that is I believe it does affect all of our 
relationships when one relationship makes us feel more holy, 
more complete. You and I have talked about this and you 
reminded me of the high culture enjoyed by the Nazis in 
Germany at the same time they were destroying millions of 
human 1 i ves, but I don't think it's the same thing. People 
involve themselves in media for different reasons; both 
artists and their audiences do. Now that I have been bold 
enough to declare my belief in what art is and isn't, I 
think I can say something about what art "appreciation'' may 
or may not be as well. Many know a lot about the visual 
arts but don't seem to have any sensitivity to the life of 
works they know well. They use their knowledge of "art" the 
way academics often use their knowledge of some other sub-
jects to get somewhere else. They aren't really there with 
the work at hand. 
I can't judge what another perceives. I just want to 
say that I believe it !.! possible for the spirit of one 
relationship to carry over into others. In my art classroom 
this did seem to happen. It didn't go on in a vacuum, the 
teaching and learning. Actually the relationships I had 
with students were far more important to me than my rela-
tionship to materials. We were there to "do art" so 
often felt guilty about this. The entire atmosphere 
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mattered. I didn't really "develop a sense of community," 
a term I'm a little embarrassed about after reading over my 
old program plans and writing that letter revising its 
content. All I did in teaching, as in the play rehearsals 
for Dusa, Fish, Stas and Vi (Gems, 1977), was care and 
assume those with whom I worked also cared. 
We cared about each other's integrity and the quality 
of our experiences together. I've been casting about for so 
long to find some educational theory that really fits what 
happened, what I enjoyed with students. Freire's (1982) 
sense of solidarity and subjectivity comes close. Greene's 
(1978) "wide awakeness" is part of it .... Dewey's (1934) 
philosophy of experience, Fox's (1979) philosophy of com-
passion, Richards' ( 1964) of centering and Macdonald's 
(1978b) of transcendence, these are part of it, too. But it 
was both simpler and more complex than anything I've read 
about in art education literature. 
Fox (1979, 1983, 1986a, 1986b) comes closest in a 
spiritual way. It wasn't so much ~powerment as power with 
instead of power ~ or power under. Macdonald's pattern 
making (1978b) as both right and responsibility enter here. 
I like "pattern making" better than "centering" sometimes. 
I get tired of the pottery metaphor, even though it is 
useful. Metaphors are so easily drawn out beyond their 
usefulness. Anyway, it just makes sense to me, spiritual 
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sense, for us to respect each other's meaning-making. That's 
the only way we can create anything new, the only way a 
true spirit of sharing can enter in. 
Two things stand out from my oral comprehensives, both 
of which came from you. I was saddened and made hopeful at 
the same time when you asked where the fun was in all of my 
writing about art. There wasn't any fun there and I really 
wished there could have been. Then I was stunned to hear 
you call relationship, !-Thou relationship (Buber, 1970), the 
"Holy Ghost." I didn't think I could talk about that. 
didn't think anyone would understand the meaning I take 
from that term--the spirit of sharing a reality that goes 
beyond any specific (and, to me, idolatrous) meaning given 
by a particular religious dogma. It seems people get scared 
when the sense of sharing is spoken of instead of just an 
idea of spiritual oneness. We're so afraid of union. 
That's the complexity of speaking seriously about relation-
ship. The simple part, though, is we all seem to want such 
reconnection more than anything else. If only we could 
operate more from the possibility rather than the fear. 
That's the thing about considering alternative real-
ities, the power of possibility you and Dr. Shapiro have 
encouraged in your students. Gradually, with much fear and 
back-sliding, I've really been able to start changing the 
way I approach "facts," my assumptions about what is real 
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and workable. I still haven't altogether demystified my 
outlook. I doubt one even can. But because this department 
keeps us mindful of alternatives, my tolerance for ambiguity 
has grown. Writing like this, for instance, is still very 
uncomfortable for me on one level, but on another it simply 
feels more honest. 
For some reason, life in the classroom was very dif-
ferent regarding my ability to take stands, different from 
just considering ''facts" at the level of ideas. The presence 
of my students meant facing the effect ideas have on people's 
lives. Responsibility like that, realizing how my assump-
tions affected the way students had to spend their time and 
energy in our classroom, this made it necessary to clarify 
my va 1 ues. De-humanizing aspects of certain "rea 1 i ties , " 
of conformity and competition, of holding subject matter 
above the importance of people themselves, these were easier 
to see and more difficult to stomach when I focused on 
sharing experiences with my students. At the very least, I 
felt compelled to "name the games" (Macdonald, 1966) when it 
was obvious to me that we were being required by the insti-
tutional structure to play them. I couldn't hide from 
over 100 young people, day in and day out, year after year. 
It seemed just too crazy to try. 
When it's just me, however, I can get terribly lost in 
ideology. "Real life"--being with the kids--kept me more 
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honest. I just wish I could learn to respect myself as much 
as I respect them. I'm working hard on that. T.he goal 
seemed a lot farther away just months ago, when I was 
writing my camps. Maybe I don't have much to show for it 
yet, but just being willing to write this way, to act as 
though the meanings I value count for something more than 
wishful thinking, even when it's 11 just me," means I'm start-
ing to say, "Why not?" to some possibilities. 
The dark side of my ability to invest myself, to get 
excited about life, is my disappointment when I see it isn't 
easily shared by other people.. I know someone who goes 
right on letting himself get caught up in the wonder of being 
alive, even when others don't understand his enthusiasm. 
really admire him for that. I respond differently. I get 
sad or angry and start to discount my own enjoyment. I run 
from my optimism when others disagree with it. One of the 
best things about being with high school students is their 
openness. I could cherish my students' aliveness, honor 
their experiences without fear of scaring them away. They 
embraced real opportunities for sharing the simple joy of 
being in the world. 
When I first read Richards' (1964) view of acceptance 
and honor, I hadn't realized how much one participates in 
the very same reverence one holds for another: 
Acceptance is not a nod of civility, nor is it 
approval. It is something more like ingestion, a 
capacity to experience the reality of another not 
as if it were one • s own but indeed as another's, a 
capacity for self-surrender to the reality of another 
person (this is a surrender not of the will, but of 
perception): honor is a single flame in which all 
honor burns. The flame of our meeting burns, and in 
it burn as one warmth my regard for you and my regard 
for myself. (p. 140) 
My students have affirmed me by allowing me to honor them. 
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Giving them what I wanted for myself simultaneously gave it 
to me. Only recently have I become aware of that, of all I 
have received from our circle of sharing. 
All of this seems to run outside of the "realities" of 
the system. I don't even want to focus on those long enough 
to criticize them, though I know I'm supposed to be prepar-
ing such a critique. I'm not ready to get to .a "review of 
the literature" yet. I want to write next about being 
female. I usually avoid that because I can't jump on the 
feminist bandwagon, but I guess I do have gender-related ideas 
about art and teaching. 
I cannot separate the concept of "home" and my involve-
ment with children from my teaching experience. My views of 
competition and isolation come from the importance I place 
on receptivity and responsiveness. When reduced to appeasing 
or manipulating others, those impulses aren't cooperative, 
though; they are destructive. More about that later. 
Before I end this 1 et ter, I want to mention one more 
act of heresy committed this week. I asked my close friends, 
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the parents of the three children I spend a lot of time 
with, for an adult coloring book for my birthday! ("Adult" 
implying complex designs, not "dirty" pictures!) You may 
not know it, but coloring books are absolute anathema to art 
educators! 




The change to letter form allowed me to admit ambi-
guities, confusion. I got back in touch with feelings about 
art that I hadn't allowed myself in years. The defensiveness 
is still present, however, in descriptions of guilt and 
hints of rebellion rather than in rigidity of style this 
time. I hadn't felt free before to say what I wanted to 
say, I only felt I had to justify every word I wrote in that 
other form. 
A lot emerged from this initial letter. I'd forgotten 
how much until I re-read it. I do feel distanced from what 
I've written now. It doesn't look so bad to me anymore, not 
once I've let it stand for a while. I'm surprised. 
expected old ways of hating myself through justifications 
and explanations to be renewed by reliving the ways I fell 
prey to them while writing before, those ways I felt so 
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guilty and silly. That hasn't happened. I can actually be 
more gentle with myself than I ever would have imagined I 
could be. It really helps to feel that I am not "there" 
now, but "here .. " Time has passed. I • ve turned some of it 
into eternity, at least. I can actually see that when I look 
back! Remember Heschel's (1951) Sabbath? I can rest where 
I am to some extent. 
It seems to me that rest, a sense of peace, both comes 
from this kind of reflection and strengthens me to ·enter 
into it again. I've "talked to myself" and survived! This 
is very different from the kind of confronting myself I've 
done less consciously. Deciding to look at myself, for 
better or worse, and to take responsibility for what I find--
for what I like and what I want to change--gives me the power 
to cooperate with my own experience. 
Summary 
The issues of rei[ieation cm.d harmony are still here, but appear, 
to some extent, cloaked in romanticism. Beneath the emotional outbursts 
of rebellion and adulation regarding art and relationship, there is a 
true sense of delight in sharing. Themes of appPeciation, celebration 
and transcendence need to be exploPed, but only after a sePious investiga-
tion of my tendency to reify positive, as well as negative, views of 
art and teaching. The shift [Pam PepoPt to letteP form has been instru-
mental in allOIUing me to Pemain open to contradictions long enough to 
gain some perspective on them. 
SECTION THREE: THE SECOND LETTER 
Identifying the Central Problem 
Introduction 
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Phis section is a "coming down" from the high hopes of the fizost 
letter to struggle with identity and relationship in terms of feminism 
and apt in tePmS of negatiTJe definitions I have yet to let go of at this 
point. !!he process of seeing nification "bring me dOUJn" into the old 
confliet ovez> who is right about -what ru-t should be leads me to make 
a connection here bettbeen the poruezo I have given to the concept of "art" 
and the p0b1el' I once gave to the idea of "God." Recogni:aing the p0b1Br 
one must have in ordeP to give it awy to an idol may not seem to be 
cause for celebration at first, but if the gpief over having made a mistake 
in the use of one's p01i1er can be transcended, it is possible to then 
ask under what conditions that same pOUJezo might be used more nspon-
sibly. 
The Letter 
Week of October 27th 
Dear Dr • Purpe 1 : 
When I closed last week • s letter, one of the issues I 
said I would discuss this week is how I feel about art and 
education as a woman. You suggested I address the "power of 
naming" that rests mostly in the hands of men. In dealing 
with this subject of labelling, or rather, the subject of 
having been labelled, I must come at the problem from several 
different angles. 
----·-----------
First I want to deal with what I feel has resulted 
from women seizing the power to label women, at least to 
deal with what it has done to me. I don•t think self-
definition comes naturally to women in the first place. 
do not speak lightly when I say this, for receptivity and 
responsiveness have been incredibly powerful tendencies in 
my life and it has been painful not to understand them--to 
try to embrace them indiscriminately or deny them as part 
of my nature .. 
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The feminist movement encouraged denial of my sense of 
connection in insisting on stark individualism and self-
determination. It is an old argument by now, that to become 
more free as women, women should become less like themselves 
and more like men, but the pressure to follow that contra-
dictory pattern still exists. Gilligan (1982) made some 
inroads into this problem in her book, In a Different Voice, 
but she seems so uninformed by the possibility of blending 
both male and female perspectives that her arguments, too, 
for a relational morality, are left hopelessly lopsided 
in my eyes. Imposing feminine values onto the world as 
the answer makes no more sense than imposing male views 
alone. 
I've personally become more and more confused by fem-
inism. It is a label that, even when including communion 
along with agency in theory (see Bakan, 1966), leaves me 
feeling more fragmented than ever when I try to apply it 
to myself. Male definitions, if they truly insisted on 
women having no choices, would be a violent trap. But 
feminist definitions that merely- juxtapose some insistence 
on self-determination with deification of 11 Woman" for her 
capacity to relate, takes me out of context, too. 
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There is no getting around mutuality. Men and women 
need each other, need to be informed by both energies, need 
to learn the delicate, miraculous art of blending male and 
female perspectives. I don't think I will ever be very 
agentic, but I do benefit from agentic characteristics dis-
played by the men in my life. I don't want to be some 
entity apart from everyone else; I don't feel comfortable 
trying to formulate some "unique" perspective all by msyelf 
and then try to impose it on the world. I want to work with 
others. I expect to be defined to a great extent by the 
environment I choose to repsond to. This is where I see my 
responsibility for choice as a woman lies. I cannot·get 
away from being receptive and responsive and still be myself, 
but I can recognize the destruction inherent in opening 
myself up to negative influences. I can choose, instead, 
to be discriminating about the quality of the forces I allow 
myself to receive; I can withhold response from the nega-
tive, reserve these tendencies for positive, life-giving 
choices. 
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Working with positive energies instead of spending 
myself rebelling against the negative ones is a kind of 
self-direction, but it involves sharing--seeing myself in 
connection, in context--not living unto myself alone. The 
whole point of being free to make meaning of our lives 
instead of having definitions imposed on us is to learn 
from and, in turn, affect our relationships, is it not? It 
is oppressive to think women should be utterly independent. 
To be asked to believe that one even ~ be all-in-all to 
oneself is to be asked to be less than human--to participate 
in a kind of self-imposed violence: 
The pursuit of full humanity ..• cannot be carried 
out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellow-
ship and solidarity. (Freire, 1982, p. 73) 
We have to do our naming together--to let it be as alive and 
growing as relationship necessarily is. 
I don't know if my love of craftsmanship has anything 
to do with being a woman or not. I do know that keeping a 
comfortable horne and working with materials in the art 
classroom in a skillful, sensitive manner give me similar 
pleasure. That craft is not: acceptable as "fine art" unless 
it makes some abstract "statement--says something that fits 
into the current fashion--feels like a denial of what art 
can and should be. Just as schools are meant to, art gal-
leries are supposed to enhance experience, intensify our 
sense of connection through representing the dynamics of 
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interaction {see Dewey, 1934). When they, instead, reduce 
this process to evidence some pat theory, they are ~aesthetic-­
they take us away from sensitive response and into numbing 
complacency. I felt guilty trying to pass certain "works 
of art" off as culturally significant; I hated making apol-
ogies for visual expressions that made no sense to me or my 
students. It wasn't because we didn't try to understand 
them that they made no sense to us; it was because some 
works were not meant to be understood. 
My guilt shows just how seriously I've taken the "art 
world," doesn't it? Is it really so strange, seeing myself 
as an art teacher who isn't at all sure that teaching art is 
moral? Why should I have to apologize for things that don't 
make sense? Isn 1 t this the danger in making images? Isn 1 t 
there, in the very essence of doing art, the danger of 
idolatry? Making things and enjoying the way they look 
and feel, even what they stand for, this honors life. But 
falling down on our knees before advertisements for a cer-
tain kind of culture (J. Berger, 1972), that immobilizes 
us, kills our spirit. There can be good reasons for 
stopping to 11 frame 11 part of the art process--to celebrate 
the mystery of synthesis in concrete form, for instance--but 
to allow any one representation of life to take the place 
of its ongoing possibilities is a tribute to death, not 
life. How many people never try again to draw or paint or 
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sculpt after their initial attempts in early childhood were 
held up to some external standard of what art "really" is? 
I feel the same way about naming the spirit of love, 
that there is such a powerful tendency to create idols 
instead of more life. Religious symbolism is difficult for 
me to handle. When some part of "the Good" is labelled "God," 
I want to run in the other direction. My experience with 
investing in dogma has always led to death--to a denial of 
relationship. Dr. Purpel, you've seen in religious terminol-
ogy the potential for affirmation, but my fear of idolatry 
has kept me from sharing that vision. Perhaps now that I 
have made a connection between the arrogance of guilt and 
the separation resulting from idolatry r I can approach the 




I'm not comfortable wj_th talking much about feminism. 
I feel like I'm attacking something I do not really under-
stand. I liked re-reading what I wrote about art and idol-
atry r though--recognizing my growing awareness of having 
reified art. I see progress in this section. I'm leaving 
guilt behind and thus I'm leaving behind the need for rigid 
rules to obey or break. 
43 
Summary 
I ahoose not to address the issue of feminism in later chapters. 
The concept~ as I understand it, is dualistic--embodies in just another 
form the very sexism it put>ports to eradicate. Hozu can communion be 
aehieved through attaek? I have been ehallenged to consider a distinetion 
between feminist activism and feminist theo:t>y. If Gilligan (l982) and 
DinnePstein rl976) are to be taken as exemplars of such theory, then 
I am left uneonvinced. I find in Stinson (l984, l985J and Welch (l985), 
hOUJeVeP, a sense of principled relationship. I see this aspect of their 
wor-k as a healing blend, though, of both male and female perspectives. 
It is the level to which the issue of reification is taken in this 
section that seems most important nOlJ. The other themes identified thus 
fa.P appea.P to hinge on this one. Seeing reifiaation at the root of idolatry 
makes sense of the one mistake I have made over and over again. 
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SECTION FOUR: THE THIRD LETTER 
Addressing New Questions to the Old Problem 
Introduction 
'1his letter represents the lowest point of the series. I express 
here my anger at any definition of art, whether it offe:r>s a proeess I 
would normally find enjoyable or one I would usually c:onsider aonfining. 
The pressure of having to do an honest review of the literature in art 
education (a self-imposed requirement) drove me to a virtual temper tant:r>Wll 
of which I can neither be proud nor afford to ignore. For the first 
time I really ask, "What is important to me?" instead of "What is 
art?" 
The Letter 
Week of November 3rd 
Dear Dr. Purpe 1: 
This will still not be a review of the literature. 
became scattered last week when I started looking into art ed 
curricula again. That's okay with me now. It served sev-
eral purposes. 
First, I realized that the art which had earlier 
energized me was being used this week for escape. I'd for-
gotten how easily that can happen. This makes me wonder 
about Fox's (1983) art as meditation. The tendency to with-
draw, to use nonverbal activity to get away from thought 
rather than for reflection and clarificaton, seems more 
prevalent than the kind of meditation of which Fox (1983) 
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speaks. Active meditation, meditation that inspires action, 
this I am not sure I can get from art. 
Am I fooling myself to so readily accept the potential 
Fox (1986b) said art has for gaining insight into relation-
ship? .!.! person/material a relationship? I ended the few 
short pages I wrote last week wondering whether or not I 
could ever really care about the production of art. Do I 
value art enough to make it the focus of this dissertation? 
The answer from my heart is, "No." 
Why have I centered in so much on art? Why haven't I 
let it be merely a vehicle, simply ~of my experience? 
Why have I felt I needed to act in this work as an art advo-
cate? Justification, glorification--the literature on art 
education is steeped with this stuff. 1 don't like myself 
when 1 join in that cause. My perspective is going to have 
to shift more radically than it has as of yet if 1 am to be 
able to live with myself while writing this dissertation. 
A friend and 1 went to see the film version of Children 
of a Lesser God {Medoff, 1980} on Saturday. I'd seen the 
play years earlier, but from such a defensive stance that 
I missed the whole point back then. My friend is also a 
teacher and after the film we talked late into the night 
about how much he wanted to express the kind of warmth and 
caring in his classroom that James shared with his students 
in the film. Know what my friend said? He believes it is 
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the subject matter that gets in the way! Covering the material 
takes precedence over connecting with human beings. If we 
would just turn those priorities around, I really think 
teachers could do both--share information and honor humanity--
and do them both very well! 
Why does the subject stand between the teacher's exper-
ience and the students, between the student and his own 
experience? This keeps us from sharing. Subjects could so 
easily be shared if we allowed the questions, the needs 
to come first. You've often asked me how doing art could 
serve my values. I didn't really understand, did I? 
thought I had to choose between the two. 
I care about human relationships, Dr. Purpel. I care 
about our impulse to care--our impulse to join our energies 
and work together for something good. Art just happens to 
be a subject I did well in and thus was encouraged to teach. 
It was supposed to take something special to excel in art, 
but being special separates us from each other. I feel 
downright silly making grandiose claims for art as though 
it were somehow more than one interest among many possible 
interests. Sometimes I don't even think it is that great 
even as an interest. Other times I see good things happen 
through it. 
Our impulse to care isn't just an interest, though. 
This is really important to me. This is what I live with 
all the time, what I want to be true to in spite of my 
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interests. I'm finally beginning to see that if interest 
does not serve importance, something goes very wrong. 
People are then used to prop up things. That's how we come 





I 'rn still too close to this part to feel comfortable 
looking back on it yet. Here my confusion appears in raw 
form, but realizations are there, too. The theme of idol-
atry is brought into sharper focus. 
Summary 
The concept of teaching through a subject, using the subject as 
a tool for' manifesting that which I value most, this uJay of viewing art 
finally surfaces--and turns my professional Wol'ld upside down! Instead 
of tyring to find a theory of art "out there" somelJJhere in "the literature" 
that matches my concern for developing caring human relationships, I 
can put the impulse to care tl!:§.! and look for those aspects of art lJJhich 
serve that purpose. I don't have to apologize for "betraying" art. 
These two issues certainly require further investigation: basing euiTicuZar 
decisions on the question, "What is important?" and the prospect of teach-
ing through CU't instead of teaching art per se. 
SECTION FIVE: THE FOURTH LETTER 
Identifying Sources that Inform a Shift in Perspective 
Introduction 
It can be seen in this letter that I still could not let go of 
doing a review of the aPt education ZiteratuPe. I seem to be trying 
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to go both ways at oncey to find some key word or phrase true to my values 
that matches the literature, to find art education literature that at least 
loosely corresponds to my basic concePns. Failure to do this points 
to my need for a broader perspective on what constitutes "the literature," 
the body of writing that can inform my questions. 
The Letter 
Week of November 1Oth 
Dear Dr. Purpe 1: 
I think I can give you some idea of how I • m approaching 
the art ed literature now. Yesterday I re-read some Dewey 
(1934), some Lowenfeld (Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1982) and part 
of a relatively new book called Doing Art Together (Silber-
stein-Storfer, 1982). Like Read (1958, 1964), Lowenfeld 
advocates a sensi ti vi ty-toward-1 ife approach to teaching 
art. Lowenfeld and Brittain (1982) wrote the art education 
textbook on which I was 11 reared. 11 There was always strong 
advocacy for the student • s development, but art had the aura 
of being some kind of "miracle growth inducer" for the 
developmental process. 
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As a result of being trained under the influence of 
Lowenfeld I came to believe in art's "magic'' power and hated 
it for not living up to its claims. I .£2. believe in educat-
ing for a sensitivity toward life, but I was so focused on 
the means as the end, on art as the goal and learning to 
be sensitive to environment and materials as the method of 
reaching "it," the narrowly prescribed product. 
I remember a paper I once wrote for you on the Tyler 
(1949} "rationale" for curriculum planning. It drove me 
crazy to make "straight lines" (confine to a linear model) 
out of what I consider to be a ''spherical" existence. To 
take any developmental theory so seriously that it causes 
the teacher to deny what is taking place with the child 
right before her eyes makes no sense. There are develop-
mental theorists in art who actually wonder if children are 
aware of having hands and legs before they reach the stage 
of drawing them! It doesn't take a full-blown philosophy 
of wholism to realize that labels can't tell the whole 
story. It seems to me it takes an incredible commitment 
to the denial of certain phenomena to live and teach within 
such narrow boundaries. 
It seems to me that we as teachers are the ones who 
need to develop our sensitivity toward life. I'm sorry. 
I sound angry and impatient. don • t want to just rail 
against these problems. I want to see how we can become 
more "wide awake" (Greene, 1978) to the dialogue that can 
exist between those with more experience and information 
and those who are just beginning to gain theirs. We have 
so much to learn from each other. 
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When you asked me what I would write about if I weren't 
writing about education, I answered immediately, "Forgive-
ness." By that I meant learning to forego the prejudiced 
agendas we tend to have for ourselves and others. Giving 
over our eKpectations to the spirit of the moment, this I 
can get excited about. This inspires me, the withdrawal of 
imposition to make room for choice. 
Children of a Lesser God (Medoff, 1980) is about the 
beauty of two human beings recognizing transcendent exis-
tence in connection, in allowing two worlds to intersect 
instead of using them against one another in fear and judg-
ment. You have referred to my writing about art education 
as a way of casting out my "demons." I thought that had to 
be done by critiquing the idol of art, but it seems to be 
leading to a study of idolatry itself, an understanding of 
the violence inherent in prejudging any human experience. 
It's difficult for me to see clearly just how much I 
need to dwell on the particulars of what I've felt was 
wrong in art and education. In turning to discuss their 
promise, I still feel stuck with old paradigms that I'm 
afraid will only keep me restricted to those views if I try 
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to do it in the context of existing art education literature 
per se. For example, Doing Art Together (Silberstein-
Storfer, 1982) looked promising, but it turned out to be a 
disappointment. There is an "Even you can do it!" attitude 
that points back to accepting an objective assumption of 
what art is. Art remains this amazing thing most people 
think they cannot do and the teacher's function is still 
to convince them that they can. Togetherness is just a 
technique, collaboration a method of accomplishing the 
task. I believe it is important to encourage a sense of 
efficacy and in contributing in whatever way I can to an 
atmosphere of belonging, but tP"'!re is something false about 
setting art up as the measure of these. I don't see in 
even the most "sensitive" articles on art education a 
switching around of the goals, a view of human project 
a need to be met coming first and the process of art as 
just one means of meeting that need. 
I tried to find in Dewey's {1934) view of "apprecia-
tion" some sense of putting people first, but to be honest, 
he ends up being even more prescriptive than someone like 
Hegel (1905) who devised such hierarchical categories for 
the different forms of visual expression. Dewey (1934) 
starts out in Art as Experience with a certain reverence 
for human interaction, but when he "gets serious" about out-
lining a philosophy of art, even experience gets classified 
to death. For art to really be art, it has to reflect a 
certain kind and level of experience. The concept of 
valuing adding value gets turned around somehow to become 
judgment based on standards just as set as those of Hegel. 
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I have to turn to the Kabbalah (see Scholem' s 1969 The 
Kabbalah and Its Symbolism) for a sense of appreciation 
involving release of the spark of life within, honoring each 





Art as a tool, this is becoming clear. An open agenda, 
a curriculum based on sharing that makes connection and 
communication possible, this, too, is emerging here. I'm 
way too close to this part, still, to comment more on it. 
Summary 
No entirely new issues emerge hePB. Phis section is an attempt 
to "!Vork through the confusion brought on by residual reification of art 
by holding on tightly to art education literature and failing to see 
beyond it. It appears throUf!hout this letter that I have not gained 
enough distance from vieuJing art education as an objective body of knouJ-
ledtJe at this point to benefit from literature in this area in a neb1 
!M.y. It is probably not as impossible as it seems to find some pPomise 
there, but because of my own need to overcome idolizing it, I find it 
necessary to tur>n to other- JJ)r>iters who do not trigger that response. 
Wl'iters who are overtly addressing the concept of knowledge as human 
creation and art from standpoints outside of the "field" of art a:re 
revealed here to be more appropriate to my research at this time. 
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SECTION SIX: THE FINAL LETTER 
Moving from Identification to Investigation 
Introduction 
Phis final letter is basically a reflection on the other four, 
showing the growth of my respect for this process of approaching my own 
experience as data and a readiness to move on to more intentional and 
informed reflection, issue by issue, in the next chapter. At this point 
I am still confused and, as a result, still frightened by the way I have 
used power in the past. Facing the struggle between doubt and hope to 
this extent has, hooever, clarified some of the problems and revealed 
within them enough pPomise for me to !Jant to go on with asking questions 
about authority that include my participation in its investment. 
The Letter 
Week of November 17th 
Dear Dr. Purpe 1: 
I want to keep writing in letter form this week, to 
let ideas flow for a little longer before I begin checking 
back through the other letters for themes and organization. 
I haven't felt as comfortable doing this since I wrote the 
first letter. I guess I've overwhelmed myself with incon-
sistencies, contradictions, and felt that to be "wrong" at 
the same time I gave myself permission to see conflict as 
all right. I'm used to conning myself into taking a stand, 
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leaving out my doubts when I write. That's why, though, as 
I told you, I've not been able before to live with what I've 
written. You have validated my need to feel honest in my 
writing, to show both, or should I say many sides. I appre-
ciate the clarity that affords, but more than that, the 
acceptance. I've really been afraid that if I could not 
take some unequivocal position and successfully defend it 
I wouldn't be "doing my job" here. Instead of pressing 
that perspective on me, you have encouraged my expressions 
of ambiguity. Thank you. It will be easier to continue 
writing now, even after leaving this letter format. I've 
had a different kind of experience, one I can build on in 
other contexts. 
I keep going back to the question, "Is sensitivitiy to 
materials transferable to human relationships?" and perhaps 
in dealing here with the written word in a more consciously 
open way and seeing its possibilities for carrying such a 
spirit into the rest of the dissertation, I have begun to 
answer my own question. If, as an interest, art can be for 
students a shared interest, that sharing counts for some-
thing important to their whole sense of being. 
Sharing one•s sensitivity, celebrating human capabil-
ity, these could so easily be focused on in doing art. 
When I see a well-crafted piece of art work, I can feel 
the care another had for his materials. That draws me close 
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to another person's experience, not just the product left by 
a process. Artifact becomes then evidence of the human 
touch behind it. Even if he used his craft to escape from 
the world of human interaction, his work might still mediate 
between him and those who can appreciate his skill and 
expression. 
I found that students love to watch each other do art. 
That is the closest thing in my experience of teaching to 
seeing a sense of mutuality emerge from the art process. 
You mentioned last week the distinction between control and 
harmony. Maybe control seen as a part of harmony isn't bad. 
There has been so much misuse of control in our times; it 
has been thrown out by many who seek a more liberative order. 
The art world, especially, has rejected control in favor of 
chaos in such a way that we are left with a sense of aliena-
tion, with the feeling there is no hope for achieving 
harmony. We only further fragment our existence when we 
give in to despair. 
An overemphasis on self-expression seems to have little 
or nothing to do with communication of being: it's just as 
bankrupt as the overemphasis on controlling media. Imagina-
tion and skill belong together. A choice does not have to 
be made between the two. The more I think about it, the 
more it appears we can learn a lot about what is important 
through an interest in the dialectic between man and material. 
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Perhaps transference of one process to another doesn 1 t take 
place automatically, but what is to prevent us from making 
the possibility conscious in our teaching? 
You once told me that Dr .. Macdonald said it would be 
enough if through our teaching we could just encourage 
students to be good to one another. What if we viewed each 
subject as a tool to be used to that end? Isn • t that what 
Dr. Stinson (1984) has done with the teaching of dance? In 
taking Macdonald 1 s (1977) value questions seriously: 
"What is the meaning of human life?" 
"How shall we live together?" 
the content of Stinson • s curriculum is not impoverished by 
putting people first; it is enhanced by connecting. an 
interest in the arts to a fundamental sense of meaning and 
purpose. 
If certain ways of appreciating art can lend itself 
to increasing the value we place on each other, then it 
belongs in a life-affirming curriculum. If a certain way 
of learning to master skill and technique can bring a sense 
of harmony to my students' lives, then that, too, belongs. 
Teaching through a subject would involve deciding what is 
important enough to make time and energy spent on an inter-
est worthwhile. 
Your lecture on authority versus power is finally com-
ing into focus for me, Dr. Pur pel. With what authority may 
we use the power of knowledge? Does that not depend on who 
we believe is responsible for creating it? It seems to me 
that if we try to take hegemony apatt piece by piece, it 
will always remain ahead of us, but if we begin to honor 
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our own experience as knowledge along with maintaining a 
critical consciousness, as writers like Giroux (1981) and 
Shor (1980) suggest, then we will not be left as Macdonald 
(1978b) puts it, always "one step behind the world" (p. 99). 
The other night at dinner a fellow student and I laugh-
ingly spoke of how we cannot "teach." She cannot "teach" 
English composition and I cannot "teach" drawing if by 
teaching we mean breaking a process down into fragments, 
feeding information to students out of context with the 
expectation that the sum of those parts wi 11 somehow convey 
the ability to perform the whole process. We have to trust 
our students to enter into a process, involve themselves in 
it to learn how it can serve their purposes. Of ~we 
can share information and suggest experiences that make 
sense of it, but that is so different from what it often 
appears is expected of us as teachers. About the only thing 
a banking approach (Freire, 1982) can serve is misuse of 
power. It doesn't make sense for helping people learn. 
It is the use of a subject, finally, that really makes 
the difference between participating in the sacred or the 





You have said that this section may belong in my last 
chapter instead of here. All I know is that trying to go 
beyond what I •ve already accomplished in letter form hasn•t 
really worked. It feels to me like I •ve come around a 
circle, spiralled up to a new place. Maybe this section is 
just a review of all the others with some foreshadowing of 
what can happen throughout the next chapter. I hope it is. 
Last night I couldn't sleep for dreading spending all 
• day today re-living this entire thing. Now, at the end of 
it, I am encouraged instead of depressed. I see movement; 
I see an opening up. I can at least bear to look at the 
process, accept it as part of a whole. Again, this sur-
prises me. 
Summary 
The question of authority versus pOIUer, of searching out ground 
on which to stand, from which to choose the sacred over the profane, 
reaches back through all the otheP issues previously identified. Reifi-
cation of art, teaching through CU"t values such as relationship, harmony 
ar.d transcendence, these are tied together by the desire to realize a 
sense of moPal purpose. This letter represents the ending of one cycle, 
that of the identification pPocess, and the beginning of the next, an 
in-depth study of those themes which have emerged. 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Throughout these sections and the reflections made thus 
far, it can be seen that distance created by either the 
passing of time or a shift in perspective determined the 
particular meanings that could be appropriated at each 
instance along the way: 
from report to letter 
from letter to letter 
from letters to comments 
from the study of report, letters and comments as 
text, in light of a Ricoeurian sense of affirmation, 
to the introductions and summaries written for each 
section. 
These are only the more obvious cycles of events and inter-
pretation present. There are wheels within those wheels, 
too. Each cycle brought greater significance to areas of 
meaning identified for further investigation. 
The next chapter will begin yet another cycle, this 
time involving both my own thought and that of writers who 
speak to the issues of reification, knowledge as creation, 
and the place of values in curricular decision-making. From 
there I will proceed, in subsequent chapters, to a discussion 
of the possibilities and limitations of teaching through 
art, including reflections on those areas of focus I find 
important for such a curriculum: embracing identity through 
relationship, establishing order through harmony rather than 
control and achieving transcendence through appreciation and 
celebration. 
CHAPTER II 
FROM REIFICATION TO RESPONSIBILITY 
Preface 
In my first chapter I described my difficulties with 
the teaching of art and my difficulties with the parallel 
issues of reification and idolatry. This chapter serves 
to set an agenda for further study, particularly the need 
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to clarify issues of reifying art as subject matter and the 
relationshiP between art curricula and social justice, through 
developing a general understanding of the social construction 
of reality and the dangers of reifying any "body 11 of know-
ledge. I shall devote a chapter to each of these general 
concerns. In this chapter I will discuss my questions con-
cerning reification and social responsibility as they have 
been both generated and informed by various writers outside 
the field of art education. In the following chapters I 
will focus this analysis on art education. 
I will begin with a reflection on Berger and Luckmann 1 s 
concept of the social construction of reality in light of 
Greene 1 s and Richards • warnings against the objectification 
of knowledge. From that discussion of the objectification 
of knowledge I will move to Freire 1 s understanding of the 
part such objectification plays in the objectification, and 
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thus oppression, of human beings, particularly with regard 
to the use of knowledge as power in the teacher-student rela-
tionship. In an attempt to resolve some of my own dilemmas 
within that relationship, I turn to Macdonald • s curriculum 
model based on identification of the need for an aesthetic 
rationality to inform the dual dialectic between self and 
environment and oneself and his spiritual ground of being--a 
need Macdonald suggests can be met by development of the 
process of centering the person in the world, thus making 
him more capable of contributing to the manifestation of 
transcendent reality. From Macdonald • s advocacy of centering, 
I go on to discuss centering as it is viewed by Richards 
and by Fox. Their connection between centering and co-
creation leads me through a discussion of the problems brought 
about by dualistic thinking and the possibi] ity of bringing 
compassion to bear on our understanding of the creative pro-
cess--a sense of 11 power with" in the part-to-whole relation-
ship of the individual to all that is other. 
By asking the question, "What is important? 11 with regard 
to the use of knowledge and responsible social relationships, 
I come to focus more clearly on my own values: the importance 
I place on finding one 1 s identity in relationship to others, 
the importance of recognizing the inadequacy of control 
ideologies for creating a growing sense of order--of harmony 
as order that resonates with the whole of being, and the 
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importance of actively appreciating and celebrating the value 
of human beings and their project of co-creating the world. 
By daring to place priority on the person's part in creating 
knowledge rather than on knowledge itself, I begin to see 
art and the teaching of art from a radically different per-
spective--one which allows art to serve us as human beings 
and develop our capacity for transcendence. 
This chapter is written as a process of discovery. 
It is an attempt to make the connections between the problems 
of reification and idolatry to curricular decision-making 
in general and the teaching of art in particular that wil 1 
lead to further investigation of art education. In this 
sense, it serves to connect the first chapter--the identifi-
eaton of issues, to the third and fourth chapters--a discussion 
of the idolatrous use of art in art education in the next 
chapter and of sacred possibilities for its use in the final 
chapter. 
"What is important? 11 --The Insufficiency of Technological 
Rat1onali ty for Meeting Human Needs 
The process of viewing my educational experience as data 
for research and, more specifically, as text for interpreta-
tion has revealed reification of art as a central problem 
regarding responsible teaching of art as a subject.. The 
reification of any body of knowledge with which I've been 
confronted has been a constant source of conflict, trapping 
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me in either rebellion against or blind obedience to idea 
after idea, robbing me of consciously choosing how I will 
participate in my own life. The meaning I make of any 
situation and the action I take in repsonse to it have been 
controlled by my tendency to objectify knowledge. As a 
result, I have objectified human beings, starting with myself. 
The use of knowledge to either liberate or oppress students 
(Freire, 1982) depends on how the teacher views herself, 
on whether or not she can see herself as subject, as co-
creator of the rea 1 i ty she expeiences. 
Greene (1983) says of those involved in curricular 
decision-making: 
Preoccupied with priori ties, purposes, programs 
of 11 intended learning" (Crary, 1969, p. 13). and 
intended (or unintended) manipulation, we pay too 
little attention to the individual in quest of his 
own future, bent on surpassing what is merely 
"given," on breaking through the everyday. We 
are still too prone to dichotomize: to think of 
"discipline" or "public traditions" or "accumulated 
wisdom" or "common culture" ( individuaJ. ization despite) 
as objectively existent, external to the knower--
there to be discovered, mastered, learned. 
(p. 168) 
The danger of believing knowledge must be objectively 
existent is not the prevention of what we know affecting 
how we live, but the distortion of that process. If the 
product of that which we project is considered out of our 
control because we take no responsibility for the meanings 
we use to achieve an end, we are not only alienated from the 
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resulting experiences but actually violated by them. Know-
ledge "turns" on us to impose a partially foreign reality, 
one we helped to make but feel helpless to fully under-
stand. 
A very graphic description of knowledge turning S?.!!. 
life instead of turning into life is given here by Richards 
(1964)' 
That which we consume, with a certain passivity, 
accepting it for the most part from our teachers, who 
in turn have accepted it from theirs, is like the 
food we eat. And food, in order to become energy, 
or will, is transformed entirely by the process of 
metabolism. We do not become the food we eat. Rather 
the food turns into us. Similarly with knowledge, at 
best. Hopefully, we do not turn into encyclopedias 
or propaganda machines or electric brains. Our know-
ledge, if we allow it to be transformed within us, 
turns into capacity for life-serving human deeds. If 
knowledge does not turn into life, it makes cripples 
and madmen and dunces. It poisons just as food would 
if it stayed in the stomach and was never digested, 
and the waste products never thrown off. (p. 16) 
Relating this misuse of knowledge to curricular concerns, 
she goes on to say, "One of the reasons formal education is 
in danger today is that a sense of work is split off from 
human earnestness" (Richards, 1964, p. 18). What I like 
about Richards' view is the underlying assumption that 
human earnestness, what I have come to refer to as the 
"impulse to care, 11 is our natural state; making life-giving 
meaning of our interactions with the world should be as 
normal for our minds as the process of metabolism is to 
our bodies. When Richards (1964) asks, '1How might this 
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split be healed?" {p. 18), a state of health, of whole-
ness, is seen not only as possible, but essential to being 
who we really are. 
Beneath my own despair at trying to handle objective 
knowledge and human relationships simultaneously in the 
classroom, there was always a hopeful aspect to the dissonance 
between feeling compelled to transmit "facts" and wanting 
to simply share a sense of meaning and purpose with other 
beings, but I could not see it until I began to recognize 
dissonance as mental pain. When I feel physical pain, I 
take it as a natural warning that my body is no longer func-
tioning properly and needs to be treated in some way that 
will bring it back to a healthy state. Wholeness is such 
an obvious goal when the body is sick. Why is it so difficult 
to see as illness the mental habits we form that separate 
us from each other and thus disrupt healthy functioning of 
social life? I hated to admit something was wrong with the 
way I was thinking. I felt ashamed and defensive at the 
same time. There just did not seem to be a way out of being 
controlled by my own thoughts. 
Although I had been involved in studying phenomenology 
and the sociology of knowledge for some time before beginning 
this research project, I generally took from those fields 
what I believed to be "better" facts than those I thought 
were true before. I replaced former ideas about rea]ity 
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with new ones, but I always tried to apply them to my life. 
Even a theory about taking one's own experience seriously 
was held apart from its meaning because I could not ever 
seem to start with my own life, I started with some judgment 
made on the basis of a perspective I thought existed outside 
my epxerience.. I used theories to justify explanations of 
my life that were part of those theories. Only as I began 
to unravel that process through my letters to Dr. Purpel 
did I start asking of my own experience, "What do I want 
this to mean?n It was only after seeing some hope that there 
is a way out of reifying that I felt I could afford to admit 
the extent to which I had participated in reification. 
In The Social Construction of Reali tv, Berger and Luck-
mann (1967) trace the steps man takes from producing a world 
through making meaning of shared existence to institutional-
izing those meanings, giving them objective reality, to appre-
bending that reality as meaning that must be taken as unal ter-
able fact: 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as 
if they 'Were things, that is, in non-human or possibly 
supra-human terms • • • the apprehension of the products 
of human activity as if they were something else than 
human products--such as facts of nature, results of 
cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reifica-
tion implies that man is capable of forgetting his own 
authorship of the human world, and further, that the 
dialectic between man, the producer, and his products 
is lost to consciousness. The reified world is, by 
definition, a dehumanized world. (p. 89) 
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When I forget the whole truth about how knowledge is created 
and focus only on its existence apart from my participation 
in making meaning of phenomena, I give the power of creation 
over to that which was created and allow the product of my 
actions to rule the process. In my letters, I have connected 
this tendency toward reification to idolatry. Idolatry, 
as I understand it through Tillich (1957), is the act of 
mistaking a symbol for that which it was made to represent, 
of attributing consummate meaning to a partial expression 
of reality. Whether in reverencing an idea of art or one 
of God, in letting my own thinking split off from its effects 
and use the resulting illusions to determine subsequent 
thought and action, I am denying responsibility for my own 
praxis~ 
I cannot avoid making the assumption that we forfeit 
our freedom to choose life's meaning because we have so little 
faith in our ability to respond creatively. I remember having 
been absolutely startled by the contrast between the Christ 
spirit and the idol the Church had made of Jesus in ~ 
Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevsky, 1950}. The Grand Inquisitor 
claims that "So long as man remains free he strives for noth-
ing so incessantly and. so painfully as to find someone to 
worship" (Oostoyevsky, 1950, p. 263}, but it is interesting 
that he goes on to explain this by citing the need for a 
community of worship. If it is communion we seek through 
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idolatry, then, turning that around, if we dare to face our 
responsibility for creation through communion, might we not 
give each other the strength to sanctify rather than profane 
our existence? 
It seems no accident that the quality of my relationships 
at different times in my life led to these questions about 
objectification, reification and, finally, idolatry. The 
destructive effects of an irresponsible use of knowledge 
can so clearly be seen in the oppressor-oppressed relation-
ship. As Berger and Luckmann have stated, "All human know-
ledge is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations" {1967, p. 3). To whatever degree we fool our-
selves into mistaking ideas for reality, giving power to 
the product rather than the process of living our lives, 
we do it together and what any one person does has consequences 
for both himself and others. 
In his analysis of the teacher-student relationship 
in banking education, teaching that becomes merely an act 
of depositing, Freire {1982) casts the teacher in the role 
of oppressor, the one who presents reified knowledge as fact 
and thus reinforces a dehumanized world view. The following 
contradictory attitudes and practices characterize this banking 
approach: 
(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught 
{b) the teacher knows everything and the students know 
nothing 
{c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought 
about 
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(d) the teacher talks and the students listen--meekly 
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are dis-
ciplined 
{f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and 
the students comply 
(g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion 
of acting through the action of the teacher 
(h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the 
students (who were not consul ted) adapt to it 
(i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with 
his own professional authority, which he sets in 
opposition to the freedom of the students 
(j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, 
while the pupils are mere objects. (Freire, 1982, 
p. 59) 
Freire acknowledges the possibility of students perceiving, 
at some point, the contradictions about reality that the 
banking concept maintains, of the oppressed discovering 
through existential experience the dehumanization involved, 
but he does not address in a similar way the fact that the 
oppressor (whether she is one knowingly or unknowingly) was 
likely once a student under the ·same system and thus has 
another level of experience with which to compare and contrast 
the role she is asked to play as teacher. Freire does indicate 
that the oppressor is freed from a dehumanized world with 
the oppressed when the oppressed revel t successfuJ ly, but 
the potential for the oppressor to become critically conscious 
of her own oppression in the very act of participating in 
the oppression of others receives no emphasis. The oppressor 
is constantly violating her own humanity by limiting her 
own choices and possibilities for co-creation. In short, 
she suffers, too. 
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The beauty of Freire's (1982) statement, "The pursuit 
of full humanity ... cannot be carried out in isolation 
or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity" 
(p. 73) is that it is completed by the acknowledgment that 
humanization cannot unfold in antagonistic relations between 
oppressors and oppressed. If, as Freire (1982) writes, "~ 
situation in which some men prevent others from engaging 
in the process of inquiry is one of violence" (p. 73), if 
"no one can be authentically human while he prevents others 
from being so" (p. 73),. then consciousness of the antagonistic 
relationship by either the oppressor or the oppressed in 
a given situation could initiate change. I am not claiming 
here there is no need to concern ourselves with institutional-
ized imbalances of power, only that both oppressor and 
oppresssed are disempowered in a fundamental way by living 
in a reified world, that ~ entrance into a critical and 
imaginative consciousness (see Macdonald & Purpel, 1987) is 
important because it has consequences for us all. 
"What is important?"--Curriculum Theory Informed 
by Aesthetic Rationality 
Because, as a teacher, I hungered for the kind of so] i-
darity Freire describes, it became important to my own sense 
of being human to develop my capacity for both critical and 
imaginative thought. Because I began to see the need for 
all of us to recognize the dehumanizing forces in our ) ives 
and thus the need for envisioning more biophil ic means of 
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co-creation (see Freire, 1982), it became important to my 
sense of responsibility as an educator to investigate the 
possibilities of a curricular framework designed to promote 
that kind of developm~nt in my students. It was to be years 
after I first encountered Macdonald's (1978b) concept of 
the dual dialectic and his transcendental developmental 
ideology of education before I actually believed such a frame-
work could inform art education curricula. This is ironic, 
since Macdonald views his work in this area as meeting the 
need for an aesthetic rationality to balance the predominately 
technological outlook of our society. Not only that, the 
doing of art itself plays a strong role in Macdonald's sug-
gested means for developing such a rationality. 
I appreciated Macdonald's goals right away, but I could 
not take them in from the actual context of my own teaching 
before now; I could only idealize them and use my previous 
failure to achieve them to discount my own experience. That 
one's values inevitably come through in one's teaching (Purpel 
& Ryan, 1976) made sense enough once I was asked to think 
about it. That a teacher's values should, therefore, be 
made explicit in curricular decision-making (Macdonald, 198la) 
appeared to be the only alternative to a dishonest pretense 
of neutrality. Asking, "What is important?" (Macdonald & 
Purpel, 1987) has, for the duration of my program of study, 
been important to me; I just could not apply that question 
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to the prospect of teaching a moral curriculum in the visual 
arts. As has been shown through my collection of data, I · 
fully believed 11 my'' subject was an exception to the theory. 
Anything I taught that conveyed my ultimate concerns couldn't 
really have been "art." Art was too self-indulgent, too 
decadent to serve the goals of centering and transcendence. 
Now, finally, after recognizing the way I have allowed 
definitions of art to rule over my experience of it, I am pre-
paring to ask of this interest what it can do to serve impor-
tance.. Before I do that in the following chapters, I want to 
review Macdonald's dual dialectic and his transcendental 
developmental ideology of education as a viable approach to 
using any subject as a tool, to teaching the importance of 
both critical and imaginative thinking through subject matter 
in general. First I will set the conception of Macdonald 1 s 
framework in the context of those he found to be insufficient 
for meeting our most basic needs, but which point to the need 
for Macdonald 1 s ideology. 
In Macdonald • s article, "A Transcendental Developmental 
Ideology of Education" (1978b, pp. 95-123), he identifies four 
educational ideologies other than his own: romantic, cultural 
transmission, developmental and radical, considering each 
one on the basis of its implied ontology, epistemology and 
axiology. He uses these particular frameworks because his 
transcendental developmental ideology is largely a response 
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to their use by Kohlberg and Mayer {1978) to promote a devel-
opmental ideology. I represent them here according to my 
understanding of their contributions and limitations to a 
broad sense of balance between inner and outer experience, 
but as Gress and Purpel (1978) have been careful to note, 
these labels are not necessarily agreed-upon realities. 
The romantic ideology as Kohlberg and Mayer {1978) refer 
to it and Macdonald (1978b) uses this category, regards the 
individual as primary. Left to unfold without societal con-
straint, both knowledge and values emerge from inner experience 
and result in beneficent action on the world. Environment 
can limit the individual's choices and thwart his inner growth 
or expand his possibilities and nourish his existence, but 
none of these are claimed to affect the individual in ways 
that constitute a reality based on a dialectic between himself 
and the world (Mead, 1936). 
Cultural transmission, as I understand Macdonald's 
{1978b) interpretation of it, fails to acknowledge inter-
dependency, as well, only for opposite reasons. This ideology 
assumes that environment shapes one • s knowledge and values 
in the behaviorist, stimulus-response manner (Skinner, 1971), 
leaving nothing to individual choice. Persona] meaning is 
denied and the knowledge and values transmitted are taken for 
granted as inevitable facts. 
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With the developmental ideology as it is portrayed by 
Macdonald (1978b), it does become explicit that inner and 
outer phenomena create reality through transaction. The 
dialectic between individual and society affects that which 
either one holds as true and good, but society is assumed 
here to have reached a certain level of evolution to which 
the individual must develop in order to contribute to its 
progress (see Dewey, 1944). Though the transaction here 
requires personal investment in social concerns, resolving 
the relationship between inner and outer structures of one's 
reality pits the developing against the developed. Allegiance 
to the illusion of a progressive democracy is a danger here, 
for transmission may occur which feels like authentic trans-
action because it appeals to a sense of participation that 
obfuscates constraints present due to an imbalance of power. 
Although it is acknowledged in both developmental and 
radical ideologies that the individual and society together 
constitute one 1 s reality, Macdonald 1 s (1978b) assessment 
of the radical ideology involves the necessary but not suffi-
cient critique of unequal power arrangements currently exist-
ing within that relationship. One must be critically con-
scious of the weight held by external structures and actively 
seek new social conditions that allow fuller development 
of the individual and greater opportunity for co-creation 
(Freire, 1982) if he is to consider himself a viable 
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participant in the dialectic between inner and outer reality. 
Solidarity with others in this process empowers the individual 
through sharing critical reflections on experience and result-
ing changes in consciousness. Reflective transaction, however 
more effective for all concerned because it is more equal 
on both sides, is still not full interaction. 
According to Macdonald (1978b), the -uneven approaches 
to individual and society in the romantic and cultural trans-
mission ideologies point to the need for a balanced emphasis 
on inner and outer experience partially met by developmental 
and radical approaches. I say 11 partially 11 because even in 
the radical ideology the interpretation of outer experience 
through reflection is still intended to serve that outer 
experience and inner experience is thus only informea by 
practical need and used to function more profitably in the 
material world. Absent here, and preventing fu11 interaction, 
is an emphasis on spiritual reality. Macdonald's (197Bb) 
transcendental developmental ideology includes an aesthetic 
rationality, a way of thinking about interaction that honors 
the importance of making conscious the effect of what I call 
"innermost" experience on the whole of one's praxis: 
My position [Macdonald writes} is best approached through 
the concept of a dual dialectical process. A dialectic 
exists not only between the individual and his environ-
ment but also within the individual himself. (p. 103) 
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Once conscious of an innermost realm of experience, it 
becomes possible to approach the process of transaction with 
intentionality based on both critical reflection of the outer 
reality we see and an imaginative vision of the way it could 
be. (See Figure 1.) 
Macdonald (1978b) points out that inner and outer exper-
ience is constantly affected by information coming to us 
from this other ground of being whether we recognize it or 
not: 
Values are articulated in the lives of people by the 
dual dialectic of reflecting upon the consequences of 
an action and sounding the depths of our inner selves. 
(p. 105) 
If this process "remains unconscious, however, we stand 1 i ttle 
chance of allowing the innermost self to speak with a clear 
voice. What actually informs the part of us that meets the 
world directly may, instead, be a fearful interpretation 
of this overwhelming power to conceive of and manifest new 
realities. It is at this point, I believe, in my own exper-
ience, that reification is embraced in thought and idolatry, 
chosen over creative action. If, looking inward to our heart 
of hearts, we find we care so deeply, yet in looking outward 
we find few social structures available for the release of 
this spirit, we may mistakenly believe it is futile to 
attempt expression. It is easy to lose sight of the fact 
that we have the power to create opportunities, to change 
the outer structure through acting on inner vision, to honor 
our "real" relationship to the world. 

















Figure 1. A visual comparison of the five ideologies. 
Source: Diagrams are reprinted, with permission, from Gress 
and Purpel (1978, pp. 97-98, 104). 
Note that in the dual dialectic explicit knowledge and beliefs, ideas and wishes are 
formed by and inform the acts, value judgments and decisions we make in response to larger 
entJironmental factors and social structures and potentialities. Through reflective trans-
action those outer elements can be affected by, as well as affect, actions, decisions 
and values. This constitutes the dialectic identified in the radical ideology. Tacit 
knowledge, values formed from pre- and unconscious data and largely unconscious needs 
and potentials inform all elements of the first dialectic, either directly or indirectly, 
in the second. 
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Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe the tendency to 
turn that relationship upside down, to so objectify meaning 
by institutionalizing experience that reification becomes 
the status quo: 
Typically, the real relationship between man and his 
world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer 
of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human 
activity as an epiphenomenon of non-human processes. 
Human meanings are no longer understood as world-producing 
but as being, in their turn, products of the 11nature 
of things. 11 It must be emphasized that reification 
is a modality of consciousness, more precisely, a modality 
of man's objectification of the human world. Even 
while apprehending the world in reified terms, man continues 
to produce it. That is, man is capable paradoxically 
of producing a reality that denies him. (p. 89) 
The extent to which man has now produced technological real-
ities that deny him is reason enough to appreciate Macdonald • s 
insistence on recovering our awareness of an aesthetic rational-
ity. Macdonald (1978b) urges us to face the evidence: 
An epistemology that does not recognize tacit knowledge 
components, or the fantastic possibilities and implica-
tions of our most advanced fields of inquiry, is simply 
weighted down with the baggage of philosophical and 
materialistic biases. How, what and why are far more 
open questions than we are often led to believe, and 
the possibilities of accessibility to knowledge from 
"hidden 11 inner sources operating on acausal, or integra-
tive, or serial and synchronistic bases point directly 
toward the awareness of another ground of knowledge 
in human being. (p. 112) 
The dangers of reification and idolatry, of denying our part 
in what we make and allowing those creations to rule over 
us, these culminate in the prospect of nuclear annihilation. 
It is no wonder that Macdonald identifies the aesthetic 
ground of knowledge, and not the prevailing technological 
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rationality, as "reason." The existence of reason as aes-
thetic rationality is explained, he claims, by the concept 
of a dual dialectic, the concept to which I have turned in 
this research to help me make sense of my own reversals 
regarding our "real" relationship to the world. 
Macdonald (1978a) takes seriously Dewey's charge that 
educational philosophy is the essence of all philosophy 
because it is "the study of how to have a world" {Dewey in 
Macdonald, 1978a, p. 51), so he therefore regards curriculum 
theory, the study of how to have a learning environment, 
as a frontier for developing an aesthetic approach to human 
project. Macdonald and Purpel {1987) challenge the prevailing 
paradigm in the field of curriculum planning, 11 the Tyler 
rationale" (Tyler, 1949), for its representation of the 
technological, linear and positivistic thinking of our con-
temporary culture. Taking an aesthetic approach themselves, 
Macdonald and Purpel (1987) address the basic problem they 
see in the Tyler rationale, that of separating means from 
ends inherent in the technical planning approach: 
Ends are stated and means are then emphasized. In many 
instances the means become another sort of ends in them-
selves. Aesthetically many activities are worth doing 
for the sake of engagement in them, and the value of 
such activity lies in the dynamics of participation. 
The outcomes of such pursuits are neither known nor 
relevant to the justification for doing them. Thus, 
inherent in an aesthetic concern is the realization 
that outcomes of any tangible sort are unknowable until 
after the fact. (p. 182) 
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From this kind of aesthetic viewpoint, curriculum planning, 
as well as the living environments it brings into existence, 
should reflect qualitative concern for the personal and mean-
ingful engagement with others in the process (Macdonald & 
Purpel, 1987). Under these conditions, knowing can be seen 
for what it is, moment of praxis, an opening, as Greene 
(1983) puts it, into "what has not yet been" (Sartre, 1963, 
p. 92). 
In recognizing the existence of a dual dialectic, Mac-
donald's ( 1978b) transcendental developmental ideoJ.ogy sets 
forth curricular goals that make possible what he calls "good" 
praxis (Macdonald, 198lb), putting theory into practice in 
a way that emancipates us from previous understandings and 
thus frees us to reinterpret situations and reach greater 
understandings (p. 133). Such a curriculum, Greene {1983) 
believes, can offer students the 11 miracle of related exper-
iences,. {Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xix), a view of themselves 
as part of the network of relationships from which meaning 
emerges. 
Before moving on to those aims Macdonald sets forth, 
I want to emphasize the miraculous aspect of finding oneself 
a part of related experience. I tend to write of transcen-
dence in terms of results, but in the process of speaking 
here to the concept of an aesthetic rationality I am reminded 
that my answer to the question, "What is important?" 
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involves the state of being in relationship, not only the 
co-creation of new realities that can result. It is so dif-
ficult to get away from instrumental thought patterns, even 
when expressing the desire to do so. It is easy to place 
the ends of developing imagination over the means, yet it 
is in the process rather than the product that we enjoy the 
greatest sense of connectedness, of being and doing together. 
I have earlier referred to an imaginative consciousness as 
both aesthetic and religious. Implicit in Macdonald's ideol-
ogy is tJ:lis sense of the religious, I believe, the feeling 
of being a part of, related to the whole of existence. 
Explicitly, his view of transcendence is based on P. Berger's 
{1969) "natural theology," the existence of experiences in 
common human activity that appear to point beyond everyday 
reality, those of ordering, playing, hOping, damning and 
finding reason for humor (see Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, 
p. 1831. 
The sense of living into one's part of the whole is 
more completely expressed in Macdonald's (1978b} belief that 
the centering of the person in the world should be the aim 
of education for both students and teachers. He does not 
take this to mean achieving mental health in the sense of 
adjusting one's attitude to social norms, nor does he mean 
self-actualization of the personality, for he says spirit 
should be served by personality, that personality should 
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not be allowed to develop as an entity in itself.. Macdonald 
is, instead, interested in bringing all aspects of being 
into a state of integration. His position is largely based 
on Richards' (1964) blend of religion and psychology in using 
the centering concept: 
The imagery of centering is archetypal. To feel the 
whole in every part: The Mystery and Action and Being 
of the whole living organism of oneself and of that 
Self which all of us together make, and of that earth 
where we are humanly born, and of that sun-sphere that 
nourishes us, too, and of all that universe that beats 
its way to us now through millions of trillions of light 
years, making our future its long past. (p. 4) 
Macdonald 1 s (1978b) own definitions reveal, true to the dual 
dialectic, both spiritual and socio-cultural concerns: 
[Centering] is a human experience facilitated in many 
ways by a religious attitude when this attitude encom-
passes the search to find our inner being or to complete 
one's awareness of wholeness and meaning as a person . 
• • , Centering as the aim of education calls for the 
completion of the person or the creation of meaning 
that utilizes all the potential given to each person. 
It in no way conflicts with the accumulated knowledge 
of a culture~ it merely places this knowledge in the 
base or ground from which it grows. As such, centering 
is the fundamental process of human being that makes 
sense of our perceptions and cognitions of reality. 
(pp. ll3-ll4) 
Macdonald (1978b) suggests we ask ourselves these ques-
tions in planning a curriculum based on the value of develop-
ing ability in students and teachers to center themselves 
in the world: 
1. What kinds of activity are encouraged that provide 
for opening up perceptual experiences? 
2. What kinds of activity facilitate the process of 
sensitizing people to others, to inner vibrations? 
3. What kinds of activity provide experiences for 
developing close-knit community relationships? 
4. What kinds of activity encourage and facilitate 
religious experiences? 
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5. What kinds of activity facilitate the development 
of patterned meaning structures? 
6. What ways can we organize knowledge to enlarge human 
potential through meaning? 
7. How can we facilitate the development of inner 
strength and power in in human beings? (p. 114) 
He further suggests certain processes, particular kinds of 
engagement of students in human activity that he sees promising 
for the facilitation of centering: pattern making, playing, 
meditative thinking, imagining, using the aesthetic prin-
ciple, attending to the body an~ understanding our biology 
and educating perception. It can be seen that these questions 
could be asked within the teaching of a variety of subjects; 
the processes could be applied to any number of students • 
interests. Because I will be looking in the next chapter 
at how some of these processes can be offered through art, 
I proceed wih a general discussion of them here. 
Pattern making, according to Macdonald (1978b), is a 
process of creating order in search of meaning and responds 
to the individual's need to transform reality symbolically. 
This personal ordering of one's existence requires opportuni-
ties for subjective encounter with cultural substance if 
the student is to be informed rather than controlled by outer 
reality. The imposition of presenting any subject as a 
collection of unalterable objective facts exacerbates the 
tendency to reify and therefore misuse knowledge. The kind 
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of order found in centering is one of harmony rather than 
rigid control. The process of pattern making necessarily 
honors the dialectic between inner and innermost self, 
together with that of inner and outer experience, both in 
receiving and giving expressions of reality. Symbols, when 
not confused with the essence of that which they represent, 
can then be used for communication rather than idolatry. 
Playing, Macdonald (1978b) says, is the freedom to 
engage in encounter without the pressure of utility. Emphasis 
on process rather than product allows one to open up to rela-
tionships with the world that would otherwise be overlooked 
in the rush from means to end. The courage to trust the 
whole of an experience is developed when focus is shifted 
from outcome to interaction. 
Meditative thinking deals with the question, "Why?", 
with an examination of the fundamental meaning of things, 
Macdonald {1978b) writes. He quotes Heidegger, saying it 
is 11 a releasement toward things,'' an "openness to the mys-
tery" that we must foster rather than utilitarian thinking 
(1978b, p. 118). This would involve providing students with 
opportunities to dwell in primary experiences, giving them 
the time and an atmosphere conducive to reflection on exper-
ience. 
Imagining, Macdonald {197Bb) offers, is a way of 
approaching pattern making, play and meditative thinking 
nonverbally. Opportunities to picture in the mind what is 
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not present to the senses, he says, can put the individual 
in contact with the ground of his being. As has been men-
tioned in the first chapter, imagination necessarily operates 
between distanciaton and appropriation in any act of interpre-
tation and we can only know our very being through interpre-
tation, through reflection on the perception of experience. 
Making this process conscious and developing its creative 
use would have a profound effect on one's ability to center 
himself in the world. 
Using the aesthetic principle involves, for Macdonald 
Read's (1956) argument that the preadolescent education of 
individuals "should move from feeling to drama, sensation 
tb visual and plastic design, intuition to dance and music, 
and through to craft" (Macdonald, 1978b, p. 119). Macdonald 
does not make it clear just what this principle involves 
past that stage other than a general respect for the develop-
ment of feelings, sensations, and thinking as the individual 
grows toward cultural art forms. On the basis of this, he 
believes the activities of dramatization, designing, dancing, 
playing music and making or crafting are important in a 
transcendent ideology. I assume here that Macdonald believes 
the teaching of any subject can and should involve the arts, 
but this is not the kind of teaching through art with which 
I will concern myself in the next chapter since my subject 
is one of the arts. A discussion of Read's (1956) "education 
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through art" is beyond the scope of my work here. I see 
his theory as a prescripton from the outside while am 
attempting to develop a concept of teaching through art from 
the inside, out, from what I believe is important to the 
possibilities for conveying those values through teaching 
art. I take "aesthetic rationality" to mean creative and 
wholistic reasoning which may or may not be evidenced by 
doing any particular kind of art. 
By attending to the body and understanding our biology, 
Macdonald (1978b) urges us to come to grips with our own 
biological being. "To be at home in our bodies," he says, 
is critical for human centering" (p. 119). Because centering 
is a creative process going on continually in nature, man 
could not ignore the place he takes in that process and still 
hope to center himself in his world. That world is appre-
hended and influenced by both the mental and physical aspects 
of our being. To ignore one or the other or fail to recognize 
that they inform each other would be to remain hopelessly 
fragmented. 
Educating perception involves recognizing there are 
many worlds of consciousness that exist aside from our present 
one (W. James in Macdonald, 197Bb, p. 120) and that the cre-
ation of altered states of consciousness is a human potential 
important to the process of centering. I am personally more 
comfortable with the concept of paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1970) 
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than altered states, but on the importance of one's ability 
to open up to different perspectives, I agree. It is the 
use of perception that most concerns me. 
Every time I return to Macdonald's transcendental devel-
opmental ideology it becomes more evident just how complex 
the development of centering can be and how very different 
a curriculum based on centering as an aim would be from any-
thing we see in public schools today. I do return, over 
and over again, because this model comes as close as any 
I have seen to reflecting my own values. This time, how-
ever, I regard Macdonald's work with less idealism and a 
greater sense of coming to it from my own experience than 
I ever have before. I believe he would say this is the result 
of my own centering process and thus more true to the spirit 
of his thinking than a dogmatic application of his sugges-
tions. Throughout the remainder of this work I will refer back 
to aspects of centering and the processes that facilitate 
that process, but a part of my own centering has been to 
bring those aspects into clearer focus. I have, to some 
extent, simplified my view of centering and added .to my sense 
of transcendence this time around. 
The importance of recognizing one's identity is found 
in relationship, of ordering one's existence through harmony 
rather than control and of achieving transcendence through 
appreciation and celebration; these values are both reflected 
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in and, I believe, move beyond my concept of centering. 
I stay with centering and, therefore, with Richards for a 
time, in investigating identity and relationship, but move 
on to Fox to look further into harmony and transcendent com-
passion. 
"What is important?"--Relationship, 
Harmony, and Transcendence 
We exist as respiring, pulsating organisms within a 
sea of life-serving beings. As we become able to hold 
this more and more steadily in our consciousness, we 
experience relatedness at an elemental level. We see 
that it is not a matter of trying to be related, but 
rather of living consciously into the actuality of being 
related. As we yield ourselves to the living presence 
of this relatedness, we find that life begins to possess 
an ease and a freedom and a naturalness that fill our 
hearts with joy. This does not mean that our troubles 
are over. It means that we are readier to live into 
and through our troubles, reaping their meaning. 
(Richards, 1964, p. 39) 
When I first read this passage in Richards' Centering 
(1964), I had to ask, "How does one hold all the diverse 
elements of existence more steadily in her consciousness?" 
My own identity seemed to constantly be spinning off in one 
direction or another. I had trouble enough relating its 
many parts to each other, much less finding relationships 
among those parts to the rest of the world. This mess reso-
nated, though, with what it was like to attempt wheel throw-
ing for the first time in my undergraduate ceramics class, 
so Richards' use of centering in pottery as a metaphor for 
centering in the person made a lot of sense to me. In throwing 
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pots, she explains (Richards, 1973) the substance of clay 
is brought into a condition of stillness at the same time 
it is spinning. That is the initial centering, but the same 
balanced condition must be maintained as the potter works 
the clay up into a vessel. It has to be handled in such 
a way that there is no difference in quality between outer 
and inner surfaces, keeping the balance constant between 
inner consistency and outside influences. Anyone who has 
ever put her hand to this task knows that stillness and spinning 
seem, at first, to be in hopeless opposition to one another. 
Both force and receptivity are required in just the right 
measure to bring the raw lumps of clay into a smooth, even 
mound. Too much force and the clay goes spinning right off 
the wheel, but with merely passive reception to mass and 
movement, it is the hand itself that is thrown helplessly 
about to flop over the uneven surfaces. Once the mound is 
centered, one may rest the hand and enjoy the serenity of 
spinning smoothness, but unless she moves on to yet other, 
even more precise, cycles of pushing and yielding, pulling 
and squeezing, no form can emerge. Without the give and 
take of relationship, centering the clay would be impossi-
ble, thus no pots could ever be thrown. So, I believe, it 
with centering and creating ourselves. 
My discussion of reification and idolatry, at both the 
level of identification of these as problems and of 
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investigating the unevenness they have caused in my life 
and teaching, reveals the extent to which I allowed outside 
forces to overwhelm me and internalized some of them as ideals 
so unyielding that there was little chance of achieving a 
balanced praxis, centered movement between thought and action 
in my life. or theory and practice in m:J teaching. Figure 2 
represents this struggle. Imagine the inescapable hermeneutic 
circle, the process of making meaning against which our lives 
are inevitably cast, as the potter's wheel and Macdonald's 
(l978b, p. 104) dual dialectic, as the inner and outer forces. 
The failure to consciously sound my innermost depths, to 
allow my interaction with the world to be informed by the 
ground of aesthetic knowledge, the rationale that knowledge 
is created and I am part of those who create it, this failure 
to use power reasonably is represented by the uncentered 
lump of clay that veers hopelessly off to one side. The 
metaphor of throwing a pot is useful, but troublesome if 
I extend it much past this point in illustrating the process 
of centering. The understanding I want to convey is just 
how distorted my identity remains as long as I cannot acknow-
ledge the authority man has over his own existence. we ~ 
co-creating reality all the time, but collectively uninformed 
by our connection to the ground of being, the rsul ts cannot 
escape being, to some extent, mad. 
When I take the outer world of experience as the author-
ity in my life, when I allow that which is external to the 
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Figure 2. The dual dialectic within a hermeneutic circle 
including implications for praxis. 
Note that the centered circle is informed by aesthetic know-
ledge, while the off-center blob represents distortion caused 
by failure to recognize my whole self as subject in responding 
to the outer world of experience. 
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sense I make of being alive to be "right" in my mind, I 
sacrifice meaning to symbolism. In school I learned to pros-
per from taking in and giving back "right" answers with 
near perfection and to believe that, because I could do so, 
I could actually be right most of the time. No distinction 
was made between the simple usefulness of correct spelling 
or reading of words, accurate computation of numbers, and 
identifying ourselves as correct, accurate individuals for 
being able to use cultural capital. Such indoctrination 
robbed me of any understanding that one moment in time is 
never the final one--something new may be revealed in the 
next, rendering that which I have already learned obsolete--and 
one's person's perspective is never the only one. Believing 
life was a collection of right answers I needed only to manip-
ulate, this separated me from the I-Thou miracle of sharing 
time and subjectivity with others (Suber, 1970), left me 
other-directed in an I-it sense, dependent on getting and 
spending energy from outside sources. It taught me that 
my own perspective could never be a valid basis for the use 
of my own time and energy and thus separated me from myself, 
as well as alienated me from others. 
"Sometimes one starts to dream, 11 Merleau-Ponty ( 1965) 
writes, "about what culture, literary life, and teaching 
could be if all those who participate, having for once 
rejected idols, would give themselves up to the happiness 
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of reflecting together 11 (p. 242). As Greene (1973, p. 270) 
presents Merleau-Ponty's words here, she states her belief 
that at some level of consciousness the teacher insists on 
just this happiness, that there are no good arguments against 
such a desire. What a contrast she shows, between this happi-
ness and the despair caused by a teacher' s pitting students 
against one another, by sending a message to the student 
"that the proper attitude is not pleasure but competitive 
horror at the success of his classmates'' (Henry, 1963, 
p. 291). As my data shows, seeking that happiness, yet 
experiencing and causing others to experience so much of 
that despair, made me question my identity as a person and 
as a teacher. In the face of seeing objectively existent 
knowledge separate me from the other human beings in my class-
room, remembering how it had separated me from my friends 
as a student, I had to consider the possibility of there 
being some better authority, some ground on which we could 
stand together. 
Richards (1964) poignantly connects our problem with 
knowing who we are to believing we should be something dif-
ferent, some successful representative of the idols we have 
made of knowledge: 
It is difficult to be as simple as we are, and as 
natural, and as beautiful. We are oppressed and inhib-
ited by concepts which are Luciferic in their pride 
and in their disobedience. They are temptations. We 
may, for example, be tempted to think that when we speak, 
we must say something intelligent and worth hearing. 
But we don't really know what intelligence is. Nor 
may we easily judge worth. If we would speak simply 
to one another, sincerely, in our most natural human 
concern, with body warmth--if we say "hello" in such 
a spirit, what could be more poetic or wiser or more 
dazzling? (pp. 92-93) 
So far from the prescriptive methods and techniques one 
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encounters in teacher training courses, Richards ( 1964) sug-
gests we simply ~ as simple as we ~: 
An act of the self, that's what one must make. An act 
of the self, from me to you. From center to center. 
We must mean what we say, from our innermost heart to 
the outermost galaxy. Otherwise we are lost and dizzy 
in a maze of reflections. We carry light within us. 
There is no need merely to reflect. Others carry light 
within them. These 1 ights must wake to each other. 
My face is real. Yours is. Let us find our way to our 
initiative. 
For must we not show ourselves to each other, and will 
we not know then who are the teachers and who are the 
students? Do we not all learn from one another? (p. 18) 
Fox (1986a) speaks of the gifts we give each other when 
we come to recognize the light within, learn to uncover its 
brilliance and manifest our natural wisdom. He sees centering 
as a practice of meditation in which we return home, using 
"home" in much the same sense as Macdonald's "ground of being" 
and Richards' reference to archetypal images. Fox believes 
the result of making contact with our deepest and truest 
images is an act of giving birth to them in some particular 
form. This gift, he says, is given to the entire universe: 
To center is to make contact with our origins, our 
beginnings, our original wisdom and original blessedness. 
Then we take this centering energy and release it in 
our creative gifting back to the universe, back to the 
community. (Fox, l986a, p. 10) 
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The purpose of education, then, is to educe that gift, for 
education Fox says, .!..! educing; its aim is commensurate with 
that for all of life: 11 to draw out the radiance of the uni-
verse11 (Fox, 198Gb) .. 
Again, as Freire (1982) so clearly states, this pursuit 
of our full humanity can only be carried out in fellowship 
and solidarity, it cannot unfold between oppressor and 
oppressed (p .. 73). Throughout my report and letters the 
problem of control and the promise of harmony are identified 
as important concerns. The concepts of compassion and crea-
tivity, as Fox (1979) uses them, connect my concern for finding 
identity in relationship to finding order in harmony. Both 
compassion and creativity mean, for Fox, connection, com-
passion being the thought, in a sense, the impulse to connect, 
and creativity being the action, the practice of connection. 
It is in nart as meditationn that Fox reveals compassionate 
creation as harmonious use of power to experience and manifest 
relationship: 11 The power that is practiced and refined in 
art as meditation is not and can never be a power-over or 
a power-under. . It is power with 11 {Fox, 1983, p. 195, 
emphasis mine) • Before I move on to investigate the use 
of art in such a power relationship, I would like to spend 
some time on the way this compassion/creation praxis reflects 
an aesthetic, rather than a technological rationality. 
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First, compassion is, according to Fox (1979), by defi-
nition, shared--the root of the word coming from cum patior 
meaning "to suffer with, to undergo with, to share solidarity 
with" (p. 3). Fox presents a series of statements further 
clarifying the meaning he makes of compassion: 
Compassion is not pity but celebration. 
Compassion is not sentiment but is making justice and 
doing works of mercy. 
Compassion is not private, egocentric or narcissistic 
but public. 
Compassion is not mere human personalism but is cosmic 
in its scope and divine in its energies. 
Compassion is not about ascetic detachments or abstract 
contemplation but is passionate and caring. 
Compassion is not anti-intellectual but seeks to know 
and to understand the interconnections of all things. 
Compassion is not religion but a way of life, i.e., 
a spirituality. 
Compassion is not a moral commandment but a flow and 
overflow of the fullest human and divine energies. 
Compassion is not altruism but self-love and other-love 
at one. 
(From the Table of Contents to Fox's A Spirituality 
Named Compassion, 1979) (no page no.) 
As I understand Fox (1979), creativity does--makes 
connections--what compassion ~--the realization of the 
innerconnectedness of all things: 
The very heart of being creative is seeing relations 
between matter and form that no one has ever imagined 
before or that people deeply want and need to see. 
It is this act of seeing connections that seems to form 
the heart of creative consciousness. • • . Perhaps com-
passion and creativity are in fact the same energy. 
For both seem to operate at the deep level of intercon-
nections! Compassion is seeing, recognizing, tasting 
the interconnections; creativity is about making the 
connections. (p. 127) 
Implied here is that an aesthetic rationality, a creative 
consciousness, is "intellectual, 11 a word generally reserved 
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for technological rationalitye It is intellectual because 
it is compassionate--,compassion being inherently intellectual 
because it seeks to know and to understand not merely the 
usefulness, but the innerconnectedness of all thingse 
Fox (1979) uses two mystical symbols to illustrate the 
contrasting dynamics of linear and circular views of relation-
ship in Christian mysticism, but looking back at positivism 
and the Tyler Model of curriculum Planning as Macdonald and 
Purpel (1987) compare them to aesthetic rationality and a 
critical/imaginative model, these symbols can illuminate 
differences between linear and wholistic approaches to edu-
cation, as well: 
Climbing Jacob 1 s Ladder 
ae up/down 




fe restrictive, elitist: sur-




j . ruthlessly independent 
k. zealous and judgment-
oriented 
1 e abstract, distance making 
m. linear, ladder-like 
n. theistic {immanent or 
transcendent 
o. love of neighbor is sepa-
rate from love of what is 
at the top 
Dancing Sarah 1 s Circle 
a. ~n/out 
b. global village 
c. dancing, celebrating 
de satisfying 
e. shared 
fe welcoming, non-elitist 
survival of all 
g. democratic 
h. strong and gentle 
i .. earth-oriented 
j • interdependent 
k. pride-producing and 
non-judgmental 
1. nurturing and sensual 
m .. curved, circle-like 
n. panetheistic (transparent) 
o. love of neighbor is 
love of God -
(p. 45) 
The image of dancing with others, of celebrating our connec-
tion to one another rather than stepping over or being 
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ti:'arnpled under each other on the narrow way to questionable 
success, this to me is a beautiful use of our energy, a har-
monious way of experiencing and establishing order. Fox 
(1979) believes the hierarchical, up/down, climbing symbolism 
of Jacob's Ladder legitimates secular violence, but when one 
applies it to Freire's (1982) identification of the banking 
concept in education, legitimation of violence to students, 
too, is characterized by this view of maintaining order 
through rigid control. 
Richards (1964) speaks of centering as a process in which 
"freedom and obedience marry in love" (p. 132).. What kind 
of obedience can be married to freedom? I believe I was 
asking this question when I tried, in my reports and letters, 
to deal with the issue of duality,, of not being able to choose 
skill and imagination at the same time because from a linear 
point of view they appeared mutually exclusive. When one 
is looking down a straight path, that on which one focuses 
can obscure the viewing of something else farther on down 
the line or cause the viewer to ignore the surrounding con-
text that connects what .!.§. seen to all that could be seen. 
At one point in my letters I turned from rigid categories 
in art education literature to the Kabbalah, to Scholem' s 
{1969) presentation of the myth of the sparks of life to 
be recognized and recovered in all things (see pp. 58-140). 
Looking back at this symbolism, I am reminded that the 
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Shekhinah, the "indwelling 11 of God in the world, was scat-
tered by separation of masculine and feminine principles 
in God. Bringing "home 11 the fallen sparks is seen as a 
marriage festival, as acting in accordance with the law of 
Sabbath rest. Might this not be a resting in each other? 
An obedience to the presence of that spark of life in every 
one of us? 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty--that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
(Keats, quoted in Dewey, 1934, p. 34) 
Resting in the truth, this makes sense to me, but only if it is 
the truth of relationship--of moving in "the between"--that 
order Buber sees in the beauty of the person meeting his world 
{Friedman in Buber, 1965, p. 58). We have lived for so long 
with another idea of truth, .of absolutes that Welch (1985) says 
give us the false security of "safe boundaries 11 (p. 77) and pre-
vent us from shifting focus and striking new balances. welch 
{1985) makes a striking comment on this when she warns, "In 
the United States we could conclude that the statement is 
the opiate of the people" (p .. 82).. I do not believe this 
is l.imited to our country or any one ideology.. Definitive 
statements that are not allowed to change with the shifting 
context of our lives, these are the means by which we reify 
and idolize, participate in the decadent praxis of social 
control. Here is where competition, compulsion and dualism 
murder compassion. 
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Neither competition nor compulsion can be lived out 
on any basis other than dualism. To see life in terms of 
"either/or" (Fox, 1979, p. 80), this robs us of a dialectical 
consciousness, of a "both/and" (Fox, 1979, p. 83), relational 
way of thinking and living. Fox provides a list of dualisms 
that, upon consideration from a both/and perspective, auto-































































believer I non-believer 
body/soul 




blue collar/white collar 




















(Fox, 1979, pp. 81, 82) 
I have presented this list in its entirety because a reading 
of it, with conscious intent to hold in one's mind the dialec-
tical possibilities, is bound to bring out in the reader some 
competitive and compulsive emotions. One experiences how 
different this way of thinking is and can only imagine what 
it might be like to be able to embrace all aspects of just 
one of these dualities. 
I have referred to harmonious order as "beautiful," 
related the praxis of compassion and creativity to Keats • 
"beauty as truth. 11 The concept of beauty as harmonious order 
is connected to a both/ and, dialectical, consciousness in 
Fox's {1983) words: 
Beauty has to do with seeing all of life as blessing, 
with returning blessing for blessing, with forging 
blessing of pain and suffering and tragedy and loss. 
Beauty needs to be made and remade. It is the vital 
work of the artist within ourselves. (p. 218) 
This brings me" to the final issue identified in my data, 
that of valuing the possibilities of transcendence through 
application and celebration. How ~ we co-create transcen-
dent realities, order shared existence in such a way as to 
include rather than exclude the spark of life within all 
things? To make and remake beauty, to bless the world with 
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ourselves, involves an understanding of the creative process 
as well as the truth of our interconnectedness; it involves 
creativity as the acting out of compassion. 
The way I see it, appreciation involves recognizing 
the universal, being so in love with eternity that we are 
capable of embracing all things. Celebration, then, involves 
choosing, among those elements embraced, some way of mani-
testing the ones that resonate with our particular experience 
of them in time and space. I have come to see these concepts 
in this way through a synthesis of a number of writers • 
thoughts on art and religion. My concept of transcendence 
has been influenced by Macodnald and Hesche!. Macdonald 
quotes Soleri here on matter becoming spirit, the transfer-
mation ~f matter through conscious living rather than the 
belief that matter de:termines the nature of our existence. 
I see most of the equivocation, the inability to act, 
as the gap between the nuts and bolts fanatic and the 
spiritualist ... the bridge between the matter and 
spirit is matter becoming spirit. This flow from the 
indefinite-infinite into the utterly subtle is the moving 
arch pouring physical matter into the godliness of con-
sciousness and metaphysical energy. This is the context, 
the place where we must begin anew. (Soleri in Macdon-
ald, l981a, p. 147) 
Close to Macdonald 1 s belief in matter becoming spirit is 
Hesche! 1 s urging us to fill time with spirit: 
Eternity was not attained by those who bartered time 
for space but by those who knew how to fill their time 
with spirit •..• The great problem was time rather 
than space; the task was how to convert timeinto eter-
nity rather than how to fill space. (Heschel, 1951, 
p. 411 
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As I understand Heschel, if we decide how we want to use 
our time, the way we work with space will reflect that deci-
sian. It is Hesche! who tells me to work with the things 
of space, for I am in space and I must respond to it, but 
to deal with matter from a certain perspective on time. 
Heschel (1951) urges me to work with space "but to be in 
love with eternity 11 (p. 48). This way the symbols we create 
can participate in the whole of our existence as particular 
instances of eternal truth. 
Living one• s life as art is, according to Dewey (1934), 
unavoidable, because even the simplest interaction of organism 
and environment creates, transforms apparent dualities into 
n~w unities (p. 23). "Art as experience" (Dewey, 1934) has 
always made more sense to me as a process involving the whole 
context of living rather than in the narrow sense of produc-
ing artifacts. Hegel (1905) speaks to 11 living as artist" 
and situates that process in the dialectic between universal 
and particular: 
For every human being while he lives, seeks to realize 
himself, and does realize himself with respect to beauty 
and art this receives the meaning of living as artist and 
forming one's life artistically. (p. 160) 
The philosophic conception of the beautiful, to indicate 
its true nature at least by anticipation, must contain, 
reconciled within it, the two extremes (particularity 
and universality), by combining metaphysical universality 
with the determinateness of real particularity. Only 
thus is it apprehended in its truth, in its real and 
explicit nature. It is then fertile out of its own 
resources, in contrast to the barrenness of one-sided 
reflection. (p. 77) 
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Consciously living out that which is born of our exper-
ience is the holy result of participating in the creative 
process, a process in which we move, as individuals, in rela-
tionship to the whole of existencee Fox presents this dia-
lectic, in three stages, from Arieti' s view of the creative 
process. I include it here in simplified form: 
A. The Primary Process involves recognizing the need 
for disorder experienced as an openness to all 
elements and is expressed through play and imagai-
nation. 
B. The Secondary Process involves recognizing the 
need for choosing experienced as decision-making 
and is expressed through ordering and forming that 
which has been imagined. 
c. The Tertiary Process involves realizing a synthesis 
in which a new apprehension of the whole is made 
possible through manifesting a subjective combina-
tion of its parts. (From Arieti [1976] in Fox, 
1979, pp. 129-131) 
Fox (1983) believes when we fail to create it is because we 
fail to choose one image in preference to another, we fail 
to trust our partial view of the whole. After making this 
study of reification and idolatry, I believe, with Dewey 
(1934), that we cannot fail to create, but that we can cer-
tai"nly fail to create with wisdom. When we trust a partial 
view as the whole instead of as part of the whole process of 
making meaning, we are still making a choice. Something 
comes from every choice we make, whether it is informed by 
the recognition of our interconnectedness or not. This is 
why an emphasis on appreciation and celebration is important 
to my understanding of a moral curriculum. If appreciation 
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of life as a whole is encouraged and opportunity is provided 
for celebration of our part in it, the realities we co-create 
stand a greater chance of being transcendent, of taking us on 
and on into positive possibilities. 
I speak with care of the creative process, of art, of 
any use of symbols. It is too easy to make monsters here to 
take up space and waste our time. I still, after all this 
struggle to turn my thinking aruond, move on to art as a 
subject, with some sense of dread. Relationship, harmony 
and transcendence, these concepts mean more to me now than I 
could ever have imagined they would when I first began to 
identify them. The light in them reveals, not just the 
error in reification and idolatry, but a way to avoid future 
mistakes. I carry them with me into the next chapter as 
guides I trust will see me through what has been before a 
tangle of doubt and fear. 
In opening my mind to the possibilities of teaching "what 
is important" through art, I will be moving back and forth 
between my past experience and present hope. It is, again, 
a relief to note that at the end of yet another cycle of 
this study I can say I have more hope than when I started, 
that I can see its development throughout this chapter and 
feel encouraged to move on to the next. 
CHAPTER III 
ART AS IDOLATRY 
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In the previous chapter I followed a general cycle from 
developing my understanding of reification to recognizing 
the implications that understanding holds for becoming more 
responsible in curricular decision-making. discussed the 
way in which I see reification can lead to idolatry--how 
the objectification of knowledge allows us to worship some 
aspects of the meaning we co-create and ignore others. Such 
objectification fails to take into account the socially con-
structed nature of reality, denying our part in choosing 
future realities and limiting our choices to dualistic 
alternatives which do not reflect the whole realm of what 
is possible. The sense of responsibility that grew out of 
this understanding is characterized by an "ability to respond" 
to my world from an aesthetic rationality rather than the 
technological rationality that tends toward reification. 
This ability to respond comes from a recognition of the need 
for allowing my epistemological position to be informed by 
a wholistic ontology and thus reform the axiological base 
from which I move to take action in the world. That cycle 
has led me to see within an aesthetic rationality the possi-
bility for a praxis of compassion and creativity that honors 
108 
our relationship to one another through participating in 
art as a sacred process. Before discussing such possibil-. 
ity, however, I need to apply my understanding of reification 
and idolatry to art as a subject, to ways in which art has 
been viewed that have not been transcendent. 
Reification and the Idolatrous Use of Art 
Because art can be seen as both a process and a product, 
because it can be both a way of knowing--of making meaning, 
and a symbol representing that which is known--of the meaning 
made by the process, reification can occur at either level 
or on both levels at once. Both the process and the products 
of that process, be they knowledge about art--art history 
and theory--or the artifacts themselves, can become so objec-
tified that we reserve the process for an elite few and even 
regard knowledge about their work to be understandable only 
through expert analysis. Recalling Berger and Luckmann 
(1967)' 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena 
as if they were things, that is, in non-human or 
possibly supra-human terms • • . the apprehension of 
the products of human activity as if they were something 
else than human products. (p. 89) 
When art is set apart from everyday life--set above it as 
an objectively existent cultural tradition characterized 
by a specialized set of standards against which all visual 
communication must be measured to qualify as art-- both a 
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way humans make meaning and those meanings which can be made 
are reified, thus limited in scope and use .. 
Recalling my understanding of idolatry through Tillich 
(1957) --the act of mistaking a symbol for that which it was 
made to represent, of attributing consummate meaning to a 
partial expression of reality, when only a portion of all 
that could be art is taken to be the definition of either 
the art process or the art product, then either making or 
consuming becomes idolatrous.. Art can be used by both artist 
and art critic/historian in a way that dominates and alien-
ates those without the "correct'' form of talent or specialized 
knowledge.. It has been left open to question by Marx and 
Engels whether or not art can be used for anything but domina-
tion and alienation as long as any one group of people have 
the power to control what counts as knowledge, to enforCe 
those particular meanings which serve their own interests 
(see Arvon, 1970; Habermas, 1971; Young, 1971}. This view 
has been tempered by the Frankfurt School's emphasis on art 
and consciousness in everyday life and culture (see Giroux, 
1983), but for now I will remain with the problem of domination 
and alienation in art and reserve a discussion of possible 
solutions for the final chapter. 
I have written at length in the previous chapter about 
reified knowledge used by teachers as a kind of currency 
in the oppressive "banking approach" to education (Freire, 
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1982). Now I turn to the specifics of viewing art as cul-
tural capital. Art is considered so special by our culture 
that people who can do or understand it well within its insti-
tutionalized boundaries are set apart and above the general 
population. This elitism involves domination of the art 
specialist (artist or art critic/historian) by the reified 
meanings and processes in which he participates, as well 
as domination over those who are "ordinary'' by the specialist. 
This elitism also involves alienation for both. The art 
specialist is alienated from his own processes and products 
because he has given his power to make meaning over to art 
as an objectively existent field of endeavor and the ordinary 
person in everyday life is alienated from the very prospect 
of doing or understanding art--making or receiving meaning 
through art--because the concept of what counts as art is 
controlled by the institution called "art." That there may 
be many ways to do art and many different kinds of objects 
that can symbolize this way of knowing and doing stays outside 
the awareness of most people, the aritst and art critic/ 
historian included, because one particular way or another 
is accepted as the only way at a given time or within a given 
power structure. "Only" ways acceptable in one time or place 
may very well contradict an "only" way acceptable in another, 
but these contradictions are easly overlooked because of 
the very 1 inear, dua 1 istic way of thinking encouraged by 
pressure to maintain a status quo. 
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With regard to what art "should" be according to some 
set standard, Richards (1964) writes: 
A pot should this, and a pot should that--! have little 
patience with these prescriptions. I cannot escape 
paradox when I look deep into things, in the crafts 
as well as in poetry in metaphysics or in physics. 
(p. II) 
Perhaps most of us feel this way on some level--that our 
personal meaning making and its expression is too subjective, 
too much a part of our own complex ordering of experience 
to be easily judged by an external, fixed measure. I felt 
that way when I disappointed my second grade teacher by 
painting a messy turkey, as I related in Chapter I, but I 
also felt I had to cover up whatever it was inside of me 
that insisted on my being allowed to "speak with my owri voice." 
I have referred to Freire's ( 1982) concept of violence as 
"any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging 
in the process of inquiry" (p. 73) --any means of alienating 
men from their own decision-making. The art teacher who 
prescribes, according to Barnes (1954), literally robs stu-
dents of the opportunity for genuine experience, creates, 
according to James (1974), a "false gap between perceiving 
and thinking" (p. 111). Welch (1985) writes of the "indignity 
of speaking for others" (p. 44), but it seems to me that 
in art there can also be the indignity of asking others to 
speak for the teacher and the art world she represents 
instead of for oneself when making art. When this happens, 
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art--a subject we profess to be all about the processes and 
products of imagination--actually alienates the student from 
his own imagination. 
Bowers (1974) notes the effect such alienation has on 
the student: 
When the individual experiences alienation he is less 
able to use his freedom in an autonomous and construc-
tive manner. The feeling of meaninglessness or apathy 
that he experiences also cuts him off from seeing 
possible choices that can be made. In effect, the exis-
tential mood we associate with being alienated tends 
to restrict imagination and to erode one's will to act. 
In not being meaingfully involved in an experience the 
individual tends to act more passively and, thus, to 
not take responsibility. Events control his behavior, 
not because he believes in them or has a deep sense 
of commitment but because his level of personal involve-
ment is so low he ceases to exercise his own imagination 
or to take responsibility. (p. 76) 
One of the most startling accounts of how school life in 
general violates the students' very sense of being is pre-
sented by Gross and Osterman (1971) in their printing the 
diary entry of a 13-year-old student in a New York City public 
school: 
November 20. I think I lost my soc~al studies book. 
This is a major crime, but it can happen so easily. 
Maybe I left it home. Any little thing that happens 
to you in school that's not right or any mistake you 
make is 1 ike one piece taken out of you by the teacher, 
and by the end of the year, you're virtually nothing. 
(p. 89) 
How much more diminished must the student feel in an art 
class when he is required to use his own eyes, his own mind, 
his own hand to express someone else's vision? 
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Dewey (1934) says we cannot live without the process 
of ordering our experience, for our very survival depends 
on finding ways to incorporate our environment into our-
selves. When Henry (1963) relates the prevalent attitude 
that "He (the student) must learn ... that the proper way 
to paint is the way the teacher says, not the way he sees 
it. . (p. 271), I believe Dewey would say this is evi-
dence that the most basic level of existence is being tampered 
with. External organization, according to Dewey (1934), 
is not order because it does not integrate growing experience. 
He has harsh words for those who interfere with the student's 
right to authentic experience: 
Arrest of the process of growth is really the arrest 
of intelligent living, of education. Growth, intelli-
gent living, education have many enemies. They are, unfor-
tunately, re-enforced by the practices- which dominate 
the professed agencies of education, the schools and 
institutions called educational. {Dewey, 1954a, p. 4) 
There is a danger here of appearing to advocate laissez-
faire chaos in reaction to authoritarian didacticness, both 
extremes that James ( 1972) warns are disenchanting to the 
learner--prevent necessary sense of involvement and develop-
ment of competence (p. 104). Dewey, especially, has 
been read this way, so it is helpful to turn to his own 
att.empt to set the record straight: 
Unfortunately, the history of schools not only in art 
but in all lines shows a swing of the pendulum between 
extremes, though it must be admitted that the simile 
of the pendulum is not a good one, for the schools remain, 
most of them, most of the time, near one extreme, 
instead of swinging periodically and evenly between 
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the two. Anyway, the two extremes are external imposi-
tion and dictation, and "free-expression.'' Revel t from 
the costly, nerve-taxing and inadequate results of 
mechanical control from without creates an enthusiasm 
for spontaneity and "development from within," as it 
is often phrased. It is found that children at first 
are then much happier in their work ••• but gradually 
tend to become listless and finally bored, while there 
is an absence of cumulative, progressive development 
of power and of actual achievement in results. Then 
the pendulum swings back to regulation by the ideas, 
rules and orders of someone else, who being maturer, 
better informed and more experienced is supposed to 
know what should be done and how to do it. 
(Dewey, 1954b, pp. 32-33) 
Dewey•s Art as Experience (1934) cannot be used to support 
either extreme, for it is the dialectical nature of experience 
he intends art to express: 
Experience, in the degree in which it is experience, 
is heightened vitality. Instead of si9nifying being 
shut up within one • s own private feelings and sensa-
tions, it signifies active and alert commerce with the 
world: at its height, it signifies complete interpene-
tration of self and the world of objects and events. 
(p.l9) 
Dewey (1954b) is neither anti-tradition nor anti-skill. 
Tradition and skill represent human experience with which 
the student can profitably interact. Of this he writes: 
As a general proposition no one would deny that personal 
mental growth is furthered in any branch of human under-
taking by contact with the accumulated and sifted exper-
ience of others in that line. (p. 33) 
It is only when 11 tradition is no longer tradition but a fixed 
and absolute convention 11 (l954b, p. 36) that Dewey objects 
to subjecting students to external authority. As for the 
other extreme, a policy of nonintervention, Dewey (1954b) 
find this so implausible that he says of it: 
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There is a present tendency in so-called advanced 
schools of educational thought ... to say, in effect, 
let us surround pupils with certain materials, tools; 
appliances, etc., and then let pupils respond to these 
things according to their own desires. Above all let 
us not suggest any end or plan to the students; let 
us not suggest to them what they shall do, for that 
is an unwarranted trespass upon their sacred intellec-
tual individuality since the essence of such individual-
ity is to set up ends and aims. 
Now such a method is really stupid. For it attempts 
the impossible, which is always stupid; and it miscon-
ceives the conditions of independent thinking. There 
are a multitude of ways of reacting to surrounding condi-
tions, and without some guidance from experience these 
reactions are almost sure to be causal, sporadic and 
ultimately fatiguing, accompanied by nervous strain. 
Since the teacher has presumably a greater background 
of experience, there is the same presumption of the 
right of a teacher to make suggestions as to what to 
do. (p. 37) 
It seems so simple to Dewey that teacher and student can 
just share in a discussion regarding what is to be done if 
the teacher's experience is not idolized, nor the subject 
nor the position of the student. It is interesting to note 
that Welch (1985), in addition to warning of the indignity 
of speaking for others, writes also of the power of conversa-
tion to reveal truth. 
When culture is reified, symbols representing it get in 
the way of our discourse with each other and the world. When 
cultural expressions are allowed to be "lived interpreta-
tions," Winter ( 1981) says they empower participation in 
symbolic discourse (p. 67); the dialectic between what has 
been created and what might be created is honored (Winter, 
1985). This is why Macdonald's (1978b) "pattern making" is 
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so important to me. It involves finding identity in rela-
tionship, harmony and transcendence--all three of my major 
curricular concerns: 
This critical process reflec'ts itself in the need to 
transform reality symbolically, to create order in search 
of meaning, and it is fundamental for locating oneself 
in time and space and for providing cognitive awareness 
that may facilitate centering. The pattern making 
process must be distinguished clearly from the trans-
mission of preformed patterns to the individual. 
Although cultural substance can never be formless by 
definition, the emphasis placed upon the nature of the 
individual encounter is critical. Thus, pattern making 
would emphasize the creative and personal ordering of 
cultural data as the individual engaged in activity. 
(p. liS) 
It seems to me that all the other processes Macdonald includes 
in his transcendental developmental ideology--playing, medi-
tative thinking, imagining, the aesthetic principle, the body 
and our biology are the education of perception--are involved 
in this one overall process of pattern making. With regard 
to teaching art, I believe reification and idolatry can be 
avoided at both the level of process and product, if teachers 
and students remain aware of their part in co-creating the 
very culture in which they participate when they study or 
practice art. 
To remain aware of the intersubjective nature of reality, 
neither the individual nor society (I include a reified notion 
of the subject in using the term "society") can receive exclu-
sive focus. Whenever a curr icul urn bases instruction on one 
at the expense of the other, information will inevitably 
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be partial and thus idolatrous. Dewey's (1954b) 11 swing of 
the pendul urn" view of trends in art education provides a 
general picture of the problem of moving between the 
extremes of "laissez-faire chaos" and "authoritarian didac-
ticness" {James' 1972 terminology is the most useful I have 
found for describing these extremes, p. 104), where the indi-
vidual is everything at one point and society, as in social 
structure, is all at another. A more specific discussion 
of the history of art education will reveal, however, that 
the swings have been less dramatic and the focus more blurred 
than the general picture would indicate. 
A Brief History of Art Education 
From reference to Dewey's {1954b) general assessment 
of broad swings in education between emphasis placed on the 
individual and emphasis placed on fitting the individual 
into the existing social structure through imposing tradition 
as absolute convention rather than allowing tradition its 
place as cultural substance from which the individual emerges 
and to which he responds and contributes, I turn now to a 
specific discussion of the idolatrous use of art in art edu-
cation when either the place of individual expression is 
overemphasized or art as subject matter is reified through 
the imposition of fixed cultural standards for both making 
and viewing art. There are certain tensions and contradic-
tions within and between the various movements that have 
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taken place in the history of art education. Skill develop-
ment and the place of art history and art theory in art cur-
ricula have received emphasis over individual expression at 
times while the reverse has been the case at other times, as 
can be seen in Hamblen, s (1984) art education chronology. 
Since it is difficult to promote creative expression without 
some emphasis on developing skills and understanding the socio-
cultural context within which the individual does art, and 
difficult to present skill as important and tradition as 
important to art education without situating the individual 
within that tradition as having a dialectical purpose for 
using skills to create expressions that transform cultural 
substance, the question of a teacher's choosing between the 
extremes of creative expression and cultural transmission 
as rigid and opposing categories for curricul urn development 
presents blatant contradictions. 
The instrumental use of cultural substance to promote 
competition and conformity through dependence on certain 
standards of excellence in using media and interpreting art 
history and theory within strict boundaries of a reified body 
of knowledge is not an issue particular to teaching art per 
se, but an issue that involves this "hidden curriculum" (see 
Giroux & Purpel, 1983) in the teaching of all subjects when 
emphasis is placed on opportunity for individual achievement 
of certain goals seen by society to have merit without regard 
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to the individual's need to confront cultural substance in a 
personally meaningful way. Because the movements in art edu-
cation have led curricular decision-making in the field 
closer and closer to the same sense of "acceptable academic 
standards" as that characteristic of other subject matter 
taught in public schools, however, the gap between art as a 
joyous activity for creative human expression and art as 
instrumental to achievement in a meritocracy has grown in-
creasingly wider. Reduction of the tensions and contradic-
tions that have characterized this movement is part of the 
movement itself. Reviews of art education history may be 
reduced to several pat categories for the purpose of advocat-
ing this view of curriculum development in art as necessarily 
evolving toward the clarification and establishment of art as 
subject matter crucial to the overall movement of education 
toward excellence (for example, see Eisner, 1984). When this 
is done, much of the ambiguity and thus the confusion that 
the classroom teacher faces is lost to the generalizations. 
For this reason, I have chosen to present Hamblen's (1984) 
art education chronology because she seeks to avoid reduc-
tion as much as possible in representing "the" history of 
art education as "a" history--avowedly her history of the 
field. 
Hamblen (1984) is careful to explain that any history 
is "a process of selection and interpretation" (p. 111). In 
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presenting her categories with their descriptions and focus, 
because she is committed to a very broad selection and mul-
tiple interpretations, I believe Hamblen's chronology will 
illustrate the complexity of curricul urn development in the 
field of art education over a long period of time. For con-
sidering later the most current trend--the development of 
discipline-based art programs promoted by the J. Paul Getty 
Trust (Getty Center for Education in the Arts, 1985), Ham-
blen's work provides a basis for understanding movements 
leading up to this approach that does not exclude instances 
when goals overlap. 
An art textbook for teacher training will generally cover 
the broad swings between emphasis on society (including the 
subject as a social institution) and on the individual. Gait-
skell, Hurwitz and Day {1982), for example, move from a dis-
cussion of Walter Smith's incorporation of European models 
of art education for industry into the schools here in the 
United States during the nineteenth century to Frank Cizek's 
emphasis on the child's artistic expression early in the 
twentieth century. Then there is presented the swing from 
the Child Study Movement to Dow and Sargent's more struc-
tured teaching of the elements and principles of design and 
Farnum's narrow offering of art appreciation in the twenties 
and thirties. From the Synthetic movement and Picture Study 
movement, however, there is another swing over to Victor 
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D'Amico's and Viktor Lowenfeld' s emphasis on the psycholog-
ical implications of creative expression for the individua'l, 
a movement which began in the forties and fifties but has 
continued throughout the sixties and into the seventies. 
Finally there is the current swing back to an emphasis on 
external structure in the view of art as a body of knowledge 
held by such educators as Edmund Feldman, Elliot Eisner, and 
Ralph Smith. 
The divisions between these movements, even the dates 
including their influence, become less clear as Hamblen sets 
them in her chronology. I present here, for the purposes of 
comparison and setting out a detailed background of informa-
tion for further discussion of the trend toward a technological 
rationale, a view of Hamblen • s categories--their descriptions 
and focus--along a time line divided into three parts that 
loosely correspond with the Gaitskell et al. (1982) overview. 
These charts are adapted from Hamblen's (1984) seven charts 
(pp. 118-120) depicting in greater detail the development of 
art education from 1750 to 1983, from Industrial Drawing 
through the Progressive movement and Age of Art Education 
Heroes to the identification of art as subject matter in 
Aesthetic Education up to the current trend toward establish-
ing a discipline based curriculum as is represented by the 
J. Paul Getty Trust program. (See Charts 1, 2, and 3.) 
Art Education, 175D-188D 
Date Descriptor 




183D Child Guided 
Pictorial Drawing 
185D Disciplined Perception 
187D Systematic Instruction 




Art for moral and practical uses 
Drawing primary, copying from two-dimensional examples for disci-
plinedthinking 
Art to train industrial designer 
Step-by-step lessons 
Monitorial and rote system 
Geometric, linear drawing 
Drawing related to writing and language skills 
Emphasis on drawing accuracy for perceptual skills, disciplined 
thinking 
linear renderings of geometric forms, nature and ornamentations 
Unfolding of child's potential through art 
Pictorial/free drawing 
Originality fostered 
learning through experience 
Based on Froebel's kindergartens 
Transcendental base 
Prussian rote methods (Peter Schmidt) 
Copying of type forms 
Art for respite from "academics" 
Drawing related to penmanship 
linear geometricism 
Simple to complex drawing lessons 
Through art instruction, beauty accessible to all citizens 
Art for occupational training 
Teacher-directed copying 













1871- (Walter Smith) 
1881 
1875 Sensory learning 
Oswego Movement 
1880 Form Study 
1880 Correlated Study 
Integrated Study 




South Kensington System 
Art skills as logically analyzable 
Subject matter 
Outline, nonexpressive drawing 
Geometric and ornamental 
Distinction between design and fine arts (pictorial) 
Applied arts, arts combined 
Training of designers, engineers 
Analytic approach to nature 
Drawing accuracy related to correct thinking 
Adult learning behaviors as models 
Product oriented 
Knowledge primary over experience 
Use of visual instuctional aids 
learning based on concrete experience 
Drawing from actual objects 
Prevalent use of type solids, model casts 
Art related to other subject areas 
Manual, fine arts, crafts integrated 
Self-active learner 
Learning based on child-environment interaction 
Art as self-expression 
Social utility of art through development of responsible citizens 
Drawing from natural world and later geometric simplification 
Child's process of learning 
Art as expression of ideas rather than training of manual skills 




Art Education, 188D-1945 
Date Descriptor 
1880 Child-Study Movement 
(theory) 
189D Multi-media 
1890- Picture Study Movement 
1925 (Art Appreciation) 
1900 Aesthetic Movement 
1900- Synthetic Method 
193D (Arthur Wesley Dow) 






Stages of child art and child development 
Child as possessing unique qualities 
Color incorporated in drawings 
Use of water-colors, crayons, colored paper, clay 
Interest in compositional prinicples 
Media used for self-expression, not just production 
Spiritual and moral con-sequences of art appreciation 
Beauty equated with morality 
Standard art collections available to schools 
"Post card" size reproductions, noncolor 
Art to beautify school and conmunity 
Academic ideals of beauty 
Teacher-originated curriculum 
"Great" works to be studied 
Nobility of art study {for integration of humanity) 
Instinct emphasized over intellect 
Pictorial drawing rather than academic outline 
Expressive line and color 
Art for self-actualization, but specific exercises in logically 
stepped instruction 
Art as subject matter 
Art nouveau ornamentation popular 
Drawing from nature 
Composition studied (line, color) 
Forerunner of basic design classes 
Related to Bauhaus approach 
Variety of art materials used and their character studied 
Child-initiated learning 
process oriented 
Teacher as guide 
Whole child vs. training of artist 
Copying avoided 













1930 Social Consciousness 





Art as Therapy 




Art for Social Responsibility 
Descri p_tion 
Art integrated with corrrnunity life 
All art forms studied 
Art study for morality 
Promotion of good taste and aesthetic responsibility 
Self-expression for social good 
Oecl ine in art appreciation (fine art) approach 
Art for personal adjustment, for emotional release 
Art indicator of personality (used as a diagnostic tool) 
Art as leisure-time activity 
Art integrated with other subjects 
World understanding through artistic knowledge to promote 
morality and democracy 
Practical applications 
war effort incorporated 
Individual freedom through art--democratic principles 









Art Education, 1945-1983 
Date Descriptor 
1945- Creative Expression 
1960 {The Age of Art Education 
Heroes: Victor lowenfeld, 
Victor D'Amico, Herbert 
Read) 
1950 Transfer Theory 
1961 Art as Subject Matter 
{Manuel Barkan) 
1965 Aesthetic Education 
Essentialism 
Visual 1 iteracy 
Environmental Design 






Self-expression and creativity prime motives for art study 
Direct experience with media {multi-media) 
Child as artist 
Art for personal and social adjustment 
Freedom of individual choice 
Psychological base for curriculum development (empirical research); 
stages of creative and mental growth 
Crafts in art curriculum 
Art experiences influence behavior in other areas 
Art study based on structured subject matter 
Minimize study for self-expression and art as experience 
Student as artist, art historian, critic 
Triumvirate focus to subject matter of art 
Intrinsic value of art study 
Philosophical and psychological orientation 
Art as visual communication 
Sequenced study (drawing) for perceptual and conceptual 
skill development 
Socia 1, psychological, anthropological approach 
Social betterment through improved design 
Focus on cultural and individual differences 
Art to promote social change 
Film, television, etc. for instruction and expression 
Study of film to understanad social/human issues 
Artist as teacher, as role model 























1975 Multi- and cross-cultural 
1981 Nonstudio Art Instruction 
1982 Museum Education as 
Art Education 
Description 
Variety of art forms to be studied 
Sensitivity to subcultural and individual differences 
Corrmonalities among the fine and visual arts 
Transfer assumed among various types of art study 
Canalization of instruction 
Phenomenology of student 
Sociology of art classroom 
Popular, folk, commercial, etc. arts studied 
Supported by ethnographic research 
Based on aesthetic education model 
Studentasaesthetician 
Museum as educational resource to supplement/complement 
classroom instruction 
Emphasis on historical study and critical analysis 
Basis in aesthetic education model 
(Among others, J. Paul Getty Trust program, 1983-) 

















Given the diversity of elements shown in Hamblen• s 
chronology, even within a particular movement, it would be 
inaccurate to imply that there is only the movement of action 
and reaction involved at the extremes of emphasizing either 
the individual or society. Even Dewey (1954b) notes this 
problem with the pendulum metaphor; he it primarily to 
gain entrance into a discussion of the need for a dialectic 
between the meaningful experience of the individual and the 
traditions he encounters through subject matter. What I would 
1 ike to point out here is that regardless of apparent empha-
sis on the individual at times, there has not been a steady 
movement toward achieving harmonious balance between the 
individual and society while there has been, even underlying 
movements emphasizing the individual 1 S creative development, 
a constant aim on the part of art educators since the turn of 
the century to clarify and establish boundaries within which 
art can be seen as subject matter essential to the individ-
ual 1 s overall educational experience. The weight has been 
increasingly given to making a place for art in the public 
schools and even such concepts as creative expression and 
aesthetic literacy have been used to justify the presence of 
art in students 1 lives in such a way that art has become as 
reified a body of knowledge as other subjects in public 
school curricula. To fit the prevailing technological 
rationale in curriculum planning in general, curricular 
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decision-making in art education has increasingly conformed 
to demands for accountability based on pre-determined resUlts. 
Rather than being presented as an opportunity for the creative 
process to be understood and enhanced as an open-ended process 
valuable to the appropriation and creation of new meanings, 
the aesthetic rationale art could contribute to education is 
placed under the control of a systems approach that distorts, 
if not dismisses its power. 
The constant movement toward taming art so that it may 
be treated as a serious academic subject instead of a dis-
pensable frill (see Hamblen, 1984, p. 117) culminates at this 
point in time in what has come to be known as "discipline-
based art education" (Greer, 1984). I see this development 
as movement away from any hope for allowing a true dialectic 
to exist between the individual and media and the individual 
and cultural substance--as a movement toward more and more 
emphasis being placed on art for art's sake, not art for 
people's sake. I believe the recent culmination of this 
discipline-based- approach in a highly polished presentation 
by the Getty Trust is a danger signal, an indication that art 
in reified form, but not in its essential substance a.:; the 
process and product of human meaning-making, is gaining a 
destructive place in general curricula along with an already 
overly technological approach to education via other subjects. 
I would not like to see art gain a place in public schools 
only to promote the values of competition and conformity that 
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serve a meritocracy rather than democracy, a use of art I 
consider idolatrous. It is to the way advocates of disci-
pline-based art education have begun the task of taking a 
reified view of art very seriously, particularly in the Getty 
Report (1985), that I now turn. 
The Current Trend Toward Discipline-Based 
Art Education 
The degree of prescriptiveness necessary for an effec-
tive art curriculum, according to Eisner (1984), depends 
on the "readiness of the teacher to handle alternatives and 
to cope with ambiguity" {p. 264). Putting aside what Eisner 
might believe actually constitutes an effective art currie-
ulum (he enthusiastically endorses the Getty Report), implied 
here is that at least some consideration should be given 
the teacher's part in curricular decision-making. In citing 
the need for a discipline-based art education curriculum, 
however, Broudy ( 1985) appears to dismiss that consideration 
when he accepts "validating a curriculum that can be pre-
scribed for all high school students'1 (p. 212). Beyond 
Creating: The Place for Art in America 1 s Schools (A Report 
by the Getty Center for Education in the Arts, 1985) comes 
as close as any proposal for art education I have seen to 
advocating a "teacher proof" curriculum. (See Apple, 1979 
on the dangers of turning teachers into mere technicians.) 
Before presenting the positions outlined in the Getty 
Report, I want to refer back to the place an aesthetic 
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rationality holds in Macdonald's transcendental develop-
mental ideology (1978b) in contrast to a technological 
rationality and to an amplification of these terms as Mac-
donald used them to refer to "disciplined curriculum think-
ing." I am struck by two ironies here: first, that the 
concept of aesthetic response plays so large a part in the 
Getty recommendation·s--a concept, it will become clear, 
sounding so similar to but used quite differently from the 
way it has been regarded in this work up to this point, and 
secondly that the concept of discipline is used so differ-
ently by Macdonald from the sense of discipline advocated 
in the Getty Report. 
As Pinar { 1985) reminds us, Macdonald's idea of aes-
thetic rationality is an expansion of Marcuse's (1969, p. 91; 
1964), the recognition of an area of sensibility crucial 
to praxis. With regard to Macdonald's (1978b) dual dialec-
tic, I have taken aesthetic rationality to mean creative 
and whol is tic reasoning, a sense of the concept I be 1 ieve 
Macdonald (1967) bears out even further in his discussion 
of it with regard to curriculum thinking: 
Although aesthetic is more often equated with a state 
of the arts, it is meant here to mean man's capacity 
to cope rationally with the world on an intuitive basis--
to return to the world for insights which will enable 
him to transcend his present systems of thought and 
move to new paradigms . . • or fresh perspectives. 
This is the meaning of the Hegelian dialectic (accord-
ing to Marcuse, 1964). Particularized to curriculum 
theory it might be described as follows. A theory is 
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projected which is applied (or tested or validated) 
in reality. Through its application and the grappling 
with world phenomena, new insights arise which raise 
questions about the adequacy of the theory. Through 
this movement from theory to phenomena, new schemes 
emerge. Then, the emergence of new theory signifies 
the beginning of a new cycle in the dialectic of curric-
ul urn thinking. 
The crucial aspect of this process is the use of aes-
thetic rationality in the development of new perceptions 
of reality. Aesthetic rationality is a rationality 
of means applied to ends which are always open, as 
opposed to technological rationality, whichls a closed 
rationality. (Macdonald, 1967, pp. 167-168) ---
In this sense, curriculum theory should be "disciplined by 
the phenomena with which it attempts to deal within the con-
text that these phenomena exist 11 {Macdonald, 1967, p. 169): 
the discipline of technical reason is only part of the total 
rational potential of man. Like Habermas {1971), Macdonald 
does not dismiss technological rationality, but urges an 
understanding of it by the whole self so that we may decide 
how best to use technology. I bring this out now, before 
discussing further the Getty Report, because I want to empha-
size again that I am not anti-tradition or anti-skillt 
am cautious of using cultural tradition and skills develop-
ment in a closed, prescriptive manner. Unfortunately, it 
appears to me that the Getty Report uses not only these 
elements of art, but aesthetic response in a closed, pre-
scriptive and thus idolatrous manner. 
The fight to find and keep a place in the public schools 
has been a major aim of art educators for obvious reasons. 
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Some approach this task more responsibly than others, how-
ever. There have been serious questions posed regarding 
the morality of art. Dewey (1934), for example, notes 
that the imagination is the basis of both art and morality 
(p. 348). There have been attempts, as Hamblen's {1984) chro-
no logy shows, since the eighteenh century, to understand 
both moral and practical uses of art. The Getty Report seems 
to look at art only in the light of how it may fit into a 
student's life as a requirement the way mathematics, lan-
guage and science are seen in the public schools. The sense 
of human possibi 1 i ty and use of art appears to be part of but 
restricted to this narrow concern. believe we "have to 
have" imagination--as Ricoeur (quoted in Thompson, 1981, 
p. 17) points out, it is through the imagination that we 
even know we exist--and I believe it is important to develop 
responsible understanding and use of the imagination, but 
I think it is quite an overstatement to present art as a 
subject essential to every student's life: 
The Center believes that if art education is to be 
accepted as essential to every child's education, 
programs will need to be developed that teach content 
from four disciplines that constitute art: art history, 
art production, art criticism, and aesthetics. Such 
discipline-based art education programs should offer 
instruction in the four disciplines because each one 
imparts knowledge and develops skills that help children 
understand art better, draw inferences about art's his-
torical and cultural contexts, and analyze and inter-
pret the meaning of art works. The programs would employ 
the same standards maintained in other academic subjects: 
written, sequential curriculum; student assessment; and 
adequate instructional time. (Report by the Getty Center 
for Education in the Arts, 1985, p. 4) 
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It is interesting to note here that art production, the main-
stay of most art programs throughout the history of art edu-
cation (Hamblen, 1984, p. 117), would be cut back to one-
fourth of the overall curricul urn based on this report, hence 
the title, Beyond Creating. 
In reviewing the Getty Report, Hausman (1986) raises an 
important question regarding the assumption that content 
comprising art history, art production, art criticism and 
aesthetics can be either easily defined or easily agreed upon 
by specialists in the field. Hausman (1986) ends his review 
of Beyond Creating with the statement that its greatest con-
tribution may be in mobilizing those who disagree with its 
tenets. In his summary of the Report he draws out question-
able catch phrases and throws them back: 
Throughout Beyond Creating there is a clear call for 
greater academic v1.gor: ••a clearly stated rationale and 
conceptual base"r "written, sequential curriculum" r 
''well-specified instructional goals'' r "continuing in-
service teacher training" r and "strategies for program 
review and development •••• " The problem, of course, 
is that being "clear" is not necessarily being "wise," 
writing it down does not make it rightJ putting things 
in "sequence" may not be appropriater and specifying 
instructional goals still leaves open the issue of "what 
is being specified?" (1986, pp. 152-153) 
Hausman does say he welcomes in the Getty approach the 
willingness to confront social, cultural and economic real-
ities as they differ in imposing themselves upon the substance 
and methods of teaching in different areas of the country, 
and the language and examples involving choice in the Report 
is impressive on the surface. 
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One instance in which the language of choice appears 
side-by-side with the language of prescription involves th'e 
problem with which I started this discussion on discipline-
based art education, that of its apparent advocacy of teacher-
proofing curriculum: 
A district cannot merely deliver a statement of theory 
and expect teachers to tailor their favorite lessons to 
it. Instead, the school district needs to develop a 
specific, well-defined instructional approach which 
directs teachers' practices, making them more likely 
to adhere to and support local art education policies. 
Ironically, such a written curriculum will inspire class-
room innovation, rather than restrain it, by allowing 
teachers to fully grasp concepts and gain confidence 
to explore new ideas. (Report by the Getty Center for 
Education in the Arts, 1985, p. 4) · 
This statement sounds restrictive and freeing at once for 
the teacher. The sense of democratic decision-making is 
implied at the local level of etablishing educational policy. 
The 11 new ideas," however, appear to be taken care of in the 
following paragraph on evaluation. Art's acceptance as a 
basic subject is there again stated as the Center's central 
goal and "strategies and objectives are to be clearly stated 
and understood" (p. 60) so that both teachers and adminis-
trators will havEi! no trouble assessing how well those goals 
are being met. New ideas, it seems are welcome in identify-
ing areas for improvement in meeting the goal of establishing 
art as an objectively existent body of knowledge essential to 
the educational development of all students. Each amplifi-
cation of the Report's four disciplines involves a similar 
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tension between appearing to offer a wide range of choices 
to the student, but within the acceptable standards of art as 
subject matter .. 
The confusion I experienced in reading Beyond Creating 
is characterized by its overtly liberal tone and covertly 
elitist undertone. One of the Center's proponents and a 
consultant for the Report makes no such attempt, however, 
to hide this sense of elitism.. Smith (1985) states avowedly: 
Art education of the sort I recommended accommodates 
itself quite readily to one definition of elitism that 
understands it as concerned with the values of tradi-
tion (a body of classics of indisputable aesthetic 
merit), continuity (the continued study and apprecia-
tion of the classics as well as the continuation of the 
tradition itself by the addition of new exemplars}, judg-
ment (the faculty of trained discernment brought to 
bear on works past and present), and excellence (that 
for the sake of which the tradition is kept alive (Hamp-
shire, 1977). (Smith, 1985, p. 173) 
It is important to note that Smith's source for this apology 
is Hampshire's review (1977) of a book about the nationaliza-
tion of cui ture ~ An agreed-upon criteria for aesthetic 
excellence is not only possible, in Smith's view, but self-
evident: 
As for the contention that all aesthetic judgments are 
relative, that is expressions of individual tastes, and 
hence unreliable indicators of aesthetic excellence ~ • 
(this) requires a powerful effort at self-deception to 
maintain. Except for the sake of populist dogma, can 
anyone really propose, say, Grant Wood as the equal 
of Matisse? (Smith, 1985, p~ 172) 
Smith believes experts not only can, but ~ agree on set 
standards of art as a tradition of excellence. This 
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excellence, he claims, will enhance and liberate the indi-
vidual, evidently by putting him on the right cui tural 
"track." Dewey {l954b), remember, would warn that this is a 
case where tradition has become restrictive and enslaving 
because the expert has taken the position of setting up a 
final authority about the ends, models and standards of a 
human project and thus rendered the tradition "no longer a 
tradition but a fixed and absolute convention" (p. 36). The 
power and freedom of the student to enter into a dialectic 
with cultural substance is severely limited by Smith's dog-
matic stance. 
There are other examples of discipline-based art educa-
tion appearing more anaesthetic than aesthetic, even though, 
as Hamblen notes (1985), this curricular model is often 
referred to simply as "aesthetic education" (p. 43). She 
cites an article by Bullough and Goldstein (1984) in which 
they discuss the Utah state-adopted curriculum guide, Art 
Is Elementary (Cornia, Stubles, & Winters, 1976). This 
guide, Hamblen says, is representative of curricular materials 
"supportive of delineated content, predefined skill acquisi-
tion, sequential instruction, teacher-proof procedures, and 
the testing of outcomes" (p. 43), so criticisms leveled at 
the Utah guide can be made· of discipline-based art education 
in general. 
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Hamblen's argument is that there is a technocratic 
rationality operating in discipline-based art education. 
"The Utah guide was initiated," she points out, "on the 
premise that 'art concepts can now be identified and taught 
in a systematic method' (Cornia et al., 1976, p. 2)" and 
goes on to say that the resulting tightly sequenced, speci-
fied content with its predefined instructional outcomes and 
teacher-proof materials are characterized by Bullough and 
Goldstein as "emanating from a technocratic perspective on 
education" (Hamblen, 1985, pp. 43-44) • This rationality, 
with its emphasis on manipulation and control of variables, 
predictability of outcomes and efficiency of means, in the 
attempt to legitimate art study, actually trivializes and 
demeans involvement in art just as it does with other sub-
jects: "Art, like other elements of the curriculum, comes 
to be defined by minimum competency requirements" (Bullough 
& Goldstein, 1984, p. 154). It is just such a rationality 
Macdonald ( 1967) has shown lacks discipline in curricular 
thinking because it is only part of the rational potential 
of man, but in searching the literature for a truly aesthetic 
model of art education, I find that either those called "aes-
thetic" are technocratic models in disguise, or that "aes-
thetic11 is limited in meaning to the concept of sensitivity. 
It is to this kind of art as idolatry I now turn. 
Previous Trends: Creative Expression and 
Aesthetic Education 
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Leeds (1985) presents tempting evidence that the "Age 
of Art Education Heroes'' (refer back to Hamblen, 1984, p. 20) 
involved an aesthetic responsive to the centering of the 
individual in the world. "Their methods," she writes, "were 
evolved from a unity of their personal experience with their 
philosophical beliefs and acquired knowledge" (p. 86). Their 
intent, using Lowenfeld as an example, was to foster aes-
thetic growth in children--development of the sensitive abil-
ity to integrate experiences into a cohesive whole (see Lowen-
feld & Brittain, 1982, p. 62). In theory, this sounds very 
much like Macdonald's concept of centering (1978b), but I was 
trained in undergraduate school to use Lowenfeld as a basis 
for my teaching and what I felt was not characterized by 
a sense of the dual dialectic. Self-expression seemed cut 
off from communication rather than integrated response to 
the world. The Romantic view that the individual could do 
no wrong left me feeling isolated and confused; it was not 
relational. Creativity meant being different, not being 
a part of co-crea ton. 
Read's (1964) emphasis on development of perception 
and sensation leading to sensitive expression of thoughts 
and feelings bothers me both because he prescribes this for 
every student in all of education and because I get from 
him, too, that Romantic view of "sensitivity., that can so 
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easily become sensationalism or sentimentality. These kinds 
of "sensitivity" have characterized my own experience with 
Creative Expression as the basis for art education curricula. 
It reminds me of the kind of sensitivity idolized in women 
that turns out to be an immobilizing emotionalism. Lessing 
(1984), in her denouncement of the women's movement on the 
basis of its exclusion of male perspectives, said in an inter-
view: 
When you put a bunch of women together without men 
they invariably become rather childish, very indulgent 
to each other and to themselves, and it becomes a great 
emotional party. And they don't do anything, they don' t 
achieve anything. (p. 90) -
Dewey (1954a) cautions that emotions, when disconnected from 
intelligent action, dissolve into "reveries that come between 
the self and the world" (p. 5).. The splits between cognitive 
and affective domains (Greene, 1980a) --between reason and 
emotion (Dewey, 1944), science and art (Macdonald, 198lb), 
these dualisms characteristic of positivism distort human 
experience regardless of which "side" is emphasized. The 
artist locked into a purely subjective realm of expression 
becomes dissociated, not only from the world but from a part 
of himself--who he is as a social being (see Richards, 1984). 
"In speaking of aesthetic rationality," Macdonald (1978b) 
says "Marcuse• s position is the recognition of an area of 
sensibility or aesthetic rationality. The dual dialectic of 
inner aesthetic and technical rationality and outer 
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individual and social condition is implicit in his state-
ments" (p. 106). ''Sensibility" implies, as I see it, not 
only an emotional but an intellectual responsiveness to the 
whole context of being, a sense of moral and social responsi-
bility. 
The curriculum movements called "aesthetic" (see Hamb-
len, 1984, p. 119) appear to me to be using the term as "the 
artist's point of view" comprising subject matter that even-
tually becomes part of the discipline-based approach. For 
example, Coming to Our senses (Arts, Education and Americas 
Panel, 1977) uses "aesthetics'' as the value developing artis-
tic sensitivity is purported to have for the student, and 
uses it primarily to push for a place in the public schools 
for both art as a subject and artists as specialists (see 
Efland, 1978). That a certain kind of "aesthetic literacy" 
can in fact do all its proponents say it can do--provide 
emotional release, develop visual communication skills, sensi-
tize people to their environment, be a vehicle for learning 
other subjects, to name a few--is widely questioned (see, 
for example, Lanier, 1986; Rush, Greer, & Feinstein, 1986; 
Serafine, 1981). My own question here is not so much one 
of transference as of transmission. It appears to me that 
not only what is known about and through art--art history/art 
theory, but how to see, how to know through art is being 
prescribed, not developed at all. Cultural substance is 
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being transmitted as fact rather than presented to the stu-
dent as meaning with which he may interact, in which he par-
ticipates. 
Stinson (1985), drawing from her understanding of 
Buber's !/Thou relationship (Buber, 1970) and Gilligan's 
work in recognizing a "feminine voice'' of morality (Gilligan, 
1982), divided the aesthetic dimension into an objectivist 
view and one that reflects encounter and transcendence. 
She is careful to explain that the kind of transcendence 
of which she speaks involves not only the imagination, but 
a critical consciousness of social realities. Although Stin-
son's curriculum theory arises from her concerns in the per-
forming arts--in dance, she speaks to the arts in general. 
The distinction she makes between an objectivist view of 
the aesthetic dimension and an intersubjective aesthetic 
allows wholistic meaning to be found and made in aesthetic 
response and that kind of response allows a sacred use of 
art. She recognizes that many of her colleagues,. in their 
attempt to take their work seriously, believe art, in and 
of itself, must be the goal for curriculum and not a means, 
even though they acknowledge the existence and power of a 
transcendent state related to art. She repeats these words 
on the subject from one of her colleagues: "Art is not to 
serve people. People should serve art" (in Stinson, 1985, 
p. 78). Much of Stinson's work involves revealing the reality 
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that art is used to serve people even ~ people try to serve 
art, and that such "service" can be dehumanizing and even 
dangerous. 
Just as we cannot escape making meaning, however dis-
torted this process may become, we cannot escape "doing art" 
in its broadest sense. We constantly imagine and manifest 
imagination in our daily lives. Art~ used as a tool, 
whether we admit this to ourselves or not. In Stinson's 
conception of an aesthetic model, curricul urn must extend 
the student's consciousness of the most basic questions of 
existence, "What does it mean to be human? How can we live 
together? 11 (Stinson, 1985, p. 82, based on Macdonald, 1977); 
only then may students come to recognize, she writes, "their 
power to create not only works of a:rt, but also their lives 
and the world 11 (p. 82). It is with a discussion of our 
responsibility for such power that I close this chapter. 
Escape from Idolatry but not from Art 
I have thus far applied my understanding of reification 
and idolatry to art as a subject--to ways in which art has 
been viewed that have been partial and distorted rather than 
relational and wholistic. I have said that because art can 
be both a way of knowing and the symbol of those meanings 
made by that way of knowing, aesthetic response can be 
reduced to a way of knowing called 11 artistic" but based on 
rigid standards and what counts for "art" can be limited 
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to those artifacts selected and interpreted for us by art 
specialists, be they artists or art historians and art crit-
ics. I have made the claim that when an art teacher merely 
transmits knowledge as though it were objectively existent 
fact and prescribes experiences that exclude much of the 
student • s capacity for response to natural and cultural sub-
stance, she is using art in a highly partial, idolatrous 
manner. 
I have given examples of dualistic thinking in the area 
of art curriculum development and indicated the futility of 
this way of thinking through presenting a chronology that 
shows movements in art education often overlap in both time 
and in theory and practice rather than appear as exclusive 
categories from which we must choose. I have reported some 
of the aspects of the current trend toward discipline-based 
art education I believe serve to reify art and contribute to 
its idolatrous use. I have shown how this approach actually 
developed out of movements called "aesthetic." I have implied 
that art as subject matter, as it is used by discipline-based 
and aesthetic models, is reified through objectification, 
but that a return to an overemphasis on creative expression 
merely trades the objective for the subjective--the aliena-
tion of worshipping objects for that of separation from the 
outer world through a kind of self-worship. Intersubjectivity 
and transcendent co-creation cannot, it seems, exist as goals 
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in art education curricula as long as the subject of art 
itself is seen as the primary goal. 
Stinson's (1985) aesthetic morality points to both the 
inevitability of creation and the validity of using art as 
a tool in the responsible development of creative power. 
Before I move on to the possibilities of teaching through 
art--of using art as a tool, I want to explain why I have 
to take Stinson seriously--why I could not simply throw art 
out with its idols in order to avoid idolatry. Art as a 
way of knowing and manifesting meaning in the world cannot 
be avoided. In the same sense Sartre says we are "condemned 
to freedom" (see Sartre in Fromm, 1969) we are condemned 
to create. We have to make choices and those choices have 
consequences for the material world; we can escape neither 
freedom nor art. 
I have used Berger and Luckmann (196:7) to illuminate 
the concept of reification as the loss to consciousness of 
our part in socially constructing reality; I turn to them 
again now, to amplify the inescapable nature of the part 
we play in making the world: 
Man is biologically predestined to construct and to 
inhabit a world with others. This world becomes for 
him the dominant and definitive reality. Its limits 
are set by nature, but once constructed, this world 
acts back upon nature. In the dialectic between nature 
and the socially constructed world the human organism 
itself is transformed. In this same dialectic man pro-
duces reality and thereby produces himself. (p. 183) 
-----------------------------
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Fuller (1982) suggests that the need to create symbols is 
part of our very biology because the nature of our existence 
is a movement from the experience of union in the mother's 
womb seeking a re-experiencing of union through reunion; 
symbols such as words and images mediate separation.. That 
this movement leads toward the creation of entire civiliza-
tions is illustrated by Freud (1961) and, to some extent, 
it is on the basis of Freud • s work that Habermas ( 1971) urges 
communicative competence and warns against 1 osing conscious-
ness of our responsibility for understanding our interest 
in and control over the way we appropriate nature (see Geuss, 
1981). The question of fearing lo_ss of union leading to 
misuse of agency rather than communion (see Bakan, 1966; 
Dinnerstein, 1976) is an important one, for it offers an 
explanation for why we fail to admit to ourselves the part 
we play in co-creation, but I am more concerned here with 
the possibility of correcting that mistake through recogni-
tion of our power to effect change a If what we truly want 
is communion and if we realize our power to create a reality 
that makes communion more possible, then we may begin to 
control our fear of loss rather than allowing it to control 
us~ If we recognize the extent of our power to imagine and 
create in general, then we are in a position to choose whether 
we will use it to maintain our defenses or close the gaps 
separating us from one another. 
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If we go back to Marx's early writings (translated and 
edited by Bottomore, 1963; introduced by Fromm, 1964) the 
dialectical nature of the relationship between man and matter 
cannot be understood apart from the act of creating. Man's 
transformation of nature~ art. vasquez (1973) relates 
the Marxian sense of appropriation directly to creation and 
Fischer (in Baxandall, 1972) speaks to "the necessity of 
art"--the ongoing phenomena of consciousness bringing cul-
ture into existence that cannot be ignored simply on the 
grounds that much of it appears to be decadent rather than 
transcendent. Held (1980) cites Adorno and Berkheimer 
{p. 80) on the importance of understanding the need to 
reject any separation of culture from society, for it is 
just as dangerous to ignore the power of art as to idolize 
it. There is a "truth" to art as a way of making meaning; 
it is an inextricable part of the "real relationship between 
man and his world" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 89)-a rela-
tionship in which human meanings and human activity are 
world-producing: 
The truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly 
of established reality (i.e., of those who established 
it) to define what is real. (Marcuse, 1978, p. 9) 
Art, then, at the level of both imagination and creation, is 
power. 
In a Marxian sense, the experience of alienation arises 
when man is cut off from meaningful involvement in the process 
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and product of his own labor by those with enough power over 
his physical survival to require him to use his own power in 
their interest {see Fromm, 1966; Ollrnan, 1976). Macdonald 
(1978b) locates alienation in the objectivist consciousness 
of technolgoical rationality, as well--in the overall ten-
dency in our culture for people to hand their power over to 
the objects they make. There is an area of our lives, how-
ever, in which we experience most vividly the contradiction 
between the ways in which we are expected to use our power 
and the disappointing results of spending ourselves in those 
ways. In our everyday lives we want all this to ~ some-
thing. Survival is not enough; having things is not enough: 
The fundamental human quest is the search for meaning 
and the basic human capacity for this search is exper-
ienced in the hermeneutic process, the process of inter-
pretation of the text {whether artifact, natural world 
or human action}.. This is the search (or research) for 
greater understanding that motivates and satisfies us .. 
(Macdonald, l98lb, p.l32) 
We are meaning-seeking, meaning-making creatures.. We get 
through life from day to day by interpreting the realities 
that confront us and acting on those interpretations.. We have 
to expect 1 ife to make some sense if we are participating in 
it at all; even when it does not, we can only be recognizing 
that dissonance from the basic belief that it should .. 
Shapiro (1981; 1982a), using the schools as an example 
of the significance of everyday life arenas, points out that 
criteria emerge from everyday experience for the quality of 
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that experience. This forming of criteria transcends and 
often conflicts with functional institutional arrangements. 
Shapiro finds hope in this dissonance, that a critical under-
standing of the gap between a sense of what 11 should be" and 
what actually "is" may equip us with the will to change 
reality. Our everyday relationship with the world, and 
particularly our everyday relationships with other people, 
hold, by nature, transforming possibilities. We "make some-
thing of 11 every encounter whether we are conscious of this 
or not. What I believe we ~ usually conscious of is the 
effect--whether or not we feel satisfied with the reality 
created through our participation in this dialectic. When we 
are not satisfied, the only way we can know this is through 
being able to imagine a more meaningful outcome. Dissatis-
faction, I believe, gives rise to resistance against those 
aspects of reality that do not meet our fundamental need to 
make sense of our lives. Resistance may be self-defeating 
when we come against limits in ways that bring on more severe 
restrictions, such as engaging in aimless vandal ism and thus 
getting fired or abusing others and becoming more lonely as 
a result (see Aronowitz, 1973: Willis, 1977), but resistance 
can also make us look for space within oppressive situations; 
it can enable us to find room for change (see Apple, 1980). 
The power to imagine life could be other than it appears 
makes art inseparable from any action we take in the world: 
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communicating that which we imagine is the force which makes 
new realities possible. Williams (1961) urges us to realize 
this sense of communication as a whole social process: 
Communication is the process of making unique experience 
into common experience, and it is, above all, the claim 
to live; for what we basically say, in any kind of com-
munication, is: "I am living in this way because this 
is my experience." ••. Thus our descriptions of our 
experience come to compose a network of relationships . 
.. • . The selection and interpretation involved in our 
descriptions embody our attitudes, needs and interests, 
which we seek to validate by making them clear to others .. 
At the same time the descriptions we receive from others 
embody their atttudes, needs and interests, and the 
long process of comparison and interaction is our vital 
associative life. Since our way of seeing things is 
literally our way of living, the process of communica-
tion is in fact the process of community: the sharing 
of common meanings, and thence common activities and 
purposes; the offering, reception and comparison of 
new meanings, leading to the tensions and achievements 
of growth and change. (pp. 38-39) 
Shapiro (1982b) indicates the speed of social change d,epends 
on an intensification of cultural exchange--that the deepen-
ing of free communication and liberation of creative expres-
sian can accelerate the process Williams describes: 
The expansion of the means and forms of communication 
increases the extent to which personal and particular 
social experience may be shared, received and compared 
with the experience of others. such sharing and compari-
son, increasingly infused, as it has been, with demo-
cratic meanings and images, unleashes an insistent 
historical force for change. (Shapiro, 1982b, p. 44) 
Marcuse's (1978) "truth of art" (p. 9) is an aesthetic 
dimension of existence, a means of transcendence not just 
for inner experience, but in everyday life. Stinson (1985) 
reminds us that at issue here is social responsibility, each 
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person's part in realizing the potential for "changing the 
world to become one in which freedom and happiness are 
possible" (p4 69). "Imagination," she quotes Dewey (1934), 
"is the chief instrument of the. good"--an instrument Stinson 
urges us to recognize as the basis for both art and morality. 
I could run, I suppose, from dealing with art as subject 
matter. I could avoid the formal ways in which art has been 
reified in the art world and art education. But I cannot 
run from the "truth of art" in my life, from my own imagina-
tion, from the inevitability of creation. If I accept the 
implications of my study of reification and idolatry, if 
I take responsibility for my own pattern making and its 
effect on co-creation, then I can also see my way through 
to incorporating my interest in the visual arts with those 
values I deem important. I can turn my conditioning to 
serve art around and use art, instead, to serve life. 
"In our time," Ricoeur (1976) says, ''we have not finished 
doing away with idols and we have barely begun to listen to 
symbols.. It may be that this situation, in its apparent 
distress, is instructive: it may be that extreme iconoclasm 
belongs to the restoration of meaning" (p. 195).. In this 
chapter I have come through another cycle, this time facing 
the specific demons I once felt compelled to worship.. Once 
again I am encouraged. My suspicion of art as idolatry has 
led to a sense of hope, the realization that its misuse cannot 
be all there is to art. 
CHAPTER IV 
TEACHING THROUGH ART 
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At the beginning of this study, my struggle with what 
role I should play in the lives of my students regarding so 
subjective an experience as self-expression led me to ask, 
"Who must I be, as an art teacher, and what must I do to 
present information about and provide experiences in the 
visual arts without violating my students' right to partici-
pate in the construction of a shared reality?" The investi-
gation of my own pattern making--searching out the ways in 
which I respond to the human project of co-creating the 
world, has led me through a number of cycles of interpreta-
tion. Within each chapter it is acknowledged that there are 
cycles within cycles, but for the purpose of tracing the 
process through to this final cycle, I will refer to those 
represented by overall chapters. 
Within the first cycle I came to regard my own personal 
and professional experience in art as research data, then as 
text. Through a formal reporting of past experiences and a 
series of letters to my dissertation chairman, I began to 
face my confusion about the morality of teaching art and 
gather the courage to search through the issues and identify 
those it would be most meaningful for me to question further. 
153 
The instance of coming to regard this cycle as a hermeneutic 
of affirmation was crucial to taking the necessary initiative 
to move on to the next.. The identification of my tendency 
toward reification in general, and art in particular, led me 
within this cycle to not only question the value of teaching 
art as a subject of interest, but to wonder if, instead, my 
deepest concerns--relationship, harmony and transcendence--
might be communicated through teaching art, using art as 
a tool. 
In the second cycle I took my questions about reifica-
tion and moral responsibility to those writers who first led 
me to this quest, interpreting their work in the light of 
how they might currently inform my understanding of the 
relationship between the social construction of reality and 
my need to overcome the tendency to think dualistically by 
developing the process of centering so that I could take 
more responsibility for my part in relationship to the 
whole process of co-creation. This led me to further acknow-
ledge the value I place on finding identity in relationship to 
others, creating order in a harmonious rather than controlling 
way and achieving personal and social transcendence through 
the appreciation and celebration of life. It also led me 
to apply my understanding of reification and idolatry to 
· the art world and art education in the next cycle. 
-------------
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The ways in which my values are not reflected in cultural 
standards set by art specialists and curricular models for 
teaching to honor art were investigated in the third cycle. 
The meaning of "aesthetic" was seen to be lost to anaesthetic 
technological rationality in art as it is typically presented 
to students as subject matter, and found in a moral consid-
eration of our power to create. This third cycle ended in 
the realization that I could not avoid the idolatrous use 
of art by trying to escape from art altogether, for creation, 
like choice, is a part of being human. Recognizing art as 
a way of knowing and its products as the manifestation of 
meaning made it clear that I had to accept responsibility 
for the power of creation in everyday life. I reasoned that, 
if creating is inescapable on the basic level of human exis-
tence, then it would be helpful to develop and share under-
standing of the creative process through whatever means 
might achieve that end. The practice of an art for people's 
sake instead of for art's sake could become a sacred process. 
This brought me to my current cycle--an investigation of the 
sacred use of art. I hope to discover some ways in which I 
might teach visual art that honor human relationship and w.ake 
us to the process involved in our common project of remaking 
the world in a more just and loving image. 
Stinson (1985) identifies sacred art as art that serves 
both personal and social transcendence: experiences in 
-------------
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creating, performing and viewing art are morally valid in 
her eyes only if they bring the student into a conscious 
engagement with the world that increases understanding of 
self and relationship and helps the student recognize the 
responsibility that comes with relationship (p .. 80).. I have 
stated similar values in my discussions of relationship, 
harmony and transcendence throughout the first and second 
cycles of this work with the hope that I would be able to 
deal with them here as appropriate goals for curricular 
decision-making in the visual arts. My doubts about this 
have been similar to Stinson's also. In. cycle three I went 
into some of the ways in which approaches to art education 
have been idolatrous, and thus dehumanizing and dangerous. 
I will be speaking here of art as meditation, art as 
pattern making and art as appreciation and celebration, but 
these cannot be tightly bounded categories for art any more 
than relationship, harmony and transcendence can be discrete 
values within the whole realm of moral thought and action. 
Macdonald and Purpel (1987) give us some idea of the limit-
less range and scope of wholistic vision: 
we choose to view the world as part of a larger 
transcendent reality, and our task as humans to be 
that of being in harmony with it. We believe that much 
is already known about these divine intentions, though 
we still have much to learn about them and much to do 
before they are fulfilled. We believe that humans are 
intended to be participants in the development of a 
world in which justice, love, dignity, freedom, joy, 
and community flourish. We believe that we are meant 
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to pursue a path of truth, beauty, and goodness. we 
believe that the world exists in an imperfect and 
incomplete state but that man and woman possess the 
aesthetic and intellectual sensibilities to re-create 
themselves and the world in unity with the divine; the 
wholeness of body, mind, and spirit; earth and cosmos; 
and humanity and nature. It is well to remind our-
selves of the common derivation of these words--whole, 
holy, and heal--so that we may see education as a sacred 
process that can lead us to be whole again and heal the 
wounds of history. (p. 187) 
The particular aspects of this whole that I have chosen to 
search out are necessarily interrelated and will inevitably 
overlap in my discussion of them. As is the case for values, 
so for art as meditation, art as pattern making and art as 
appreciation and celebration. Art as meditation involves 
ordering--pattern making --as well as relationship. Art as 
meditation is also a ritual of valuing and celebrating our 
value. So it goes for each way of ·seeing art and, as with 
values, there are many other than the ones I choose to use 
here. As I move on to investigate these particular values 
and ways they may be reflected in particular views of art, 
I am finally beginning to recognize this search for sacred 
possibility as participation in the creative process. 
Art as Meditation 
Early in this study--throughout my letters--! kept trying 
to make a connection between working with art rna ter ia 1 s and 
improving the quality of human relationships. Blocking my 
way was the opinion of art educators {such as Serazine, 1981; 
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Lanier, 1986; Rush, Greer, & Feinstein, 1986) that it is a 
grave error for art teachers to assume any correlation between 
doing art and becoming better people. This position is seen 
as naive and unprofessional because there is no proof through 
empirical research that art can .affect morality. Urging. 
me on was my own experience of art as a kind of meditation that 
brought me close to paper and clay, helped me clarify thoughts 
and feelings through expressing them visually and aided my 
ability to communicate that meaning to others. 
In several classroom experiences I have been asked to 
express concepts regarding curr icul urn and teaching through 
making art, twice in clay (Macdonald, 1982, 1983) and three 
times with cut or torn paper (Leeds, 1983; Purpel, 1983a, 
1983b). In each instance I was to let the medium speak of 
my understanding of a concept ("knowledge,'' for example) both 
to me and for me, then share both the visual representation 
of the meanings that emerged and my verbal interpretation of 
the entire process. In addition to offering my expression 
to others, I received their verbal comments on both what I 
showed them and what I told them, adding their interpretations 
to my own. I could then respond to the new meanings made 
in such conversation, either privately--to myself--or in contin-
uing the discourse. This was an incredibly powerful experience 
for me. It was in doing the cut paper assignment for the first 
time that I felt authentic for the first time in my adult 
life while working with art materials. This was quite 
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remarkable, since I had spent all of my adult life up to that 
point either taking studio art courses in college or teaching 
studio art in the public schools. 
I have since experienced this kind of art as meditation 
from a teacher's view as well. I offered the cut paper project 
to several high school English classes at the last public 
school in which I taught and I used the same assignment with 
my own students and those of another graduate student when we 
taught undergraduate Foundations of Education classes. In the 
English classes I asked students to express their ''ultimate 
concern'' and in the education classes, their response to a 
film on nuclear war. There was always a deeply felt and openly 
expressed sense of community established during these exper-
iences, on both my part and the students' , whether or not I 
had formerly had any contact with the students involveda Some 
told me of the experience, similar to my own, of feeling 
authentic working with art materials for the first time since 
childhood a Others spoke of the closeness they felt to the 
class, of the change in the quality of their relationships to 
one another that took place within just a few hours a Some said 
they felt that closeness evolving even during the time just 
spent working silently, side-by-side. 
Given the power of personal and shared experience, both 
as a student and as a teacher participating in the process a 
number of times, it would be difficult for me to deny the 
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effect doing art as meditation had on my relationship to the 
material, myself and others a That I questioned this and 
even rebelled against it in my letters indicates the depth 
of the problem I had with reifying art and idolizing the 
field of art education. It is no wonder I had such great 
reluctance toward dealing with the literature in art educa-
tion. Almost everything I read threatened to invalidate the 
radically different meaning I had found art could have for 
me on both personal and professional levels. It was not 
until I could see my own experience as data for research 
through a phenomenological approach to this study that I 
began to allow my own knowledge of teaching and art to 
count. 
was actually angry with Fox for a period of time 
because his writing {1983, 1986a) and his lecture {1986b) 
involving a view of art as meditation agreed with my exper-
ience and challenged the technological rationality of what I 
thought I had to believe, instead, to be a "professional•• 
in my field. How turned around it is to regard that word 
in such a dehumanizing way--how literally self-destructive. 
It astounds me to realize how reification can so distort 
the meaning of the words we use to describe ourselves that 
we are actually startled when someone reminds us of their 
· original sense: 
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I have realized that if one wishes to influence others' 
ideas and perspectives, one must literally embody 
these ideas and perspectives ..•. What we must reveal 
is our passion, our values and our justifications .. 
What we must ask of ourselves is to really profess. 
(Macdonald, 198la, p. 146) 
How different this understanding of "professional" is from 
meaning "programmatically correct. 11 
My experience of art as meditation was vastly different 
from art as production of art. Stinson (1985) cites the 
distinction Hawkins (1969) makes between sacred and secular 
art. "Secular art,'' she points out, uses the aesthetic 
materials for their own sake .. • Sacred art, by contrast, 
reveals the harmony, the patterns of relationship in the 
world" {Stinson, 1985, p. 80). Secular art involves "for-
getting about what the total world of man, nature, and God 
is, and deals with totality in a partial way leading to 
triviality and naive r~alism" (Hawkins, 1969, p. 38). 
prefer the word "profane" to describe art that serves a 
reified world. What seemed to be most different about my use 
of art in art as meditation was the feeling of authenticity--
of expressing something that really mattered to me at the 
deepest level of my being instead of demonstrating skill to 
hide what I believed were unacceptable interpretations of 
experience. I do not know if I used proficiency to impress 
or to protect myself from those who required certain 
standards of work: I do know that it· split me apart and 
caused me to profane my own sense of being alive in the 
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world. Art as meditation healed that split, brought the 
fragments back together. Skill served a purpose that was 
more important than skill alone could ever be. I felt at 
one with myself, with the work, with others .. James (1972) 
writes of this kind of dialogue between objects and people 
and the other within oneself that the value fundamental to 
it is wonder (p. 112) • I felt that wonder. It is a way of 
being I want to experience again and again and again. I did 
not "have" a relationship to everything else; I was l!! rela-
tionship. Hawkins {1969) says that the relationship revealed 
by sacred art is love (p. 39). It felt like being in love 
with the whole world all at once. 
If it seems this is a lot to say for putting a few 
scraps of colored construction paper together with one human 
concept, hear Mooney out: 
Deep in all this is a center of emergence, a something 
that comes to be formed, not by being made something in 
itself, but by being the result of the dynamic field in 
its process-relation makingt though ''nothing" in itself, 
it is the vital, living center of the existence of the 
field. It is the hub of relations formed and forming, 
the dynamic center of the whirl of integration. Per-
haps it is just this thing that accounts for the liv-
ingness of a living cell, the emergent outcome of 
relations-making in the structured forming of the 
field that is the cell. Perhaps this is what is 
called living spirit, the thing that makes the opera-
tional difference between life and death in man--the 
center of emergence that is the resultant of all else 
and the secret to awareness of the ways by which many 
things come to be one living thing. 
This is something the artist has a chance to know as he 
becomes aware of the process of his own creation. It is 
in the nature of his work that he compose the many into 
a living one. From hundreds of brush strokes he is 
to make a painting; from thousands of words he is to 
make a novel.. It is not the specific colors and 
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shapes for his canvas or the specific words for his 
novel that he is to fix uponJ rather it is the larger 
involution to which he gives himself and through which 
his specifics come to be instrumental. It is the 
ordering of the experience that gives the painting or 
novel its unity and its vitality. The specifics are 
suggestive. Communications comes in the felt-relations 
that extend beyond. (1955, pp. 12-13) 
"Vital energy seeking opportunity for effective expression," 
this, Dewey (1944, p. 72} says is the very essence of educa-
tion. When he speaks of experience as the means and goal of 
education (Dewey, 1938) he is speaking of the condition out 
of which all form emerges: 
Interaction of environment with organism is the source, 
direct or indirect, of all experience and from the 
environment come those checks, resistances, further-
ances, equilibria, which, when they meet with the 
energies of the organism in appropriate ways, constitute 
form. (Dewey, 1934, p. 147) 
All experience yields new information and thus iri-forms us 
(Mooney, 1976). Our very identities are created by the 
same exchange of energies that brings into existence a work 
of art. P. Berger (1963) writes, with regard to the trans-
formability of the self, that we can know ourselves only in 
relationship: 
Looked at sociologically, the self is no longer a 
solid, given entity that moves from one situation to 
another. It is rather a process, continuously created 
and re-created in each social situation that one 
enters, held together by the slender thread of memory. 
(p. 106) 
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If the process of self and the process of art are seen within 
the whole process of life as "movement in relationship" 
(Krishnamurti, 1985), then the question of whether or not 
one can influence the other no longer needs to be asked. 
What does need to be asked is how we might make connections 
between the creative process and the way we live our lives 
more conscious, so that our participation can become more 
responsible (see Barfield, 1965). 
Art as meditation returns to each of us, Fox claims {1983) 
responsibility for the images we believe in (p. 194), it 
presumes trust--"a trust that out of silence, waiting, 
openness, emptiness one can and will give birth to images 11 --
images we need if the people of our society are to come to 
shared truth (p. 193). Fox presents this revelation from a 
student of painting as meditation: 
I am beginning to respond to an inner "drive" within 
me that is very old; it is inscribed in my archetypal 
depths. (John Mix in Fox, 1983, p. 196) 
James (1972) notes the importance of silence in "being with" 
rather than merely "naming'' such an experience (p. 121). 
Richards (1964) says that, "As we grow quiet, our love 
rises. We need only to get out of its way" (p. 70) ~ Fox 
(1983), that allowing "silence to be silence 'lets our 
truth' be" (p. 193)--lets us know and live into its existence. 
I believe in this way art as meditation brings to conscious-
ness the connection between imagination and identity at a 
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level which empowers us to manifest that identity. There 
are other ways art educators have tried to promote visual 
thinking, Arnheim's for instance (1969, 1986}. His emphasis 
on establishing criteria for visual literacy, as Lanier's 
(1986) for aesthetic literacy, is highly analytic. Robert-
son ( 1982) suggests archetypal images to her students. 
have tried that and found the results to be compelling, as 
she predicts, but felt uncomfortable about prescribing an 
experience at this level for the sake of having interesting 
paintings to display. That is not all Robertson advocates; 
she is concerned with a deeply felt process, too. I am just 
skeptical of the Jungian base :involved {Jung, 1923, 1953, 
1957): I worry about imposing the limitations of this partic-
ular psychology onto the process of symbolization. 
Art as meditation, as I have experienced it and as Fox 
(1983) represents it, allows images, symbols, pictures to 
emerge out of trust in their source. There is no definition 
of that source as absolute truth. I believe this increases 
both our freedom and our responsibility to manifest partic-
ular, contextual truth (see Welch, 1985). "To live artis-
tically," Richards charges, "is to embody in social forms 
the unique individual and the intuitions of union" (1964, 
p. 94, emphasis mine). When there is a concept of the 
absolute imposed on doing art, this usually generates fear. 
It also clamps down on the creative process a sense of stasis, 
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a reluctance to let imagination create what has never before 
existed, to manifest an ongoing, growing truth. Even in 
art as meditation fear can be an obstacle at first. Fox 
(1983) relates this experience through the words of another 
student of painting as meditation: 
The first obstacle for me to face in my painting as 
meditation course was and is fear--fear of doing 
something totally new, fear of being inadequate and 
inept, fear of doing it "wrong," fear of not being 
in control of what's happening to me, and fear of 
facing myself. (Marilla Barghusen in Fox, 1983, p. 197} 
It seems the process of creating something new with art 
materials can be so intertwined with personal identity that 
one can become immobilized by the prospect of letting new 
images emerge (see Field, 1957). Richards (1964) addresses 
these questions to the creative process: 
Am I willing to give up what I have in order to be what 
I am not yet? Am I willing to let my ideas of myself, 
of man, be changed? Am I able to follow the spirit of 
love into the desert? To empty myse 1 f even of my 
concept of emptiness? Love is not an attitude. It is 
a bodily act. In my crisis of conscience I have to 
yield myself to the transforming condition of love. It 
is a frightening and sacred moment. There is no 
return. One•s life is changed forever. (p. 141) 
I suggest that this fear comes not from the change that 
occurs when we yield to relationship, but from fear of 
failure--fear that resulting changes will not meet with the 
arbitrary standards that have been imp.osed on us as abso-
lutes by prevailing institutionalized meanings and to which 
we have become habituated (see P. Berger, 1963). When 
allowed to take freedom and responsibility seriously in doing 
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art as meditation, perhaps we can learn to trust not only our 
relationship to material substance, but to other people as 
well. Once one has a different experience, free of unreason-
able expectations and the threat of failure, the possibility 
of having more creative experiences is powerful incentive 
to honor any opportunity to participate in authentic rela-
tionship. 
It is notable that, following the experience of fear, 
this testimony to the rewards of overcoming fear is given by 
the student Fox (1983) has introduced: 
Taking the risk to choose to let go and be vulnerable 
with watercolor, paper, and brush is leading me to try 
to take the risk to let go more and be more open and 
vulnerable in my prayer and meditation. This is 
because I found that I didn't die when I made that 
risk with paper, watercolor, and brush. To the con-
trary, I came very much more alive. (Marilla Bar-
ghusen in Fox, 1983, p. 197) 
In this way art as meditation serves a healing process, 
restores one to the whole. There is a wisdom to be learned 
from freely entering into dialogue with material that can 
inform our willingness to risk open conversation with other 
people: something does die--the very limitation our fear 
imposes on the possibility of union. Of why art is so 
powerful a form of healing when we allow it to serve inner 
truth, Fox (1983) writes: 
Neither the clay nor the piano keys nor the body in 
dance nor the colors in painting nor the back in massage 
will tolerate subject/object relationships. The holy 
matter with which all art instructs has a good opinion 
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of itself--no one instructs it in original sin ideol-
ogies--and as a result it demands relationships of 
equality. With:.clay and dance, music and painting, one 
actually learns the wisdom of fifty-fifty relationships, 
of give and take, of action and receptivity. Nothing 
less holds together. Everything less, all our attitudes 
of war and control over self or others or matter 
itself, is enervating. And fails to yield fruit. The 
word "craft" means power. The power that is practiced 
and refined in art as meditation is not and can never 
be power-over of a power-under; it is the ultimate 
affront to sado-masochistic relationships of power. It 
is power with. (p. 195) 
The process of interacting with materials can release the 
power of birthing (Fox, 1983) --the 11 passion to make and make 
again in a society that has enthroned unmaking or the making 
by others instead of making ourselves" (p. 195) .. 
Edwards' work (1979) in the area of healing dualistic 
thinking through the process of drawing--what she calls "draw-
ing on the right side of the brain"--serves also to overcome 
the harsh judgmental attitude most people have towards their 
own self-expression (see Fox, 1983). Edwards has developed 
a series of exercises that provide students with successful 
experiences in realistic drawing. An example of these is 
the assignment of drawing upside-down (see pp. 50-57 in 
Edwards, 1979). In this exercise, students are asked to 
turn a complex picture of a realistic drawing of a person 
upside down and copy it, line for line. The complexity, 
she believes, activates the right brain's ability to deal 
with part-to-whole relationships. Turning the picture 
upside-down, she claims, confuses and thus circumvents the 
--------------
left brain's tendency to reduce visual information to 
convenient labels for storage and expedient use. The 
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choice of a realistic drawing of a person is made because 
students generally build their belief that they cannot draw 
on previously unsuccessful attempts to render accurately the 
human figure. All of this conspires to allow the student to 
approach drawing wholistically rather than mechanically or 
naively. Regardless of questionable terminology and theory 
applied here, I see Edwards• purpose in using art this way as 
a radical departure from the art for art's sake--art for the 
sake of demonstrating certain standards of skill or expres-
sion--assignments typical of most art education curricula. 
I have experienced her exercises, and offered them to stu-
dents, as art as meditation. 
Nearly every detail of the drawing upside-down assign-
ment goes against the Creative Expression approach (see 
Hamblen, 1985) to teaching art. Even though Lowenfeld's 
stage theory reveals an overriding desire on the part of 
children in early adolescence to develop realistic drawing 
ability (see Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1982), insistence on 
developing self-expression at the expense of skill separates 
students from the external realities they need to deal with. 
The dangers of becoming too dependent on objects have been 
brought out in this study in many instances: reification, 
idolatry--these can easily result. But copying, whether it 
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involves rendering an image or nature realistically, is 
limited by its misuse. I believe it is just as abusive to 
forbid children to copy at all as it would be to restrict 
art experience to a kind of photographic realism. Encourag-
ing overdependence on uniqueness interferes with the devel-
opment of integration and carries with it the opposite 
danger--that of becoming too subjective to interact crea-
tively with the outside world. 
Edwards has also been criticized for claiming to be 
scientific when there is no empirical evidence of correlation 
between split brain research and the "perceptual shift" 
from left to right modes of awareness she (1979, pp. 56-57) 
says her exercises can induce {see Youngblood, 1980). She has 
been accused, too, of actually perpetuating dualistic think-
ing by exhibiting a bias towards the right side (see Young-
blood, 1983; Clare, 1983) and even fostering a kind of 
artistic elitism based on right brain thinking (Youngblood, 
1979). In my own experience, however, from both partici-
pating in Edwards 1 exercises and asking students to do so, 
this approach "worts• whether it can be explained in instru-
mental terms or not and serves the purpose of integration, 
not further fragmentation. I experienced them as an oppor-
tunity to develop skill in a wholistic way and they certainly 
appeared to meet my students 1 need to experience a sense of 
efficacy and their need to open up to the dynamics of rela-
tionship in visual expressions. 
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I believe it is the pressure placed on art educators to 
justify aesthetic involvement in technocratic terms that 
explains Edwards' apparent contradictions. It is interest-
ing that she is caught between taboos--one forbidding edu-
cators to develop curricula on any basis but data obtained 
through empirical research and the other forbidding artists 
to admit to so "objective" a concern as skills development. 
I have already dealt with problems inherent in approaches to 
art education based on technological rationality--the reifi-
cation of aesthetic response in discipline-based art educa-
tion, for instance. Here there is also revealed the disso-
nance created by artists' shame over relying on anything 
other than sheer talent. In Edwards·• attempt to 0 play both 
ends against the middle, •• she could either be read as too 
scientific or not scientific enough, as too aesthetic or 
not aesthetic enough. It is her purpose that matters to me, 
however mixed her justifications might be. 
In theory the perceptual shift of which Edwards speaks 
could be seen as maintaining a sense of left-right dualism, 
but in practice I experienced it as a movement in relation-
ship, a blending of thought that enabled me to experience 
part and whole seemingly at once. As for an elitism built 
on right-brain thinking, that would defeat Edwards' overall 
goal of wholism. Finally, as for her crossing over the "line 11 
between aesthetics and technology to make use of copying, 
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this is done in a way that actually serves integration of 
the two. 
Edwards never suggests that copying or realistic 
drawing should take the place of giving birth to our own 
images; she only asks that their usefulness in developing 
both wholistic perception and technical skill be recognized. 
It is ironic that drawing from life or from the life in 
another • s drawing should, in modern times, be considered too 
literal, while abstract and "non-objective" art objects 
require lengthy verbal explanations if they are to be under-
stood at alL Wolfe's (1975) feigned surprise at this 
realizaton in The Painted Word made sense of the dissonance 
I experienced throughout undergraduate school when I was 
asked to take "modern art" so seriously: 
What I saw before me was the critic-in-chief of The 
New York Times saying: In looking at a painting-
today, "to lack a persuasive theory is to lack some-
thing crucial.'' I read it again. It didn't say "some-
thing helpful'1 or "enriching" or even "extremely val-
uable.•• No, the word was crucial. 
In short: frankly, these days, without a theory to go 
with it, I can•t see a painting. 
Then and there I experienced a flash known as the Aha! 
phenomenon, and the buried life of contemporary ar_t_ 
was revealed to me for the first time •••• 
All these years I, like so many others, had stood in 
front of a thousand, two thous.and, God-knows-how-many 
thousand Pol lochs, de Koonings, Newmans etc ••• ] , 
now squinting, now popping the eye sockets open, now 
drawing back, now moving closer--waiting, waiting, 
forever for--it--for it to come into focus, namely, 
the visual re"Ward (torso much effort) which must be 
there, which everyone ( toute Ie monde) knew to be 
there •••• 
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All these years, in short, I had assumed that in art, 
if nowhere else, seeing is believing, well--how very 
shortsighted! I had gotten it backward all along. 
Not "seeing is believing," you ninny, but "believing 
is seeing,'' for modern art has become completely 
literary: the paintings and other works exist only 
to illustrate the text. {pp. 4-6) 
Interpretation is not really this simplistic--believing .!.§_ 
seeing--but seeing is also believing--the danger comes in 
thinking dualistically that ei'ther one or the other must be 
true. It is the healing of this split that I have exper-
ienced in art as meditation. I find it remarkable that 
Edwards' copying exercises can offer insight merely going 
"into oneself" and abstracting one's subjectivity may not. 
In her late work, an explorati.on of the creative 
process, Edwards (1986) writes of how the dialectic involved 
in drawing from life can be seen as a dialogue between oneself 
and the world: 
Drawing gives one a feeling of power--not power over 
things or people, but some strange power of understand-
ing or knowing or insight. Or perhaps it is just the 
power of connection itself: through drawing, one 
becomes more connected to things and people outside 
oneself, and perhaps it is this strengthened connection 
which seems to signify personal empowerment. 
In drawing, there is always the sense that if you can 
just look closely enough, see deeply enough, some 
secret is going to be revealed to you, some insight into 
the nature of things in the world • 
• . . Drawing and creativity are both replete with 
paradox .... By looking outward and seeing the world 
around you in the artist's mode of seeing, you gain 
insight into yourself. Conversely, by looking inward 
to find the artist within, you gain insight into the 
world. These paradoxical insights, I believe, form a 
basis for wonder and lead one toward further creative 
endeavors. (p. 231) 
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From this we see that, despite earlier justifications that 
can be held in question, Edwards' use of drawing is quite 
holy. By coming to her defense, I do not mean to imply that 
the verbal explanations we give for our purpose are l,mimpor-
tant~ Art as meditation, while it avoids dependence on 
words, is not devoid of the need for verbal presentation and 
reflection. 
At one level it is simply a show of the teacher's 
respect for her student when she "names the game," as Mac-
donald (1966) puts it. The quality of a learning experience is 
highly dependent upon the atmosphere in which it is offered. 
If one purpose of an assignment is to work with art materials 
as a way of relating, I believe this aim should be made 
explicit and discussed openly, both before and after the 
experiencee Franck (1973), for example, speaks at length 
"from the heart 11 about how drawing as meditation has become a 
personal way of relating to himself and the world and of how 
he has known other students to experience a similar sense 
of movement in oneness, then invites dialogue on this before 
students actually begin the process of drawing. Students 
find out what they might expect from the experience, what 
the instructor would like to share with them through offering 
the experience, but they are not told ~ experience any 
particular thing will be a sign of success. On the contrary, 
the very emphasis on honoring one • s personal interpretation 
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is made from the beginning. In this way an assignment can be 
seen as possibility, not prescription. 
The "silence" that the leader in art as meditation allows 
11 to be silence" (Fox, 1983, p. 193) is not necessarily the 
absence of speech but an attitude of openness and trust. 
Fox (1986b) has spoken of art as a "ritual of relationship; •• 
if I am to offer such a ritual to my students I must recognize 
my own participation in it. Greene (1985) has warned educa-
tors of the stereotype that must be overcome if we are to 
share in a meaningful event with students, reminding us 
that the very presence of teachers in the public schools 
can make students feel ashamed, make them fear saying who 
they are, where they are as human beings. Shor ( 19 8 0) 
believes there must be a "withering away of the teacher" 
(P. 98) for students to feel empowered. This withering away 
is not abandonment, but a withdrawal of prescriptive monologue 
on the part of the teacher so that dialogue can take place. 
If dialogue is not allowed and, possibly, even if it is not 
emphasized and explored, by both teacher and students, as 
a goal, it is unlikely that art as meditation will be per-
ceived by students as anything more than a cute little 
trick, at best~ at worst it can be seen as an extension of 
the teacher's power to manipulate into the deepest level of 
a student's life. 
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One can all too easily deal with a holy symbol in an 
idolatrous manner. There is a vast difference, for instance, 
betwee~ Arnheim's (1982) portrayal of "the power of the 
center" as a useful technical device and the Arguelleses' 
(1972} presentation of many ways in which the symbolism of the 
center can be a dynamic force in relationship, not just 
within art but within our lives; in Arnheim, technique is 
analyzed and imposed, in the Arguelleses' work it is allowed 
to emerge. With regard to the act of centering in art as 
meditation, the same difference could occur, depending on the 
degree of prescriptiveness and that of possibility determined 
by the teacher. James (1974), Macdonald (198la), Richards 
(1964), and Fox (1986b) all speak to the need for teachers 
to be involved in making art for the purpose of centering 
themselves and thus becoming a more centered presence in the 
lives of their students. The distinction between making an 
offering of experience and imposing unjust limits on students' 
interaction with the world is understood by the teacher at 
the level of her own awareness of being in relationship to 
a larger whole. 
Art as meditation is primarily a use of art in the 
studio. Drawing, painting, print making, sculpture, crafts--
all the media generally included in studio instruction--have 
potential for this kind of use. Art as meditation emphasizes 
quality of experience, but information about skill and 
176 
techniques is not ignored: it is, instead, handled in a 
wholistic way. Information receives more emphasis in art 
history and art theory. The quality of experience is impor-
tant in those areas, too, though. In considering this, I 
will be discussing how the teacher's presentation of infor-
mation affects the way students are encouraged to orient 
themselves toward cultural substance, much in the same way 
her offering of experience affects the student's relationship 
to material substance. A meditative attitude, one of open-
ness and trust, is not put aside, but may be even more impor-
tant to the student's pattern making than it is to their 
making art. It is to the need to order information in a 
sacred way that I now turn. 
Art as Pattern Making 
In viewing art as pattern making, I refer to the way we 
know and tell symbolically--how we order experience in thought 
and action (see Macdonald, 1978b). A part of this involves 
receiving information; another, the way we respond. This 
affects the presentation of art history and art theory and 
the expectation on the part of the art teacher that students 
will communicate through the visual representation of symbols 
in producing works of art. 
Much has been written in this study about reification, 
but in order to discuss art as cultural substance I want to 
extend this consideration even further. Williams (1961) 
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reminds us that knowledge and symbolic representation of it 
is socially created and constantly being reinterpreted. Any 
"history'' is a partial selection of interpreted information; 
it is a description of reality, not "the" reality itself. 
An illustration of how open events are to interpretation is 
Mohr's (in Berger & Mohr, 1982) use of photography in "What 
Did I See?• (pp. 41-57}, a personal experiment he conducted 
involving his own photos and other people's interpretations 
of them. Mohr showed fiv.e photographs to nine different 
people and asked for an interpretation of each event depicted, 
resulting in nine different stories, none of which told what 
had "really" happened. A striking example is the difference 
between what was happening in the first photograph and the 
interpretation of the men depicted--particularly of his emo-
tional state.. We think a photograph "captures 11 what is 
really 11 there 11 and we think we can tell from a facial 
expression and body posture the emotion a person is exper-
iencing. Of this photo of a man standing on a platform with 
his arms spread wide and an apparent smile on his face, 
Mohr writes: 
It was a foundary in West Germany. I was photographing 
a Yugoslav worker for a reportage made for the Inter-
national Labour Office. A Turkish worker nearby, seeing 
me, shouted out: "So there are only Yugoslavs here! 
Me, I don't exist!" Yes, he existed too, and I took 
his picture.. (Mohr in Berger & Mohr, p. 48) 
Not one of the nine interpretations report anything close 
to the man's exasperation. Instead, the man is seen as 
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joyous, proud, happy, healthy, cheerful and noble. It is 
amazing how much context, too, is given by each person asked--
time, place, as well as the man's emotional state and social 
status is assumed from the photograph. Even Mohr's choice in 
taking this particular picture is an interpretation. His 
sympathy with the man's sense of alienation, his desire to 
affirm the man's humanity, to honor his existence--all these 
responses to the event made it worthy of Mohr's artistic 
expression. A moment earlier the man might have simply 
been bending over to pick up a box and been overlooked 
entirely. Even my interpretation here is colored by what 
know of his co-author's political beliefs and the connections 
J. Berger seeks to make between man and man through his art, 
both understandings gleaned from other sources (J. Berger, 
1972, 1985). 
w. Thompson (1981) believes history is so inextricably 
bound to the stories we tell ourselves about our being in the 
world and moving through time that he makes a distinction, 
not between myth and history, but between myth as sacred 
history and 11 the lie commonly agreed upon" (p. 247) as history 
misused, profaned by technological rationality. The history 
we are all taught in school, according to w. Thompson (1981)--
the succession of kings and empires, technologies and wars--
is a partial history used as the apology for a class of 
behavioral and political scientists who hope to build power 
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over nature and culture, a rewriting of history for the 
purpose of bringing it under their control {p. 247). It is 
not my task here to go into how art history might have been 
revised in this way, but to be conscious of the overall 
tendency of our culture's technological rationality to 
declare and use knowledge of past events as objective fact 
and the hope that an aesthetic rationality can restore 
balance. 
When I first began to teach art history, I taught it 
as fact. Students had to take Gombrich's (1978) word for 
how and why certain works of art carne into existence, for 
when people began to use certain techniques, because his 
The Story of Art was the textbook we were issued. There was 
never any question as to why the particular works with which 
we were to become familiar were considered representative of 
the best a time and place had to offer 1 they were simply 
there in the book and that was supposed to be reason enough. 
It was not until I was faced for several years with stu-
dents 1 apathy toward the art history part of the curriculum 
that I began to feel like a liar when I presented it, and 
even then the sense of lying was from making empty justifica-
tions for why they should know the information, not because 
I had any suspicion that Gombrich 1 s was ~ story rather than 
the story of art. 
Students who enjoyed studio work and whose company I 
generally found delightful would turn into pouters and 
----------
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rebels when the art history book came out. After justifica-
tions like, "You're going to need this for college"=- fell 
flat, I tried to simplify the information--re-wrote parts 
of the book to make it easier to read, provided outlines and 
so on. My approach was almost totally instrumental. Because 
the information had never been 11 made interesting'' to me, I 
never learned how to do that for others. I saw it as facts 
and figures, names and dates to be managed because that is 
just what students and teachers ~ in school. Making board 
games and card games for learning information about differ-
ent periods of art history was as innovative as I could get 
at that point. I had majored in art education for the same 
reason my students took high school art: I thought it could 
be fun. After tolerating art history classes for four years 
in college, I knew I was supposed to take it very seriously 
to be considered professional, but beneath it all I felt just 
the way my students did--it was the "work" end of the deal, 
the price one paid for getting to "play" the balance of the 
time. 
Eventually I did become interested in history, once I 
began to study the work of critical theorists. When I started 
to see the way in 'which man makes history, I became excited 
about it. I began to see myself as a part of on-going 
schemes and I really wanted to understand where I fit in, 
how it all affected my life--not just the way it affected 
me materially, but the way it had the power to "make me who 
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I am." I felt if I could understand that power, I could 
use it to effect change. I did not then like who I was. 
hated the compulsion to try to get people to do the "right" 
thing, including myself, in order to feel comfortable--to 
feel my life was going the way it was ''supposed" to be 
going. I felt ashamed of telling my students what to do, 
what they should believe is important, when I was not even 
happy with this way of living myself. 
As a result of beginning to feel free to interpret art 
history, I began to look at it through various lenses--
capitalist, Marxist, Freudian, Jungian, Christian, Jewish, 
etc.. In my teaching, I began to ask questions about the art 
history textbook that encouraged students to investigate 
various interpretations. I was not as free at that point as 
I thought I was. I was bound to certain frameworks that took 
a lot of explanation and went "over the heads 11 of most of my 
students. Some good things came of this, though. At least 
I started having students deal with the information in dif-
ferent ways--both from varied points of view and, most impor-
tantly, together. I let them work in groups most of the time 
and even "take tests,•• which were really "open book" research 
projects, in pairs. The students did cooperate more, but I 
think it was mostly because they felt they were being 
allowed to "cheat.•• The purpose was still to get the infor-
mation across~ encouraging varied interpretations really 
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just made it more palpable. I felt so much anxiety over 
"covering•• the material that could not trust students to 
respond in their own way to the entire endeavor. 
A sacred use of art history would place the emphasis 
on pattern making as a creative process. I have to admit to 
the temptation to deal with 11great works" by 11great artists 11 
in an entirely critical manner. There is so much demysti-
fication required to open the student's way to dialogue with 
tradition in art. For the most part, art history appears to 
exist to promote a certain cultural standard {see J .. Berger, 
1972), one that is highly elitist in nature. Developing a 
critical consciousness of the way in which "fine" art serves 
that purpose--its use as cultural capital (see Freire, 
l982r Giroux, 1981}--is necessary if students are not to 
feel ashamed of their own nlimited 11 ability and reluctant to 
express their own meanings through visual symbols when faced 
with such a highly exalted tradition. Recalling Ricoeur 
(1976a, 1978), however, demystification is not enough. To 
dismiss the symbolic content of traditional works on the 
basis of idolatrous use would cut us off from the meaning of 
the symbols themselves, keep us from re-discovering their 
origins in human intention. 
11Traditions are a product, 11 Gablik (1984) writes, 0 0f 
the recurrent affirmations that have gone into their prac-
tice." Moving out from under the control of reified knowledge 
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cannot be achieved by seeking complete freedom from the 
store of information it holds without alienating us from the 
dialectical nature of our being: 
To be located in nature as human is to be located 
historically, living out of the past through sensibility 
to the present into the creative possibilities of the 
future. The originary disclosures of the symbolic 
heritage come to be in this artistic process, under-
going transformative renewal as they are creatively 
appropriated. Winter, 1981, p. 109) 
Pattern making involves encountering cultural data in a 
relational way--creating order by making meaningful connec-
tions. In the creative process choices are made that neces-
sarily preclude some possibilities so that others may become 
realities, but those choices are made from realities that 
have previously existed, not in a vacuum. It is the attempt 
to do away with all sense of tradition and "start from 
scratch," that Gablik (1984} identifies as the "failure of 
modernism" in art (p. 117). The "escape" from tradition 
simply became the next tradition. Just as imagination and 
creation are constantly moving the individual forward in 
everyday life, collective vision and cultural transformation 
operates in the movement from tradition to tradition. 
Winter (1985) writes: 
Art and tradition live in tension but not contradic-
tion. Every work of art, unless it is mere imitation, 
involves a negation of what has gone before in selec-
tion, perspective or subject matter. At the same 
time, the work builds on the heritage of works and 
craftsmanship. (p. 128) 
--------------
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I believe students might better understand this relationship 
in the context of telling their own stories through visual 
symbols. Whether in presenting information about art his-
tory--works of art characteristic of a particular period, 
theme or artist, or art theory--the various styles or tech-
niques used for certain purposes or to achieve certain visual 
effects, or studio art in which visual communication is the 
goal, it makes sense to again "name the game" (Macdonald, 
1966). Explicit explanation of the creative process, of the 
dialectic between the individual and tradition, of students' 
responsibility for their own pattern making of the social 
implications of communicating experiences--the discussion 
of these as a preface and conclusion to information or 
experience offered in an atmosphere of openness and trust 
should establish a relationship between the student and 
these processes. 
The important thing here for me is my own recognition 
of and respect for the student's need to make meaning of his 
life and to communicate that meaning. Offering information 
about traditions in art or providing the materials, time and 
space for symbolic expression with the spoken and lived 
understanding that the student has a right to his own 
responses, to make his own choices, honors, I believe, the 
natural process of making meaning in which we all participate. 
I have faith that interest and a sense of purpose will 
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emerge under these conditions. Of making the artist the 
subject of an art course, Greene (1978} says: 
So there should be choosing and participation and 
experience and the search for order in all the arts. 
And there is a need to push back the walls of time to 
comprehend developing traditions in their continui-
ties and discontinuities. Finally, each individual 
must somehow be liberated to transform her or his own 
reality, to become aware of her or his encounters and 
of what it means to be present in the world. Music, 
dance, and painting, if engaged in participatively and 
thoughtfully, can be distinctive in the confronta-
tions they make poesible and the personal possibilities 
they disclose. Only human beings can experience 
incompleteness, the gap between what is and what might 
be. Only human beings can fill the gap by moving out 
in search of meaning and transcendence, moving out to 
change their world. The focus must remain on the 
human being, on his or her achievement, his or her 
choice. (p. 209) 
Rather than feeling I have to "motivate" my students to 
respond to art, I believe young people are just waiting 
for authentic opportunities to make sense of their world 
at the level of both thought and action. I think they 
would welcome the chance, if convinced the teacher could 
really be trusted not to try to manipulate them 'into war-
shipping subject matter. 
It is When art, or any way in which we know--any body 
of knowledge--becomes separated from lived experience, 
from relationship to the student's need to order his exis-
tence, that students must be "motivated." The opportunity 
to make connections offers them a chance to heal this split. 
Often in a classroom in which students are required to 
deal with knowledge only at an abstract level, the teacher 
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will hear a student say, "Let's get real." I believe they 
mean it and that we desperately need to listen. Rebellion 
on the part of students is usually aimed at organization, 
not order. In the sense that knowing is stopped for the 
sake of revering a static form of knowledge, it is the one 
who insists on interfering with the movement in relationship 
of students • lives that represents a disruptive force; it 
is the teacher who creates disorder by denying the active 
nature of ordering experience. Too often I have heard 
teachers despair of trying to motivate their students and 
resort to blaming them for being superficial and lazy when 
what those students are resisting is a superficial, lazy 
way of knowing and using knowledge. 
"In a world like ours," Dewey (1934} writes, "every 
living creature that attains sensibility welcomes order with 
a response of harmonious feeling whenever it finds a congruous 
order about it" (p. 15). It is in our very nature, according 
to Beittel (1979), to choose the most beautiful way of knowing 
our world open to us. "We respond to that which is most 
radiant, full of presence, admirable, and desirable to us" 
(p. 51). This is Beittel's interpretation of the unavoidable 
connection between knowledge and human interests (see Haber-
mas, 1971). What is needed, I believe, is a move in art 
education from mystification of this search for beauty--from 
canned statements and abstract formulas for encountering 
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the beautiful, to the mystical--the unfolding revelations 
of beauty that the very ordering of our lives makes possible. 
we need to make open to our students a way to know their 
lives as part of a cosmic adventure (Fox, 19B6b). 
To encourage students to interact fully with symbols 
and use them for making their own meanings requires the faith 
of a mystic, I believe. It requires openness to the mystery, 
trust in each person's part in finding and revealing connec-
tions to transcendent reality and manifesting them in tim.e and 
space. The organization of knowledge at the expense of a 
growing order represents a lack of faith--the paranoia of 
which Fox (1986b) spoke when he described the kind of person 
who believes the universe conspires against him and thus 
believes that he must control it. "The mystic, too, believes 
there is a conspiracy, 11 Fox (19B6b) said, "but one in our 
favor." To allow art to be pattern making i~ to open ourselves 
to the wonder that "we are 'stardust '--loved from the begin-
ning," and to let education be "educing"--the drawing out 
of this radiance in the universe (Fox, 1986b). I turn now 
to art as an appreciation and celebration of that conspiracy. 
Art as Appreciation and Celebration 
I have written of art as meditation as a way of relating 
to the creation of our lives through relating creatively 
to material substance. I have written, too, of art as pattern 
making as a way of knowing cultural substance dialectically 
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and communicating that knowledge symbolically that participates 
in ongoing transformation of the human story. I have said that 
we not only must create and co-create as part of our nature, 
but that we tend to choose the most harmonious ordering--
the most beaut-iful way of interacting we perceive as open 
to us. This understanding from Beittel (1979) necessitates 
an appreciation of transcendent possibility--of being able 
to see beyond the limits of technological rationality--if 
we are to fully value and celebrate the truth of our ontology: 
that we in-dwell creating (p. 53). We must be able to per-
ceive and feel free to receive what Mooney (1967) refers to 
as "creation's blessing": 
Through many strokes of brush, or pen, or bow on violin, 
or many stones, or bricks or movements, we shape a 
lovely thing. Opened out to "~," we integrate "a 
living one" by what we do between our forming selves 
and medium, creating both ourselves anew and a new objec-
tive structure, which, given life to us, may then give 
life, in turn, to those who, viewing it, receive crea-
tion's blessing. (p. 277) 
Creation's blessing is the energy of life itself made conscious 
to the human mind: "life that knows it is living'' (see Franck, 
1973, p. 9). 
In a discussion of Schutz, Greene (1978) speaks of this 
type of awareness as an achievement of ful 1 attention to 
life and its requirements characterized by a sense of 11 Wide-
awakeness" (p. 42) as opposed to the sleep of mechanical 
reaction to outside limitations that comes from the feeling 
of being dominated and powerless in modern society. In her 
belief that "wide~awakeness ought to accompany every effort 
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made to initiate persons into any form of life or academic 
discipline" (p. 47), Greene {1978) cites the importance for 
teachers to be clear about how they ground their own values. 
One of the simplest, most direct examples of moral curricular 
decision-making I have ever encountered is the last line 
of a poem Richards {1964) wrote to her students: "I owe 
you life 11 (p. 99). One of the ways in which she carries 
out this curriculum is ''to keep wonder alive 11 in the pro?ess 
of teaching skills. 
After writing so much about the dangers of technological 
rationality, it may seem odd for me to now suggest that focus 
on the technical aspects of using art materials can be a 
holy undertaking--can deepen students • appreciation for 1 ife 
and give them a sense of celebrating its value. Noting that 
skill can be developed in a wholistic way through art as 
.meditation is one thing, but to zero in on technique may 
appear to be a return to fragmentation. I charge that this 
need not be the case. Remembering Dewey {1934}, that inter-
action is the source of all experience and thus of all crea-
tion in both art and life (p. 147}, how can we ignore man's 
fascination with the way things work? In advocating the 
healing possibilities of an aesthetic rationality (Macdonald, 
1978b} the intent is to understand and make wiser use of 
technology (Habermas, 1971), not to throw it out altogether. 
-----~-~~--~--- --
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Winter (1985) writes of the absurdity of excluding tech-
nology for the sake of art: 
The work of art does not dispense with materials, tools 
and crafts. It merely rearranges our priorities and 
sets media, materials, tools and crafts in proper per-
spective. Art uses the linearity of mechanism without 
surrendering to it. (p. 128) 
Richards (1964) points out that "craftsmen live with a special 
immediacy in the double realm of these concerns" (p. 10), 
they deal with both the questions of technique and those 
of meaning: 
Humanly speaking, there is no such thing as mere tech-
nique •..• "Skill 11 means discernment: an ability 
to distinguish one thing from another. • . • It is also 
closely connected with wonder. When we teach skills--
that is, whewn we teach the differences between things 
or stages in a process--it is our duty to keep wonder 
alive. (p. 89) 
In developing my own skill, often for the wrong reasons--to 
hide behind techniques, to avoid revealing the content of 
my imagination--one aspect has held throughout and that is 
my fascination for process. It still amazes me to watch 
paint flow from a brush onto paper, to see and feel what 
the pressure of my fingers does to clay and how that differs 
from using a wooden tool--from the feel of the wood against 
my hand to the increased detail the tool makes possible. 
Even while writing with a pencil 1 take a certain satisfac-
tion in thinking about what I have learned a pencil can do, 
the effects my use of it while drawing can create. There is 
a kind of respect involved here, a sense of intimacy in being 
••Jet in" on the mystery of how certain things work together 
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to make other things happen. This feeling of efficacy has 
nothing to do with how some end product might stand in com.: 
petition with other 'ones, it has do with discovery and coop-
eration. 
In his lecture to us last spring, Fox (1986b) urged 
us to understand the need for a trifold cosmology on which 
to base educationa 1 endeavor: the recovery of awe through 
science, the recovery of wisdom through mysticism and the 
recovery of art through doing art. Of these, it is science 
which gives us the information for wonder. 11Wisdom," Fox 
(1986b) said, "is to taste the wonder: sin is to ignore it.'' 
I have had students render to scale tiny man-made objects 
such as safety pins, paper clips, thumb tacks, rubber bands 
and straight pins--at first because those things were readily 
available and relatively simple to draw, but I stayed with 
this assignment because of students • responses. They were 
fascinated with both the objects and the process of drawing 
them. They realized how easy it is to take both man and 
nature for gianted and experienced the delight that comes 
from focusing long enough on one thing or one process to value 
it more fully than we generally do in everyday life. It 
was a celebration of life through becoming more conscious 
of a very small part of it, but that part reflects larger 
wholes in many ways. Some students spoke of the imagination 
it took for someone to have invented the safety pin1 others,_ 
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of the complexity of drawing a relatively simple object--
of the number of pencil techniques needed for portraying 
light and shadow, form and proportion, being comparable to 
those needed in more apparently complex drawing projects. 
Placing an emphasis on technique was not destructive of the 
meditative possibilities in drawing. The wonder of the 
objects and the skill it took to render them actually enhanced 
those possibilities. 
Broudy (1972) uses the term 11enlightened cherishing" 
(p. 6) to describe love of objects and actions and, while 
I would like to be able to use that phraseology for what 
it could mean to me regarding art as appreciation, I feel 
it necessary to distinguish my desire for students to celebrate 
life through finding value in focusing on objects and action 
(in the way I have just described) from Broudy's sense of 
"art appreciation" in general and "enlightened cherishing" 
in particular. According to Broudy, "enlightened cherishing 11 
involves loving certain objects and actions judged worthy 
by high standards set for aesthetic education--the sense 
of aesthetic education I have previously discussed as elitist 
and idolatrous. 11 Art appreciation" in this sense is educa-
tion to appreciate exemplars. Broudy (19 85) has brought 
such aesthetic education into the disciplined-based art 
education format I have presented in this study as an example 
of a curricular approach that makes use of a reified concept 
of art to serve art. 
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The distinction between art appreciation in an idola-
trous aesthetic model and art as appreciatiOn in a moral 
aesthetic approach is even more important in the student's 
encounter with art objects others have made. I have mentioned 
earlier, in one of my letters, the heightened appreciation 
for life that I feel when I see a sensitively crafted work 
of art. I want to qualify that statement by repeating the 
understanding I meant to convey of a love for craftsmanship. 
The felt sense of another artist's process, the sense of 
there having been a living, choosing, creating human being 
behind the object, someone who related to the material in 
a meaningful way that also relates to me--this is what I 
hoped to communicate. My own interpretation and not some 
particular standard is involved in my perception of a work 
as ngood.n It is this ri.ght to make one•s own meaning in 
viewing art that I would make explicit to students. Greene 
(1980b)· gives an account of how it is the experience of having 
done art oneself that can be a means of art as appreciation: 
Conscious of some of the choices they themselves have 
made in the course of shaping, improvising, composing, 
or narrating, students cannot but confront aesthetic 
objects with a quality of attention different from what 
they would have been capable of if they had not them-
selves experimented and explored. {p. 319) 
It is this quality of attention, in both doing and viewing 
art, that wakens us, leaves us more alive than we were before 
we encountered the object or the process involved. 
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Regarding Dewey, Greene (1980b) points out that he knew 
that 11 only through noticing, only through paying heed, can 
human beings make it possible for works to be" (p. 321). It 
is this sense of increasing the value of cultural substance 
by valuing it, of causing it to appreciate through our appro-
priation of its mea.ning that I wrote about in one of my let-
ters--what Gablik (1984) has spoken of as "recurrent affirma-
tion" with regard to traditions. I believe art as apprecia-
tion and celebration can extend the value we place on life 
with respect to the processes and products of man's appropria-
tion of nature--both its technology and its art, but I believe 
it can also extend the value we place on people. 
in figure drawing and portraiture I have had students 
spend a good deal of time drawing themselves and each other. 
It is surprising how little we may know of the details that 
make up our own bodies. Students have expressed wonder at 
the fact that there is a shelf-like rim along the edge of our 
eyelids. Thinking of the division between the eyeball and 
the lid as merely a line with eyelashes sprouting from it, 
they had not noticed any more to it than that. Surely, as 
high school students, they had looked in the mirror at their 
own eyes or looked into the eyes of other people, but in 
looking without "paying heed," as Greene (1980b, p .. 321) puts 
it, some of them really had not seen--did not know this detail 
about themselves. 
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I think it would be difficult to enjoy drawing someone 
without coming to love them, or to love them more than before. 
One student told me that, for her, drawing the human face 
is an act of prayer. She feels a constant sense of goodwill 
toward the person she is drawing. She described to me how 
she might have felt angry or indifferent towards someone 
before, but drawing the person--even from a photograph--put 
her in touch with his innocence anQ. his goodness. Cusick 
(1973) has found in an anthropological study he conducted 
in a high school near a medium size metropolitan area that 
some students are never noticed, never even spoken to through-
out the entire school year. Students go through the day 
as a crowd of people, but rarely do they spend much of that 
time interacting with one another in ways that allow them 
to truly come to know each other. Onder these circumstances, 
the opportunity to pay careful attention to one another, 
even honor each other through personal interpretation and 
expression in drawing--this is healing and holy. 
Drawing, painting and sculpture of the human face and 
form are not unusual occurrences in high sChool art classes, 
but it ll unusual for students to feel comfortable doing 
this kind of art. It is not, from what I have seen, because 
students lack interest, but because they would like so much 
to be able to render the human being realistically and are 
either not given a chance to do so (abstraction is often 
-------------------------· 
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the standard set) or are asked to do it within a context 
of criticism and mistrust. The fear of failure may not be 
caused directly by a demanding, prescriptive teacher--it 
may simply be the result of previous negative art experiences 
that have left the student critical of himself and doubtful 
of his ability. The opportunity to develop skill in this 
area in an atmosphere, not only of openness and trust, but 
active and constant encouragement, is needed--a show of 
appreciation for the student's ability and a celebration 
of his sense of efficacy. In such an atmosphere initiated 
by the teacher, students quickly begin to maintain that atmos-
phere themselves, to appreciate the process of each other's 
work and to celebrate each other's achievements--at least 
this has been my experience as a high school art teacher. 
Giving students the opportunity to work on projects 
together is an obvious way to enhance cooperation. For a 
long time I took this for granted, but as I saw the sense 
of community develop among students when we spent time on 
common products--results of skill and expression that everyone 
shared, no one person owned--! began to respect the process. 
I started out resenting the expectation that my classes would 
be responsible for practically every form of visual communi-
cation required by the school. we did the publicity programs 
and sets for school plays, the posters and banners for sports 
events, and decorations for seasonal band and music 
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performances and school dances. I had been trained in college 
to refuse such duties because they take time and energy away 
from the individual•s expression of original works, so at 
first felt guilty for not standing up for my "program." 
Later I began to feel guilty, too, for enjoying these projects 
so much. 
Students really gave themselves to group work. The 
se.nse of purpose in serving the school and the chance to 
socialize while accomplishing those tasks created a sense 
of family, made the art room a home base for many of my stu-
dents--one to which they would return throughout the school 
day to "pitch in• at lunch or during study hall, as well 
as before and after school. We experienced an everyday appre-
ciation for each other that turned our daily lives into a 
constant celebration~ The energy and excitement, the passion 
for living my students shared with me was unforgettable~ 
Doing art together gave us the context for developing 
the kind of human relationships that make one believe that 
anything is possible~ It is this kind of transcendent vision, 
not some esoteric fantasy world, that resulted from our doing 
art~ We learned from sharing information and experiences 
what each of us could contribute to the ongoing project of 
being together 1 we learned to be good to one another. Is 
this not the essence of imagination and the core of justice? 
Greene (1978) writes about an aesthetic literacy vastly differ-
ent from the idea prevailing in art education curriculum 
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theory that students should be able to break down visual 
information and use it as "language'' to speak visually for a 
certain standard of artistic excellencer she asks of the 
aesthetic encounter that it make us niore "capable of the 
excited and passionate absorption attentive perceiving makes 
possible" (p. 190}. Greene (1978) asks that art be used 
to aid the conscious creation of our lives: 
What is important is the effort to define a vision aild 
to work on giving it expression • • • to become per-
sonally engaged in looking, from an altered standpoint, 
on the materials of one's own lived life, and in imagina-
tively transmitting (from the fresh standpoint) the 
fragments of the presented world. (p. 187) 
In art as meditation, as pattern making, as appreciation 
and celebration, art serves life--makes more life from life--
brings us closer to harmonizing with the transcendent reality 
of which Macdonald and Purpel (1987) speak, Fox's (1986b) 
11 conspiracy in our favor. 11 
When through art, or any human project, a way is opened 
up for us to be more fully human, I believe something reso-
nates within each of us which draws us toward our sacred 
identity. The desire to extend the meaning of 1 ife through 
the energy of love is who we are and what we seek to manifest 
in the world. Apple (1980) has located the promise of resist-
ing oppresssive systems in "finding the spaCes where limits 
dissolve .. (p. 64). I believe life is too big, too full of 
energy and possibility to ever really be contained and, 
because of this, that a technocratic rationality can never 
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offer more than the illusion of control. However true it 
is that we can and have, out of our fear, imposed severe restric-
tions on the movement of life toward our sacz:ed identity, 
even the smallest recognition of our power to choose other-
wise opens our vision onto the vastness of transcendent real-
ity. Limits do dissolve when we focus, instead, on that 




I began my career as an art teacher with high hopes 
and aspirations, with a vision that I could help students 
to become more fully realized human beings through art 
experiences. What actually happened when I became a teacher 
involved the usual frustrations and disillusionments of 
beginning teachers--the pressures, strains, contradictions 
of real school _life--and later in graduate school r came to 
a deeper understanding of the cultural reasons for my inabil-
ity to attain my hopes. I came to know about alienation, 
reif ication, oppress ion and hegemony, and with that awareness 
came rage and even deeper frustration. 
I also, in the process of my studies, came to a deeper 
understanding of the human dimensions of our predicament--
that with the very realization that our culture contained 
contradictions, if not hypocrisies, came the crucial insight 
that these phenomena were human in origin--that they had 
been created. More specifically, I came to see the dialec-
tical nature of our created culture and with that the hope 
that comes from the possibility of de-construction and re-
creation. I came to accept the notion and concomitant 
responsibilities of co-creation, that I was not really alone, 
nor was I free to disaffiliate from my culture. The concept 
of co-creation came to be, therefore, not only descriptive 
but prescriptive for my further professional growth. 
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Because I saw in my understanding of co-creation the 
need for becoming more conscious of my own meaning-making, 
I have utilized a hermeneutic approach, viewing my personal 
and professional life experience with art as text for inter-
pretation. In the first chapter I came to accept the power 
of Ricoeur • s ( 1978a) notion of a hermeneutic of suspicion 
and affirmation, recognizing the need for both a critical and 
imaginative consciousness of problems and possibilities in 
curricular decision-making (Macdonald & Pur pel, 1987) • In 
the second and third chapters I approached the issues of rei-
fication and idolatry in knowledge in general, and art and 
art education in particular, from a critical standpoint but 
with the hope that such a hermeneutic of suspicion would lead 
from an investigation of the problems to insight toward more 
creative and responsible possibilities. It did; it led to a 
hermeneutic of affirmaton reflected in the fourth and final 
chapter. 
Now, looking back on this process, I have come to 
recognize my writing this dissertation as participation in 
the creative process--that the search for meaning has led to 
a manifestation of that meaning in the form of choosing and 
presenting a particular series of interpretations out of many 
possible ways of seeing our human project of co-creation. As 
such, let me end with Dewey's (1934) words on how such a work 
might serve to connect the point at which I find myself now 
to what lies yet ahead: 
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Art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in 
which the past reenforces the present and in which the 
future is a quickening of what now is. . . 
The past absorbed into the present carries on7 it 
presees forwaid. (pp. 18, 19) 
As move on, I take these understandings with me as a work 
of art in the sense that what we make of our lives from 
moment to moment is art. I take this experience, not as 
a basis for applying definitive statements to future concerns, 
but as meaning created in one moment of my life that can 
only continue to live as it is transformed in the next 
moment, as I make meaning of new experiences. 
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